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ABSTRACT
The purpose of the analysis is to make a theoretical contribution in two related 
fields of international relations research. Firstly, the concepts of complex 
interdependence and international regimes are critically examined with particular 
reference to the development of existing theories of regime creation and change. 
The role of organisation theory in encouraging the development of a new process 
based model with which to analyse the formation and alteration of international 
regimes is introduced.
Secondly, by way of an analysis of the failure of an armaments collaboration 
regime to evolve in the period between 1949 and the late 1960’s in the North 
Atlantic community of states, a vital component of the national security policies 
of the states involved will be studied from an essentially inter-organisational 
perspective.
The issue area of armaments collaboration, and the complex of actors involved, 
represent a real challenge to regime analysis and especially the assumptions which 
are inherent in the theory of hegemonic stability. The role of hegemonic actors 
in the formation and maintenance of regimes, and the implications of this for the 
armaments collaboration issue area, are particularly important in this regard. The 
study aims to highlight the extent to which the prerogatives of states and 
governmental actors in areas of "high politics" have been constrained by 
transnational activities or bodies.
The emergence of American dominance in the armaments collaboration issue 
area since 1945, and the prospects for a European alternative to such dominance, 
is one of the major foci of the analysis. The evolution, development and role, if 
any, of informal regimes in this area will be examined with particular reference 
for changing patterns in armaments collaboration between 1949 and the late 
1960’s.
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CHAPTER ONE
COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this analysis is to make a contribution in two fields of international 
relations. First it aims to critically examine the related concepts of complex 
interdependence and international regimes, and to suggest further development of 
existing theories of regime creation and change, with particular reference to the role 
of organisation theory in encouraging such development. Second, by way of an 
analysis of the failure of an armaments collaboration regime to evolve, a vital 
component of the national security policies of the states involved will be studied from 
an essentially inter-organisational perspective.
The choice of armaments collaboration as a case study is specifically designed to 
answer the criticisms of regime analyses which contend that high politics are outwith 
the rubric of international organisations.^  Armaments collaboration as an issue area 
exhibits impeccable high political credentials. In addition, by studying the complex 
of actors involved in the armaments collaboration issue area, by no means all of 
which are states, it is hoped that the development or otherwise of recognisable 
patterns in the field of complex interdependence, as well as regime formation, 
maintenance and change can be identified. As such, the study hopes to make a 
contribution toward the continuing debate on the utility of regime theories as modes 
of explanation in international politics.^
In its broadest sense, the methodology which will be developed in this study evolved 
from a concern with the pattern of relations between the United States and Western
2
See for example Christer Jonsson International Aviation and the Politics of Regime Change 1987, London: 
Frances Pinter, pp4 and 10 who notes: "Students of international regimes have sometimes been accused 
of selecting issue areas in such a way that their hypotheses are doomed to success. Realists claim that, by 
focusing on low politics issue areas, regime studies find trends toward interdependence which do not pertain 
to the high politics of security issues." ibid p4.
For a sample of the various shades of opinion on this debate, consult the special edition of International 
Organisation 1982, 36. This volume subsequently appeared in book form, See Stephen Krasner (ed). 
International Regimes 1986, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Europe in the area of defence cooperation. As a security community^  involving a 
considerable and pervasive degree of complex interdependence, yet simultaneously 
an association which has, apparently, failed to transform itself into the type of explicit 
regime able to complete with the power of states in a direct sense, the issue area of 
armaments collaboration and its complex of actors represent a real challenge to 
regime analysts. Especially important in this context are the assumptions which 
appear to be inherent in the theory of hegemonic stability. The first is that regimes 
are typically created by a single dominant power or hegemon, and the second assumes 
that the maintenance of regimes depends upon the continuance of the said 
hegemony.'^
The concomitant of these assumptions is that declining hegemonies produce weak or 
unstable regimes.^  This conclusion has important implications in the defence 
collaboration issue area, where the role of the United States as either a partner, or 
conversely a competitor, of her European allies, is directly affected by the level of 
perceived dominance or hegemony exercised by the United States. Following the 
work of Lawrence Scheinman,® the present analysis will attempt to provide insights 
into the role of transnational relations as a constraint on states and governmental 
policy, and test the validity of commonly expounded propositions about the role of 
transnationalism in relation to the armaments collaboration issiie area.^  The 
contention is not that regimes and transnational relations are synonomous, rather that
4
5
6
7
A term first used by Karl Deutsch in Karl Deutsch et al Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. 
1957, Princeton: Princeton University Press pp4-6. Barry Buzan People. States and Fear. 1983, Brighton: 
Wheatsheaf Books, defined as existing: "among independent states which do not expect or fear the use of 
force in relations between them." ibid pp 114-15. See also K J Holsti International Politics: A Framework 
for Analysis 1967, Englewood Cliffs, N J: Prentice Hall, particularly Chapter 16.
Robert Keohane After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 1985, 
Princeton; Princeton University Press p31.
R Keohane "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes 1967-77" 
in O. R Holsti et al (eds) Change in the International System 1980, Boulder Co: Westview.
Lawrence Scheinman "Security and the Transnational System: The Case of Nuclear Energy" in R Keohane |
and J Nye (eds) Transnational Relations and World Politics 1973, Cambridge Mass: Harvard University I
Press pp 276-99, especially pp 298-99. I
Scheinman’s analysis focuses on the issue of nuclear energy, the asymmetries between nuclear weapon and s
non nuclear weapon states in this field, and the interaction of private and public authorities. The basic ]
principles which Scheinman sets out however, might just as easily be applied to different issue areas such I
as armaments collaboration, refugees, telecommunications, air transport, or others. i
9transnationalism is a phenomenon which encourages regime formation. Whilst 
regimes presuppose a degree of transnational relations, such relations do not 
automatically signify the presence of a regime.
Among these propositions, three appear to be particularly pertinent. First, as the 
level of asymmetry (whether in goods, knowledge or influence) in a given issue area 
diminishes, the phenomenon of transnationalism becomes more evident. As 
Scheinman notes in relation to the nuclear energy issue area:
"The reduction of asymmetry reflects the successful dissemination of 
nuclear technology and the emergence of industrial and commercial 
interests which, within defined limits, exert their force and influence 
on the evolution of national and international nuclear transactions.
In relation to the potential for the establishment of a regime in the armaments 
collaboration issue area, the levels of asymmetry between the United States and her 
European allies will be examined, and any increase in transnationalism resultant from 
such change will be sought.
Second, a growth in transnational activities wÜl have a conditioning effect on 
governmental policies:
"As transnational activities have increased, the capacity of government 
to exercise unilateral control or predominant influence has 
correspondingly decreased.
The apparent failure of an armaments collaboration regime to develop will therefore 
be examined to ascertain to what extent, if any, the prerogatives of governments in 
an area of "high politics" have been constrained by transnational activities or bodies.
Third, intergovernmental organisations and multi-lateral mechanisms can evolve a role 
in a given issue area, by virtue of their ability to carry out functions seen as
ibid p298. 
ibid pp298-99.
necessary by all the actors involved, which no single actor is willing or able to 
perform. For example, Scheinman believes that the United States turned to multi­
lateral mechanisms such as the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) as a 
result of losing its initial preeminence in the field of nuclear energy. Having helped 
create such an organisation, the United States subsequently found itself constrained, 
"to assume responsibility for its survival and to take its existence into 
account when shaping national and international nuclear policy.
Once again, transnationalism is seen to be an indication of declining hegemony, but 
in addition, can directly affect national policy through the agency of organisations 
active within the area. Transnationalism can be regarded as a "coping mechanism" 
for a declining hegemon, which may or may not be characterised by creation of, or 
support for, international regimes within a given issue area.
COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE
The concept of complex interdependence received perhaps its most seminal exposition 
in the work of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. In "Power and Interdependence: 
World Politics in Transition"the authors set out, as the title suggests, to contrast 
the traditional realist model of world politics with an ideal model of complex 
interdependence. The transition to this new model necessitated an explicit relaxation 
of the assumption that states are the only units which can act in international politics. 
Rather a number of possible actors and connections are assumed.
"These (multiple) channels can be summarised as interstate, 
transgovemmental and transnational relations .... interstate relations 
are the normal channels assumed by realists. Transgovemmental 
applies when we relax the realist assumption that states act coherently 
as units; transnational applies when we relax the assumption that states 
are the only units.
ibidp299.
R O Keohane and J S Nye Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 1977, Boston: Little 
Brown.
ibidp25.
15
Complex interdependence theory then owes its existence to a dissatisfaction with the 
existing paradigms, and the search for an alternative mode of explanation for 
contemporary international affairs. As Coate notes:
"Generally, four traditions are said to have dominated the (global 
relations) field of study at one time or another in the last century.
These include diplomatic history (prior to 1914), political idealism (in 
the interwar period), political realism (1945 - early 1960’s) and 
behaviouralism (early 1960’s to mid 1970’s)."^ ^
The three basic referents of the state centric paradigm are held to be:
(a) nation states and their decision makers are the most important set of actors to 
examine, in order to account for behaviour in international politics,
(b) political life is bifurcated into "domestic" and "international" spheres, each 
subject to its own characteristic traits and patterns of behaviour.
(c) international relations in the struggle for power and peace. This struggle 
constitutes a single system and it entails a ceaseless and repetitive competition 
for the single stake of power. Understanding how and why that struggle 
occurs, and suggesting ways for regulating it is the purpose of the 
discipline.
As Coate notes however,^ ® this listing omits much which is influential in the state 
centric paradigm, perhaps the most basic omission is the uncritical acceptance that 
nation states act. Coate warns that:
13
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Roger A Coate Global Issue Regimes 1982, New York: Praeger, p20.
See for example Mansbach and Vasquez, who note that "These assumptions (on the basis of the realist 
paradigm) have provided a core of beliefs about world politics that has been shared by scholars as diverse 
as A F K Organski, Thomas Schelling, J David Singer, Inis Claude, Karl Deutsch, E H Carr and R J 
Rummel. To say that the realist paradigm has dominated the field means only that its three fundamental 
assumptions have been widely held, and not that there is no disagreement over various conceptual 
frameworks, theories or even methodology. Nevertheless, agreement on assumptions provide a cognitive 
map of the world that scholars are investigating, it informs them of what is known about that world, what 
is unknown and how to view the world if one wants to know the unknown." R W Mansbach and J A 
Vasquez In Search of Theorv; A New Paradigm for Global Politics 1981, New York: Columbia University 
Press, p5.
Idem
Coate, 1982 op cit p21
"the term nation state is nothing more than an analytical construct, a 
conceptual device used simply to supply order to our perceptions of the 
world around us. To attribute actions to such entities can be very 
misleading, depending on the nature of the question being asked.
While reification of such terminology need not always lead to Îanalytical disaster, substantial misrepresentation and misunderstanding
are very possible. " j
i
Other researchers, such as Mansbach et al^ * have discerned no less than seven basic I
assumptions underlying the state centric bias of the realist paradigm: !i(1) Global politics are based on the interaction of nation states, with states as both 1
the actors and targets of action. ;
(2) Each nation state is the "sovereign equal" of every other state. ;
(3) Each nation state is treated as if it forms a homogeneous political system with j
a central government controlling a domestic monopoly on the legitimate use |
of force. I
(4) Nation states are independent of one another, are indistinguishable from one i
another in a legal sense, and are subject to no higher earthly authority. Î
(5) Nation states possess exclusive control of an explicit range of territory and j
number of subjects; the world is divided into neat geographic compartments. |
(6) The foreign policy agents of nation state governments are the sole participants I
in world politics; all other groups make their presence felt through the
medium of these governments.
(7) Nation states are the secular repositories of the highest human loyalties. !
!
1At the risk of appearing hortatory, an analysis of the separation of social processes I
on the international level, which is engendered by this model, can be seen to commit |
the "sin of reification" mentioned by Coate above. Reality has been shaped to fit the j
Ianalytical preconceptions of the model. As a result international society is split into jIdiscrete levels of analysis, namely local, state and international, but also into distinct I
17
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ibid pp 35-36.
Richard Mansbach et al The Web of World Politics; Non-state Actors in the Global System 1976, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, p3.
functional areas such as politics, economics, ecology or security. This closed system 
approach prohibits any holistic treatment of international affairs.
The period since the mid nineteen seventies has, however, evinced a growing 
disillusionment with state centric paradigms, and the evolution of a new tradition in 
international affairs, commonly known as post-behaviouralist.^  ^ Despite the claims 
of behaviouralism or neo-realism to the title of saviour of the state centric paradigm 
by virtue of their introduction of scientific method, the attempt, however laudable, 
must be regarded as a stop gap or transitional phase before the evolution of a new 
paradigm. As Rosenau says, once a paradigm has begun to crumble, it is effectively 
beyond salvation.^ ®
PARADIGM SHIFT AND COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE
The post behaviouralist reaction to the shortcomings of the state centric paradigm, 
directly encouraged the development of the complex interdependence model, via the 
discussion of the significance of transnational relations. Instrumental in this process 
were the earlier works of Keohane and Nye,^  ^ and James Rosenau^ ,^ which 
justified the necessity for a paradigm shift with reference to the three main arguments 
put forward to support the continued utility of the state centric paradigm.^  These
19
20
21
22
23
See Coate, 1982 op cit p22. I follow Coate’s nomenclature in deference to his contention that the paradigm 
shift he discusses was not instituted by the behaviouralist traditions of the state centric paradigm, largely 
as a result of the non-contextual nature of most behaviourial research. As far as Coate is concerned, much 
of this "neo-behaviouralist" research is tainted by association with, and tacit acceptance of, the underlying 
political realism of the original state centric paradigm. The new tradition might be technically labelled 
surrealism, in that it is "beyond" realism. Bearing in mind the alternative associations of the term however, 
the epithet post-behaviouralist will be preferred in this analysis.
James N Rosenau The Scientific Studv of Foreign Policv. 1980 (Revised and enlarged edition), London:
Frances Pinter.
Particularly the essays collected in R O Keohane and J S Nye (eds), 1973 op cit. This collection originally 
appeared as a special issue of International Organisation 1971, Vol 25(3), under the same title.
See J N Rosenau "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R Barry Farrell (ed) Approaches to 
Comparative and International Politics 1966, Evanston HI: North Western University Press, pp53-92, also 
his "Introduction: Political Science in a Shrinking World." in J N Rosenau (ed) Linkage Politics 1969, New 
York: Free Press p2; and "Foreign Policy as an Issue Area." in J N Rosenau Domestic Sources of Foreign 
Policv 1967, New York: Free Press, pp 11-51. ;J
Both Coate, (1982 op cit pp 22-28) and Mansbach and Vasquez (1981 op cit pp 6-27) present critiques of 
the state centric paradigm. The former observed: "the post-behaviourial period represents a growing 
frustration of many scholars with the state centric paradigm for understanding contemporary global 
relations. Even with the methodological rigours of behaviouralism, the poverty of the paradigm’s III
8
justifications with their post behaviouralist critique are, according to Keohane and 
Nye:^ j
1. In direct confrontation with transnational actors, governments prevail jiTwo basic flaws can be discerned in this statement. First, the incidence of j
confrontations between such actors is relatively low, and second, governments |
cannot be regarded in every case as unitary actors. Rather they are distinct j
from the societies which they represent. In the former case Keohane and Nye 'inote that: I
"the question "who wins confrontations?" is insufficient. It j
focuses only on the extreme case of direct confrontation j1between a government and a non-governmental actor. Winning j
may be costly even for governments. Transnational relations 
may help to increase the costs and thus increase the constraints
on state autonomy. I
!and later: I
"more relevant than "who wins" direct confrontatioris are the j
new kinds of bargaining coalitions and alliances being formed |
between these actors and segments of governments and jIinternational organisations."^  ^ j
Curiously, Keohane and Nye fail to follow their critique through to its logical |
conclusion, which is that a preoccupation with state centric conflict- 
cooperation frames of reference ignores the vast majority of interactions which 
occur in world politics. A possible reason for this somewhat half-hearted |
thrust may be the rather uncritical acceptance that states as units can "act". iIAlthough Keohane and Nye explicitly state that transnational relations relax I
the assumption that states are the only units in world politics, they are still |Iregarded as central.^ J
assumptions for theory building inhibited substantial progress." op cit p22. 
Keohane and Nye, 1973 op cit pp 371-79.
^  Ibid p372 
Ibid p373.
^  Keohane and Nye, 1977 op cit p25
The second flaw in the realist defence regards the assumption that 
governments are unitary actors. As Mansbach and Vasquez note, this 
shortcoming stems from:
"a tendency to collapse the distinction between governments 
and the societies for which they are surrogates, a confusion that 
has been buttressed by an Ül-founded determination to compare 
actors on the basis of accessible quantitative national data, 
instead of elusive data that may be more relevant. Sovereignty, 
the concept still employed to retain the above distinction, is a 
legal fiction and asciiptive characteristic, not a descriptive and 
empirical one. Reliance upon it neglects the fact that not aU 
governments can control their societies.
Since the actors in international politics are variables within an open system, 
rather than unitary actors within a closed system of either domestic or 
international society, it is impossible to support the contention that 
governments are always unitary actors, are always in control of their societies, 
or that they are the only meaningful participants in the international system. 
This may be so under certain circumstances, but no fixed array of actors, 
defined by legal attributes, can be assumed to exist. Keohane and Nye’s 
analysis appears to tacitly endorse the reification that states have empirical 
referents.
2. Transnational Relations have always existed, and are therefore relatively 
unimportant in terms of understanding world politics 
While post behaviouralists do not dispute that transnational relations existed 
in the past or that they supercede interstate politics, they are believed to have 
a more important place in contemporary international relations than was 
previously the case.
"Transnational relations ... affect interstate politics by altering the 
choices open to statesmen and the costs that must be borne for 
adopting various courses of action. In short, transnational relations 
provide different sets of incentives or payoffs for states.
Mansbach and Vasquez 1981 op cit p8. Emphasis in the original.
Keohane and Nye, 1973 pp374-75
10
According to this analysis, contemporary transnational relations have assumed 
different and more important forms than was the case in the past. Primarily, 
this change reflects increased sensitivity of societies, based on the twin 
foundations of improved communications between states, and the fact that 
governments are now more ambitious in trying to control their economies. 
The effects of such interdependencies necessitates closer attention to, and 
involvement with, interstate politics, as governments attempt to deal with 
global trade, energy and security concerns.^ ®
A second reason for the heightened importance of transnational relations, 
especially in the field of economics, is that since transnational organisations 
are now much more influential and numerous than in the past, as contended 
above, individual loyalties may be divided between the state and other actors. 
This development does not infer that states are no longer relevant, nor even 
that they do not remain important, simply that they are not invariably pre­
eminent in every instance, and may themselves be subject to constraints.
3. Transnational relations do not affect high political issue areas.
This contention is particularly apposite in relation to the case study of 
armaments collaboration. It can, however, be criticised on the basis that it is 
no longer possible to draw sharp distinctions between areas of high politics 
such as military and security concerns, and issues of low politics such as 
economic policy or social welfare. Coate believes that:
"the state centric paradigm does not provide the flexibility 
needed to conceive of contemporary global decision processes 
in such a manner as to describe and explain adequately the 
underlying structural relationships and allocations 
processes.
By adhering to the high/low politics and domestic/international distinctions.
Ibid p375-76. Governments have, of course, always attempted to deal with such issues. The post 
behaviouralist view however, presupposes that states and their governments must deal with a vastly more 
complex external environment, and increased linkages between domestic and international arenas than was 
previously the case.
Coate, 1982 op cit p23.
11
analysts blind themselves to a wealth of detail and linkages which render such 
distinctions effectively meaningless. As early as 1970, Stanley Hoffman 
claimed that lines of demarcation between high and low politics were 
increasingly difficult to distinguish. He likened the role of transnational 
relations in issue areas to a related series of chessboards:
"for a variety of reasons (including .... new conditions on the 
use of force as well as economic enmeshment in an age 
dominated by technology) the competition between states takes 
place on several chessboards in addition to the traditional
military and diplomatic ones .....  These chessboards do not
entail the resort to force .... Thus "winning" presupposes the 
acceptance and mastery of considerable constraints. These 
constraints result either from the players own entanglement in 
the web or from the hazardous nature of the game on this 
chessboard over which the actor rarely has adequate control...
Not only does each chessboard have rules of its own which 
have often not been adequately studied, but there are 
complicated and subtle relations between chessboards. For 
instance, depending on the national situation a state may be 
able to offset its weakness on one chessboard thanks to its 
strength on another or else be prevented from exploiting its 
strength on one because of its weakness in another.
Further, domestic politics cannot be differentiated from international affairs 
on the basis of governments preventing domestic anarchy and retaining the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of force, since this is frequently not the case. 
Civil wars, terrorism, coups d'état, and communal violence testify eloquently 
to this phenomenon.
"Just as realism underestimated the impact of collaborative
32 Stanley Hoffman "International Organisation and the International System." International Organisation 
1970, 24: 389-413. Quote p401. Interestingly Keohane and Nye note that: "We find ourselves in a world 
that reminds us more of the extensive and curious chessboard in Lewis Carroll’s "Alice Through the 
Looking Glass" than of more conventional versions of that ancient game. The players are not always what 
they seem and the terrain of the chessboards may suddenly change from garden to shop to castle. Thus in 
contemporary world politics not all players on important chessboards are states and the varying terrains of 
the chessboards constrain state behaviour. Some are more suited to the use of force, others almost totally 
unsuited to it" (1973, op cit p379).
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arrangements in global politics, both formal and tacit, to 
allocate values peacefully, so prevailing approaches to domestic 
politics have overestimated the conflict management capacity of 
governments."”
The implication that domestic society is less structured and controllable, and 
international society less anarchic and uncontrollable than is commonly
supposed, is basic to the post behaviouralist paradigm. It also represents iiperhaps the starkest discontinuity from former models of international J
relations. I!i
This belief also highlights the continued implicit attachment of Keohane and 
Nye’s critique of state centric paradigms, to the centrality of states as the 
actors in world politics-even if only as the subject of constraints. Coate 
maintains that Keohane and Nye shore up the state centric paradigm while 
simultaneously attacking it, since transnationalism is seen through essentially 1
state centric lenses. • j
"The political activities of individuals themselves or individuals |
acting on behalf of non-governmental entities, when not 1
directly influencing national governmental actors, appear to be |
relegated to some subsidiary status .... the world politics !
paradigm proposed by Keohane and Nye while not inherently 
biased in this direction, contains components that aid in |
perpetuating such a state centric perspective. j
To be credible, a paradigm shift must represent a change in kind rather than j
simply in degree from previous patterns. A number of observations, which I
have an important bearing on how a new paradigm will be perceived, ought j
to be made, following from the discussion above. First, the contemporary I
international system is characterised by the existence of many autonomous |
iactors of various types, which interact in coalitions and networks of 
alignments which are diffuse, flexible and situationally specific. Second, the 
reification of the perceptual constructs known as states into actors in their own
”  Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981 op cit plO. 
”  Coate, 1982 op cit p24.
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right is a serious misrepresentation of the processes of world politics - it is 
persons who act, not governments, albeit that these individuals may act in 
specific roles such as governmental representatives.^  ^ Third, the actors in 
world politics are interdependent and unequal. Fourth, central governments 
do not invariably have exclusive control over their subjects loyalties, nor do 
they invariably prevail in conflicts of interests with non-state actors.^ **
The perceptual problem with state centric paradigms is summarised by Coate, 
who believes that:
"We have tended to reify our conceptual spheres of 
reference. Thus we have arbitrarily allowed our latent 
concepts (eg power, nation states, national interest) to 
assume positions of scientific fact or reality. Once we 
have moved beyond the spatial and temporal limitations 
of our traditional analytical paradigm, we should begin 
to perceive the global social order in a much different 
manner.
A post-behaviouralist paradigm presupposes moving the unit of analysis away 
from an over intense focus on states, to other less highly aggregated systems 
of actors. Within such systems, relationships between the various units wül 
be seen as variables rather than definitional parameters. It is, at best, 
intellectually suspect to see politics as stopping at the waters edge, where an 
analytically distinct phenomenon known as international relations takes over, 
simply by virtue of a national political and legal line of a quite abstract nature 
being crossed.
A person may be said to act in the name of a government, or on its behalf, but personality, attitudes and 
other factors such as situation, age, education and others will have an influence on the effectiveness of the 
operationalisation of state policy. As Snyder, Bnick and Sapin note: "State action is the action taken by 
those acting in the name of the state. Hence the state is the decision-maker". R C Snyder, H W Bruck 
and B Sapin (eds) Foreign Policv Decision-Making 1963, New York: Free Press p65.
These observations follow the work carried out under the "aegis" of the Non-state Actor Project (NOSTAC) 
which is discussed by Richard Mansbach et al 1976, op cit. See also Coate, 1982 op cit pp28-29.
”  Ibid p29
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Both Coate^ * and Mansbach and VasqnezP^  agree that a further important 
aspect of the post-behaviouralist paradigm concerns the authoritative allocation 
of values. This concept can be traced back to the work of David Easton, who 
defined politics itself as "the authoritative allocation of values.'"  ^ It is 
important in this context as a result of its intimate relationship with the 
discussion of political processes. By concentrating the analysis on the basic 
questions of how dissatisfaction is generated, and the political processes which 
respond to such problems, the analysis of international relations can be re­
orientated. Rather than viewing questions of conflict and cooperation, and the 
struggle for power as central (a view consistent with state centric, realist 
paradigms) questions relating to the allocation of values will be used as a 
focus. These analyse the participation of actors in the decision making 
process, expressing their many different types of relationships as variables 
rather than given parameters. Power and conflict are therefore seen as aspects 
of the political process, rather than as its focus.
Keohane and Nye contend that there are three assumptions which are central 
to the realist vision:
"First, states as coherent units are the dominant actors in world 
politics. This is a double assumption: states are predominant and they 
act as coherent units. Second, realists assume that force is a usable 
and effective instrument of policy. Other instruments may also be 
employed, but using or threatening force is the most effective means 
of wielding power. Third, partly because of the second assumption, 
realists assume a hierarchy of issues in world politics, headed by 
questions of military security: the high politics of military security 
dominates the low politics of economic and social affairs.
”  Ibidpp28-32
Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981 op cit. pp28-30
David Easton The Political Svstem. 1953, New York: Knopf, p50. Power is not the only influential factor 
in deciding conflicts over the authoritative allocation of values. The ability of objectively weaker actors 
to achieve their desired policy outcomes will be discussed in greater depth in the succeeding chapters.
Keohane and Nye, 1977 op cit pp23-24.
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In marked contrast, complex interdependence exhibits three main
characteristics:'^ ^
(1) Multiple channels connect national societies: consisting variously of 
interstate, transgovemmental and transnational relations. These 
channels represent successive relaxations in the parameters of the 
assumptions of the realist paradigm. The first assumes that the 
channels employed are those of the classic realist model, necessitating 
an acceptance of the state as an actor. Transgovemmental channels 
involve an acceptance that states are less coherent actors than strict 
realist theory would demand, but still assumes that the actors are 
government departments or agencies connected in an official capacity 
with government, departments or agencies connected in an official 
capacity with government, which maintain contacts with their
counterparts in other states. Transnational channels allow non-state
actors within the rubric, and represent the final relaxation of realist 
assumptions.
(2) An absence of hierarchy among issues: as a result of the blurring of
the distinction between domestic and international politics, the 
international agenda does not exhibit, as realists would assume, an 
ordered hierarchial structure, headed by issues of military security. 
Rather, international relations are characterised by coalition building 
both within and between governments, and across them, constructing 
different sets of agenda in response to linked issues.
(3) Military force plays a subsidiary role in settling most international
issues. International relations can no longer be seen as a ceaseless 
struggle for the single stake of power within a single system, 
especially in conditions of complex interdependence. Military force 
may still be utilisable in certain cases, but even in this event, it would 
tend to rupture other mutually profitable contacts between the actors 
concerned.
42 Ibid p24-29.
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The debate between proponents of realism and those of complex 
interdependence is far from settled/^ but one notable by-product of the 
argument has been, as Jonsson notes:
"the question of whether it is meaningful to speak of a single 
international system. A more appropriate conceptualisation might be 
in terms of multiple issue based systems.
According to Jonsson such a system would feature a unique cast of 
participants for each set of issues, with linkages as the result of either 
common participants or interdependence of issues, possibly both'^ .^ The 
emphasis of the post behaviouralist paradigm shifts, via its concern with 
complex interdependence, from a concern with actors to a concern with 
issues.
The classical billiard ball model of world politics characterises political 
processes as a function of the relative size and power of closed, impermeable 
systems, usually of state actors.'^ ® The post-behaviouraUst critique of this 
model however, necessitates an examination not only of the internal structures 
of the billiard balls, but to stretch the analogy somewhat, of the rules of the 
game itself. States can no longer be seen as the only, or for that matter 
invariably the most important, actors in the contemporary international 
system. Further, since states can no longer be fruitfully characterised as 
unitary coherent actors, or as closed systems within a single international 
system, the realist state centric paradigm can no longer be regarded as a 
useful guide to meaningful research."*^
Although the complex interdependence model may not, as yet, provide a
43 See Ray Maghroori and Bennett Ramberg (eds) Globalism versus Realism: International Relations Third 
Debate 1982, Boulder CO; Westview Press.
^  Jonsson, 1987 op cit p3. Emphasis in the original.
Ibid p3. See also D E Lampert et al "Is There an International System?" International Studies Quarterly 
1978, 22:143-66,
The billiard ball analogy is used by Jonsson, 1987 op cit p3 
See Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981 op cit pp3-13.
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viable alternative theory for the post-behaviouralist paradigm, the manifest 
shortcomings of previous models have served to make a new focus necessary. 
As Mansbach and Vasquez note:
"critics (of realist paradigms) have succeeded in making this case, and 
their arguments may be summarised as: (1) the realist paradigm has 
failed to account for and to predict recent political events; (2) it has
failed to guide adequately empirical research; and (3) research on
actors and issue areas has revealed that these two variables produce 
significant effects on behaviour.
In order to utilise the alternative, post-behaviouralist paradigm suggested by 
the complex interdependence model, the most appropriate research strategy, 
and the one which will inform this work, will be based on an issue centric 
approach. A particular concern will be the formation and change of those 
cooperative arrangements which have been labelled by political science as 
regimes. This is partly intended to examine regimes as theoretical structures 
in their own right, but also to ascertain whether, and to what extent, the 
armaments collaboration issue area exhibits any regime characteristics.
WHY STUDY ARMAMENTS COLLABORATION?
The issue of armaments collaboration, whether in its transatlantic or intra-European 
facets, has not been examined in any detail from a complex interdependence
viewpoint, despite apparently promising qualifications for such treatment. The
production of armaments is an important aspect in the economies of the United States 
and many Western European states. Expenditure on defence equipment supports the 
employment of hundreds of thousands of people, both directly and indirectly, sustains 
many commercial operations, provides export earnings for many economies, and 
accounts for large proportions of the expenditure of many governments. In addition, 
the defence sector has direct links with areas of high technology and research and 
development (R & D) seen as vital for the general economic well being of advanced
Ibidpl2
J
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industrialised societies/^
Further, armaments collaboration displays a wealth of linkages with areas of high 
politics, such as security and defence policy, as well as other areas such as economic 
policy, foreign policy, arms control and disarmament, and social welfare. 
Armaments collaboration is an issue area inhabited by a varied cast of actors 
including governments, their agencies, armed forces, commercial companies, military 
alliances and their sub-units, non-governmental organisations and individuals in both 
formal and informal capacities. Cumulatively these actors interact in an area which 
has direct and important effects on matters of high politics.
The use of armaments collaboration as a case study, avoids the criticism that studies 
of interdependence are "doomed to success" by virtue of their concentration on issue 
areas of low politics, which do little to disprove the utility of realist analyses, since 
they are regarded as peripheral.^ ® Examined in relation to the characteristics of 
complex interdependence outlined above, the issue area of armaments collaboration 
can be seen to exhibit a strong correlation with the major requirements outlined 
therein.
First, as has been noted, multiple channels connect the national societies involved in 
North America and Western Europe. More particularly with reference to the issue 
area, states are not the only actors involved. Second, the armaments collaboration 
issue area does not exhibit a hierarchic ordering of issues. Considerations of 
economics and politics are of fundamental importance in the formation of armaments 
collaboration policy both nationally and internationally. The relatively high levels of 
interdependence between the states involved, particularly in the case of Western 
Europe, means that national prerogatives (defined in terms of outcomes favourable 
to the state) do not always prevail. Contrary to realist expectations, the actors 
involved possess different and changeable agendas. These exhibit linkages with other 
issue areas and are characterised by intensive bargaining, coalition building and a
49 Supporting figures and comparative data will be presented at a later, more appropriate point in the analysis. 
See below, Chapters 5-8.
Jonsson, 1987 op cit p4.
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realisation that splendid isolation, although an option, carries heavy costs. Third, 
military force plays no part in settling problems inherent in the armaments 
collaboration issue area, as a result of the "security community" dimension of 
relations between the actors.
Issue areas which involve areas of high politics have seldom been seen as likely 
candidates for transnational analyses, especially within an essentially state centric 
paradigm. The production of armaments represents one of the most obvious and 
potent manifestations of national sovereignty, thus it is not entirely surprising that 
collaboration in the production of armaments across national boundaries has been one 
of the last areas to come under examination by students of transnational relations. 
It is basic to the realist paradigm that states retain a monopoly of the legitimate use 
of means of coercion, this prerogative being exercised via the instrument of armed 
forces and their armaments. Similarly, realism posits that the preservations of 
national security is one of the prime functions of the nation state. As Wolfers notes: 
"a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having 
to sacrifice its core values, if it wishes to avoid War, and is able, if 
challenged to maintain them by victory in such a war. This definition 
implies that security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to deter 
an attack, or to defeat it. This is central to the common usage of the 
term.
Realism, therefore, forged a direct and casual linkage between the preservation of 
national security and the ability to wage war successfully, or be sufficiently 
formidable to avoid attack in the first place. The capacity to produce armaments 
deemed necessary for the national defence, has long been regarded as an activity 
which only the state had the resources and, perhaps more importantly, the right to 
direct. The concept that any state should depend to a great extent on sources of 
supply outwith its own control was either unthinkable before the Second World War, 
or the extent that it occurred, a demonstration of military weakness.
Arnold Wolfers Discord and Collaboration 1975, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press pl50, see 
especially Chapter 10, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol" pp 147-65.
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The pattern of arms procurement in the pre-1945 period emphasised, wherever 
practicable, domestic development and procurement of weapons. Only during the 
Second World War did a gradual change in such attitudes begin to surface. It is 
prudent however not to overstate the implications of the exigencies of wartime 
cooperation, particularly between the United States and the United Kingdom, to the 
later development of transatlantic and intra-European cooperation in defence and 
armaments collaboration. The groundwork laid between 1941 and 1945 was not to 
be the basis for a lasting post war partnership. The remarkable mutual dependence 
between two sovereign states of world stature derived from the strategic necessities 
of total war. In the post war period, the competitive collaboration of the "special 
relationship" gave way to American hegemony, and a retreat into national armaments 
production and procurement. If nothing else however, the experience may at least 
have planted the seed for later propagation.
"By 1944-45 the balance of power and resources within the (Anglo- 
American) relationship had shifted to the USA. In 1944 America 
produced about 40% of the worlds armaments and in the course of the 
whole war she contributed to the allied cause a quarter of the 
manpower and half the munitions. The vast increase in war production 
was accompanied, uniquely among the belligerents, by a 12% increase 
in consumer spending. The USA enjoyed both guns and butter, and 
her wartime boom not only pulled her out of the Depression, but laid 
the foundations for her quarter century or so of post war industrial 
supremacy.
The emergence of American dominance in the issue area of armaments collaboration 
since 1945, and the prospects for a European alternative to such dominance, will be 
one of the major foci of this analysis. The evolution, development and role, if any, 
of formal or informal regimes in this area will be examined, with particular reference 
to changing patterns in armaments collaboration since the mid 1950’s.
The theoretical section of this analysis will therefore involve close examination of the
David Reynolds "Competitive Cooperation: Anglo-American Relations in World War Two" Historical 
Journal 1980, 23:233-45, p284.
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extent to which theories of regime dynamics are applicable to the armaments 
collaboration issue area, and whether the scope of regime dynamics can adequately 
account for the development and maintenance of the pattern of relations within the 
issue area in the period under discussion. The methodology outlined in the theoretical 
analysis will be applied through the case study of the failure of armaments 
collaboration in the North Atlantic area since 1945. Particular attention will be given 
to the perceived role of declining American hegemony, and its implications for 
regime formation and change in this issue area.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ANALYSIS
In Chapter 2 the concept of international regimes is introduced and discussed. A 
critique of the explanatory power of existing regime analyses will be presented in the 
light of the concerns of the armaments collaboration issue area. Chapter 3 will 
discuss the concept of hegemony, with particular reference to the posited decline in 
American hegemony in the past two decades. It will continue with an analysis of 
perceived episodes of regime change, discernible in the issue area.
In Chapter 4, the changes in the armaments collaboration issue area will be examined 
using the commonest extant models of regime dynamics presented in Chapter 2, in 
an attempt to judge how far such models can account for any perceived changes. The 
second section of the analysis will present a process based model of regime change 
to complement the largely structural models which have, heretofore, informed 
research into regimes. Chapter 5 presents this alternative perspective and the role of 
the process based model, emphasising the role of organisational analysis and the role 
of organisation theoretic concepts in the study of international organisations. 
Linkages both across national networks and between domestic and international 
networks of actors will be highlighted as an important aspect of the political process.
Subsequent chapters will apply this perspective in instances of regime formation and 
change in the North Atlantic armaments collaboration issue area. The conclusion will 
address the question of whether the failure of an armaments collaboration regime to 
establish itself can be better explained using a process based model than by extant 
theories, and to what extent the states involved are constrained in their actions by 
other inhabitants of the issue area.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
INTRODUCTION
International regimes have been at the centre of theoretical discourse and empirical 
research within the international relations community in the past decade. Interest 
stemmed from a generalised dissatisfaction with prevailing explanations of 
international order, and the development of trans-national cooperation, within the 
contemporary international anarchy. Despite a growing corpus of research however, 
relatively few attempts appear to have been made to assess the "state of the art", or 
even to examine regime theories in light of current insights into the interaction of 
domestic and international political systems.^  The most obvious explanation of this 
shortcoming lies in the continuing debate among political scientists as to the basic 
structure of their discipline. Although growing international interdependence since 
the end of the Second World War has generated forms of international cooperation 
which are novel and ill-suited to explanation by realist analysis, concepts of 
international society suffered by association with the doctrine of idealism, which was 
largely discredited by inter war appeasement.
It is important to note therefore that "the regimes literature can be viewed as an 
experiment in reconciling the idealist and realist traditions" in international relations.^  
The level of dissatisfaction with existing theories of international behaviour is 
reflected in the tendency of the literature to use the concept of regime as a theoretical 
cure all, to such an extent that the terminology has begun to lose any exact definition. 
Although early work on regimes focused on the centrality of non state actors, 
international organisations, growing interdependence and the greater variety of 
objectives pursued by international actors, more recent treatments have exhibited a 
growing state-centric bias. The theoretical risks of an uncritical characterisation of
2
See however, John Ruggie and Friedrich Kratochwil "International Organisation: A State of the Art on the 
Art of the State." International Organisation 1986, 40:753-56; Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons 
"Theories of International Regimes." International Organisation 1987, 41: 491-517. Alexander Wendt, 
although not concerned specifically with regimes, makes an important contribution in the area of examining 
the relationship between states and the international system in "The Agent-Structure Problem in 
International Relations Theory." International Organisation 1987, 41:335-70.
Haggard and Simmons op cit p492.
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states as unitary, rational actors capable of performing actions, were discussed in the 
previous chapter.
The reification makes it difficult to apply regime concepts within a post-behaviouralist 
analysis, due to the preconceived notions which separate the concepts of the 
international system, the state system and the domestic system into neat theoretical 
pigeon holes. In order to assess the utility of regime analysis in the study of 
armaments collaboration issue area, it is necessary to examine both the accepted 
definitions of regimes, and the major extent theoretical approaches to regime variance 
and change.
REGIME DEFINITIONS
The concept of international regime owes its early development to the field of 
international law. Understandably, the international lawyers have defined the term 
regime strictu sensu as a recognised set of rules devised by actors, whether 
governmental or non-govemmental, for regulating conflict prone behaviour.^  
Political scientists have expanded this straightforward legal definition to include a 
broader range of behaviour in the hope that regimes might provide an explanation of: 
"how in our era, international collaboration can flourish in a setting of 
conflict, how islands of order can form in an ocean of disorder.
The usage of the regime concept in political science reflects discontent with the realist 
conception of the anarchical basis of international society, and by extension with the 
overstructured view of its domestic counterpart.^  While no contemporary regimes 
can be compared with national governments in terms of explicitness, levels of 
formalisation or coherence, neither can they be dismissed as structures with no role 
in the international order. What is at question however, is the extent to which
3
4
5
See Ernst Haas "Why Collaborate? Issue Linkage and International Regimes." World Politics 1980, 32: 
357-405, especially p396.
Ibid p385
The distinction between the usage of regime in its national and international senses should be strictly 
preserved. As Susan Strange notes: "The analogy with national governments implied by the use of the 
word regime is inherently false. It consequently holds a highly distorting mirror to reality." in "Cave! Hie 
Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis" International Organisation 1982, 36: 479-96, p487.
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regimes can exert independent influence on state behaviour, and in what manner.®
The failure of regime analysis to develop any satisfactory definition of the very term 
regime, appears at first sight a surprising lacuna in the literature. The concept has, 
however, undoubtedly suffered in theoretical terms from imprecise formulation, and 
careless, not to say misleading, usage.^  The parameters of regime definition remain 
indistinct. Possibly the most comprehensive yet succinct definition was delivered by 
Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins, who argue that:
"a regime exists in every substantive issue area in international
relations wherever there is regularity in behaviour, some kinds of
principles, norms or rules must exist to account for it."*
Such a catholic definition invites a dangerously inflated estimation of the levels of 
normative consensus in international relations. To see any patterned behaviour as 
indicative of the presence of a regime risks tautology, making it difficult to ascertain 
what additional properties might accrue to a regime. If a regime is simply equated 
with patterned behaviour, it is difficult to posit that they might have an independent 
role and even act as constraints on actors. This broad definition has, as a result, been 
largely discredited in the literature.^  Puchala and Hopkins insist that mtemational 
regimes are in any case basically subjective attitudinal phenomena:
"they exist primarily as participants understandings, expectations or 
convictions about legitimate, appropriate or moral behaviour.
In a theoretical sense this conviction is correct in that it is impossible to point to a 
concrete object, within which all the attributes of a regime inhere. This is a similar
John Gerard Ruggie has investigated whether, and in what ways, regimes matter in "International Responses 
to Technology: Concepts and Trends." International Organisation 1975, 29: 557-83, p559. See also 
Haggard and Simmons op cit pp513-15.
 ^ Haggard and Simmons, ibid p494 criticise the unnecessary use of the regime concept, especially in the work 
of Robert Keohane, notably After Hegemonv: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economv. 
1985, Princeton: Princeton University Press. For a defence of the broad interpretation of the concept of 
regime, see Jack Donnelly "International Human Rights Regimes" International Organisation 1986, 40: 
599-642.
* D Puchala and R Hopkins "International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis." International 
Organisation 1982, 36: 245-75.
 ^ Haggard and Simmons op cit p493.
Puchala and Hopkins op cit p246.
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argument to that which was encountered in the previous chapter on the attribution of 
acts to states, since states are also artificial constructs. To argue that states or 
regimes are "artificial constructs", and have no objective existence, is not to say, 
however, that they do not exist at all. Attributing actions to such constructs is merely 
a useful, and indeed necessary, shorthand used to describe the complex of subjective 
' attitudinal phenomena constituting the entities in question, be they states or regimes. 
To maintain that such constructs have no objective existence can only be regarded in 
this context as pedantic.
If regimes are to be seen as something more than an exercise in "adhocery", a more 
exclusive definition is called for. The careful definition put forward by Stephen 
Krasner has become the benchmark by which all other definitions are judged. It 
appears to satisfy more readily the need for a definition in which, as Jonsson notes:
"regimes may be thought of as intermediary normative frameworks%
which facilitate the making of substantial agreements in a given issue 
area."^ ^
Keohane further notes that:
"it is critical to distinguish clearly between international regimes on the 
one hand, and mere ad hoc substantive agreements on the other.
Regimes ........  facilitate the making of substantive agreements by
providing a framework of rules, norms, principles and procedures for 
negotiation. A theory of regimes must explain why these intermediate 
arrangements are^necessary.
In the classic definition, Krasner believes that regimes can be defined as:
"sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision 
making procedures around whicji actors’ expectations converge in a
11 4This point will be discussed fiirther below, in the analysis of the ontological status of unobservable entities.
as described in thê' scientific realist school of the philosophy of science. It is in fact logical in strictly 
empirical terms to hold that states cannot act. The shorthand of accepting such actions for the sake of 
brevity is, in point of fact, an admission that unobservable structures can have concrete effects.
Christer Jonsson International Aviation and the Politics of Regime Change 1987, London: Frances Pinter 
pl3.
Robert Keohane After Hegemonv: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economv. 1985, 
Princeton N J: Princeton University Press p58.
given issue area
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Regime principles are the beliefs or purposes which adherents are expected to pursue. 
Norms define the limits of legitimate and illegitimate behaviour in terms of rights and 
obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision 
making procedures are prevailing practices for implementing the principles of 
adherents, and making collective choices.^ ®
Although Krasner himself points out similar formulations in the roughly 
contemporaneous works of Keohane and Nye, Ernst Haas and Hedley Bull, he fails 
to acknowledge the contribution of earlier research in the area.^ ® In the mid to late 
1960’s, work in the field of integration engendered a concern with regimes which 
predates the works discussed above. Leon Lindberg’s analysis of the European 
Community system put considerable emphasis on the concept of regime, and 
acknowledged an explicit theoretical debt to the even earlier works of David Easton. 
According to Easton, a regime represents attempts by members of a political system 
to establish regularised methods for ordering their political relationships; it is in short 
an aspect of the political community^  ^which
16
Stephen Krasner "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables" 
International Organisation 1982, 36: 185-205, pl86.
Krasner ibid p i86, Keohane 1985 op cit pp57-8.
R O Keohane and J S Nye Power and Interdependence 1977, Boston: Little Brown pl9; Ernst Ebas 
"Technological Self Reliance for Latin America: the OAS Contribution" International Organisation 1980, 
34: 541-570, p553; and Hedley Bull The Anarchical Societv; A Studv of Order in World Politics 1977, 
New York: Columbia University Press p54.
Easton defines political community as: "that aspect of a political system that consists of its members seen 
as a group of persons bound together by a political division of labour. The existence of a political system 
must include a plurality of political relationships through which the individual members are linked to each 
other and through which the political objectives of the system are pursued." David Easton A Svstem 
Analvsis of Political Life 1965, New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc pl77. Interestingly, Easton sees 
political community as distinct from what he calls a "sense of community", since the latter is not a 
precondition for the existence of the former. Indeed, both Easton and Lindberg posit that a political 
community can develop without members supporting it, or even being aware of it, as a result of an 
increasingly pervasive division of labour. See Leon Lindberg "The European Community as a Political 
System: Notes Toward the Construction of a Model." Journal of Common Market Studies 1966-67, 5:344- 
87 p353; and Easton, op cit pl77 and pp 185-86. Easton notes that "the entrenchment of the habit of 
working together in a political division of labour sometimes derives less from the pre-recognition of 
common political interests than from the convergence of complementary aims" ibid p i86 This point is a 
potentially important aspect in the development of cooperation in the armaments collaboration issue area, 
and will be discussed more fully below.
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"represents relatively stable expectations, depending on the system and 
its state of change with regard to the range of matters that can be 
handled politically, the rules or norms governing the way these matters 
are processed and the position of those through whom binding action 
may be taken on those matters. Within this range the politically 
relevant members are less likely to challenge the validity of settlements 
arrived at, even though they may of course question their wisdom." *^
The establishment by the members of a political community of regularised methods 
for ordering their political relations is regarded by Easton as an important method to 
reduce the prospect of systemic stress or failure.
It was Lindberg who appears to have attempted the first clear exposition of what 
exactly was understood by the values, norms and structures of a regime.^ ® Regime 
principles (also termed values) can be seen as broad limits in terms of the day to day 
functioning of policy which do not violate the deeply held convictions of important 
segments of the community. These principles are, therefore, likely to reflect the 
general political environment of regime members, representing at least the lowest 
common denominator of accepted beliefs and statements of ideology. Principles, in 
short, are derivative from the sub-systems.^  ^ Regime norms specify the kinds of 
procedures that are expected and acceptable in the processing and implementation of
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Ibid pl92. Values in the context of Easton’s definition are analogous with Krasner’s category of principles 
quoted above. The exact meaning of "binding action" is not explained. Whether it should be understood 
as an outcome which is binding as a result of enforcement by regime authorities, or simply because regime 
members accept the decisions of the regime as a constraint, is not made clear. Easton focuses on the 
position of individuals within the regime through whom "binding action" can be taken, and the rules or 
norms of behaviour through which political relationships are processed. Krasner on the other hand refers 
to decision making procedures, which would appear to be a much broader concept, encapsulating the role 
of individuals, bargaining structures and the processes involved. The two concepts are related, but not 
coterminus.
Ibid pl92: "the alternative would be for the rules and aims of political interaction in a system to be largely 
random and indeterminate. In that event members would have to argue about day-to-day actions and 
decisions at the same time as they questioned the fundamental assumptions about the way in which these 
daily differences should be settled, or about the validity of the procedures that determined who was to have 
the major power and responsibility for negotiating differences and establishing authoritative and binding 
outcomes matters of basic procedure as well as substance would be intermingled."
Lindberg, op cit pp364-68.
Ibid pp 364-65; Easton op cit pp 192-93.
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demands.^  ^ Insofar as norms involve the behaviour of members of the system and 
represent operating rules, they can also be seen as derivative from the sub-system. 
The system itself may also develop indigenous regime norms, which are defined with 
reference not to the subsystems, but to the strategies and tactics which the system 
authorities must employ in the process of consultation, negotiation and bargaining 
according to which the system is defined.
Decisions are generally made and implemented through regime structures, which, 
therefore, represent formal and informal patterns in which power is distributed and 
organised. As Easton notes:
"The particular structuring of the relationships among the authority 
roles will both reflect and condition the way in which power is 
distributed and used in the system. The rights and duties assigned to 
each role and the extent to which each limits or reinforces the power 
of the other helps to determine who has what authority and how it is 
used.
This structural element would seem to include both the rule and decision making 
procedure aspects of Krasner’s regime definition, referring more generally to the 
institutional apparatus within the political system which "structures" the regime.
The mid-range theory of how regimes ought to be defined has been heavily criticised 
in recent analyses for lacking sufficient detail to adequately explain the dynamics of 
regime change. According to this critique,^  principles, norms and rules as defined 
in the regimes literature lack distinct boundaries, and tend to merge into one 
another.^ ® Studies in political economy especially have held that subsystem (ie state)
Easton, idem.
Lindberg, op cit p365 
Easton, op cit p209
See especially Haggard and Simmons, op cit pp493-94.
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®^ Detailed criticism can be found in Friedrich Kratochwil "The Force of Prescriptions." International 
Organisation 1984, 38: 685-708 p685; Ruggie and Kratochwil, op cit passim; and Oran Young 
"International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions." World Politics 1986, 39: 104-22, pl06.
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actions can undermine the fundamental premises of regimes. Such analyses are, by 
inclination if not explicit structure, hostile to the concept of implicit regimes, and to 
definitions of the norms and principles of regimes which they believe over emphasise 
the extent to which state behaviour is rule governed.^
The question which separates these critics of implicit regimes from those, including 
Robert Keohane, who defend the concept as theoretically sound, is just how explicit 
a commitment is required of the subsystem actors before a regime can be said to 
exist. Unlike those "minimalists'* who insist on a restrictive definition of regimes and 
regard discussion of any differences between norms and rules as theoretically 
underdeveloped, the "maximalists" are more forgiving. The latter maintain that 
patterns of behaviour identifiable as regimes can be discerned in areas not normally 
considered as demonstrating any regularised ordering of political relationships, let 
alone authoritative allocation of values. In short, a regime does not necessarily have 
to be able to make an authoritative allocation of values at all. Since in many respects 
the fundamental theoretical difference between the minimalist and maximalist 
conceptions of regimes is the level of institutionalisation in a political system which 
can realistically be called a regime, the search should perhaps be directed toward how 
one might measure such institutionalisation.^ *
The clearest exposition of the basic elements of institutionalisation can be found in 
the work of Simon Huntington,^ ® and in the later study of regimes by Lindberg. In
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See also Keohane 1985, p58 where he attempts to deal with this problem.
Stephen Cohen and Mark Zysman "Double or Nothing: Open Trade and Competitive Industry." Foreign 
Affairs 1983 , 62:113-39; J Finlayson and M Zacher "The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: 
Regime Dynamics and Effects." International Organisation 1981, 35: 561-602; and Susan Strange "The 
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International Organisation 1979, 33:303-34.
Oran Young developed a more restricted definition of regimes as multi-lateral agreements among states 
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of agreements and regime structures as causes of change, risks formalism, that is an excessive concern with 
the outward form at the expense of content. See Oran Young Resource Regimes: Natural Resources and 
Social Institutions 1982, Berkeley: University of California Press, p20; also "International Regimes: 
Problems of Concept Formation." World Politics 1980, 32: 331-35, and "Anarchy and Social Choice: 
Reflections on the International Polity" World Politics 1978, 30: 241-63.
Especially in "Political Development and Political Decay" World Politics 1965, 18: 386-430; see also the 
later development by Lindberg op cit pp 367-69.
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this work, Lindberg posited that a "composite index of integration" could be 
produced, and applied to his case study of the European Community. The aspects to 
be examined included the authorities of a political community, its extent, the salience 
of the issue areas which it covered and its "regime".^ ® Lindberg notes with 
reference to the EC system that:^ ^
"the common division of political labour by which (the members of the 
system) are bound, is to be defined in terms of areas of public policy 
that have been imade subject to intensive consultation, negotiation  ^
bargainings and administration in the institutional system of the three 
communities (the regime of our political system) '|
Both Lindberg and Huntington utilise four dimensions whereby the extent to which 
the political organisations and procedures Jiad acquired value and stability over time 
(ie had been invested with support by subsystems) might be measured. These ^  
comprised: (a) adaptability-rigidity, (b) complexity-simplicity, (c) autonomy- 
subordination, and (d) coherence-disunity.^  ^ According to these criteria, a highly 
institutionalised regime would be characterised by:
High adaptability. If the regime had been in existence for a substantial period of 
time, had survived several changes of leadership, and if it performed several 
functions simultaneously, and if it demonstrated a capability to adapt to changes in 
the environment by assuming new functions.
High complexity. The more complex an organisation or regime, the greater its 
chances of surviving change, since a large number of subunits means that support can 
be more easily maintained, and that losing one of its functions to another actor, or 
through lack of demand for the said function, will not substantially weaken the 
organisation. Survival can be ensured by the performance of alternative functions.
High autonomy. An autonomous organisation will be able to resist particularist 
influence, both from members and from outside the political system. It will deal with 
an area of politics well insulated and differentiated from other functional areas, and 
will be able to socialise new members gradually into accepting the organisations
®^ Lindberg op cit pp 355-56 and footnote 27, p356.
Ibid p35.
Ibid pp367-69, and Huntington op cit passim.
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goals. Lastly, it will not depend on a single social group for support.
High levels of coherence. The organisation will be characterised by few contests for 
its leadership, consensus in decision making and high levels of loyalty among 
members with low levels of dissent about organisational goals.
Although interesting as an initial statement of what is understood by the term regime, 
work on institutionalisation such as that of Lindberg and Huntington failed to be 
developed by more recent regime analyses. Indeed it seems likely that this earlier 
work has been largely ignored by contemporary scholars. Part of the reason for this 
neglect may be the linkage of such studies with work on the dynamics of integration. 
A further influence may be in the lack of a clear understanding of the intimate 
linkages between the international and domestic systems which is apparent in the 
institutionalisation literature. The basic concerns of such analyses have however been 
replicated in more recent studies, particularly the work of Haggard and Simmons on 
the theory of international regimes, in a fashion which appears to overcome the 
shortcomings of previous treatments.They maintain, for example that:
"Regimes may change over time or vary across cases in at least four 
ways: strength, organisational form, scope and allocational mode.
33
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See especially Haggard and Simmons, op cit passim. 
Ibid p496
1
The conception of strength is analogous to Lindberg’s dimension of adaptability, in I
that both concern the ability of the regime to respond to stress. Adaptability itself can |
be seen as a form of institutional strength. Organisational form is closely allied to j
the concept of complexity, allocational mode to autonomy and scope to coherence. IiAlthough there are difficulties in reconciling these dimensions in works separated by I
1twenty years and different areas of specialisation, there are sufficient grounds to *
identify common concerns across both approaches which may be useful in the study 
of regime change. Indeed, it is in respect of analysing regime formation, variance I
and change that the more recent works exhibit their most obvious superiority when j
compared to the earlier focus on institutionalisation. j
The following classification develops five dimensions which are seen as basic to the ï
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understanding of regimes, drawing both from the existing works discussed above, and
more recent material not previously covered in regime studies.
A. Structural Complexity
Concern with the internal organisational design and operation of regimes has 
been notable by its absence in the literature. A concentration on issues of 
global political economy, the dynamics of interdependence, and world systems 
theory, has not encouraged close attention to the internal design and workings 
of regimes per je, especially if the analysis retains a basically state centric 
bias. Increasingly however, heightened interest in the dynamics of regime 
change, and growing awareness of the potential for applying the precepts of 
organisational theory to the study of international organisation,^ ® has 
encouraged a reassessment of the organisational forms and workings of 
international regimes.
It is true that certain issues are more conducive to decentralised structures than 
others. For example, certain regimes may simply require adherents to share 
information, or desist from certain actions. Such activities require relatively 
little centralisation on the part of the regime, and even regimes which require 
a more interventionist role, such as a fixed exchange rate regime®® are likely 
to remain relatively decentralised.
Most regimes are likely to possess administrative apparatus, however limited, 
to collate and disseminate information or arbitrate in disputes. This apparatus 
might be a centralized body provided by regime members, or it might be a 
looser more ad hoc structure brought together for a limited time period, or to 
achieve a specific agenda. The type will depend on the issue area in question. 
Highly complex issues are likely to engender more structurally advanced and 
elaborate organisational forms. As Lindberg notes,greater complexity in
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The potential role of organisation theory will be explored in greater detail at a later point in the study. See 
Chapter 5, below.
This example is used by Haggard and Simmons, op cit pp496-97 
Lindberg op cit p368.
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terms of the number of subunits in a regime, and the functions they perform 
will enable an institution to cope with systemic stress, or the loss of certain 
functions. Further, highly institutionalised forms of cooperation are ill-suited 
to analyses which assume that the international system is totally anarchic. 
This factor has in the past helped to restrict attempted linkages between 
organisation theory and international organisation.®* The more complex and 
elaborate the organisational structure, the more potential the regime has to be 
autonomous, by virtue of its ability to link issues and involve a variety of 
actors.
B. Maturity
The concept of maturity denotes the flexibilty and adaptability of a regime 
rather than its "age", since although the number of years an organisation has 
been in existence may exhibit high levels of adaptability, the converse may 
also be true, with atrophy being the result of longevity.®® Unlike the 
previous variable, maturity is essentially concerned with operational rather 
than structural characteristics, with particular reference to stress responding 
ability. A mature regime, therefore, would be expected to operationalise its 
influence and power in response to threats. The suitability, or otherwise, of 
its structural make up to face such challenges, is a function of the structural 
complexity discussed above rather than the maturity of the regime.
The stress responding capacity of a regime will be enhanced if the 
organisation exhibits mature characteristics as well as complex structures. 
Such characteristics include the number of generational changes in the 
leadership, whether these were contested or not, performance of more than 
one function, and progress in extending these functions over time. The 
maturity concept echoes the work of Barry Buzan on the characteristics of 
mature anarchies.'^ ® Buzan warns that the character of a system must be
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Haggard and Simmons warn that simplistic results will follow from the blackboxing of organisational 
structures and processes, op cit p497.
Interestingly, Lindberg in his discussion of adaptability (op cit p367), does not appear concerned that 
advanced age could have a negative effect upon the stress responding capability of an organisation or 
system.
See Barry Buzan People. States and Fear 1983, Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, p95-101.
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distinguished from its structure/  ^ and of the dangers of determinism in 
discussing the progression from immature to mature status/^ He further 
points out that it is erroneous to see a
"pleasing image of historical drift toward greater maturity and security 
in the international anarchy"'^ ® 
since there is no compelling evidence that a mature system may not be 
followed by a collapse, as has occurred with apparently cyclical regularity in 
the past. In addition, progress does not take place against a static background 
of threat:
"from this perspective, increasing system maturity cannot be seen as 
a process of steady gain on a problem of fixed dimension. Rather it 
must be viewed as part of a larger process in which the forces of order 
compete endlessly against the ever mounting capacity for chaos. Thus 
progress toward a more mature form of anarchy is not a cause for 
congratulation or complacency in its own right, but only if it seems to 
be outpacing the simultaneous increase in threats."'*^
Since the supposed demand for international regimes'^ ® is an important aspect
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Buzan posits that the concept of progress must be used with care, lest it be thought inevitable that the 
international anarchy (or for that matter immature regimes) will progress toward more mature forms as in 
biological organisms: "The idea of progress is not strongly developed in international relations, not least 
because of reluctance to take risks with normative or deterministic positions. On the national policy level, 
ideas of progress are commonly either very short-term or non-existent, excepting those states governed by 
forward looking ideologies. Progress is, anyway, much easier to define for revisionist than for status quo 
powers. For the international system as a whole, hazy ideas about a more peaceful world provide almost 
the only yardstick for a sense of progress." ibid pl24, fhS.
Ibid p99 
Ibid pl(X).
On this point, see Robert Keohane "The Demand for International Regimes" International Organisation 
1982, 36: 325-55. Keohane believes that while his findings do not imply any underlying harmony of 
interest in world politics, "regimes can be used to pursue particularistic and parochial interests, as well as 
more widely shared objectives. They do not necessarily increase overall levels of welfare. Even when they 
do, conflicts among units will continue. States will attempt to force the burdens of adapting to change on 
to one another." ibid p355. Nevertheless, "as long as the situations involved are not constant sum, actors 
will have incentives to coordinate their behaviour, implicitly or explicitly, in order to achieve greater 
collective benefits without reducing the utility of any unit. When such incentives exist, and when sufficient 
interdependence exists that ad hoc agreements are insufficient, opportunities will arise for the development 
of international regimes. If international regimes did not exist, they would surely have to be invented." 
ibid p355.
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in the apparent change, or even progression, in the maturity of the 
international system, it is very important to specify just what a regime is, and 
what role it may have in the evolution of cooperation in the international 
system.
C. Autonomy
The autonomy variable contains two distinct elements. First is the concept of 
allocational mode, investigated by Haggard and Simmons‘S, and second is the 
ability of the organisation to mobilise support outside the regime, which can 
be used either against external political forces, or recalcitrant members of the 
regime. According to Haggard and Simmons:
"Regimes can endorse different social mechanisms for resource 
allocation. A market oriented regime supports the private allocation 
of resources, discourages national controls, guarantees property rights 
V and facilitates private^  contracting .....  At the other extreme,
authoritative allocation involves the direct control of resources by:regime authorities, and will demand more extensive and potentially 
autonomous structures. %
In these terms, a market orientated regime represents a more diffuse, less 
autonomous structure, whereas an authoritative allocation regime denotes a 
coherent, autonomous organisational make up, capable of engaging and 
prevailing in conflicts with other organisations or even states.
The second aspect of the autonomy variable refers to the centrality of the 
regime within the given issue area, that is the extent to which it can call up 
support from several, rather than individual, social groupings. Further, the 
regime can, as a result of the perceived benefits of regime membership,
socialise new members into acceptance of its precepts. Lastly, the leadershipIprocess should be orderly and stable, with new leaders rising from within the
46 Haggard and Simmons, op cit p498.
Ibid p498
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organisation, rather than coming in from outside.'^ *
D. Potential
The potential of a regime refers to the range of issues which it covers, 
sometimes known as the jurisdictional scope. The potential of a regime is not 
incidental to its success. Overly broad jurisdiction raises administrative costs 
and complexity, while too narrow a scope is likely to leave little room for 
bargaining and issue linkage, and may make the regime vulnerable to a loss 
of power.'^ ® An optimal regime is one which exhibits neither too broad nor 
too narrow a domain, but also one which is willing and able to adapt to novel 
environmental conditions.
It has been noted in relation to the operation of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that the causes of regime change may be external 
as well as internal. Despite substantial progress in the elimination of tariff 
barriers to trade during the 1950’s and 1960’s, GATT was seen to be 
inadequate in scope. The potential of the GATT regime was insufficient to 
prevent, and indeed may have positively encouraged, the use of non-tariff 
barriers in their place. This "externality" (i.e. the casual factor lay outside 
the jurisdictional scope of the regime) led to the attempted reform of the 
regime under the aegis of the so called Tokyo Round.®®
E. Coherence
The fifth and final variable concerns the coherence of the regime, that is the 
extent to which its internal social structure is conflictual or consensual. A 
more coherent regime is, ideally at least, likely to enjoy few contests for 
leadership, consensual decision making, no open denouncement of the
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Regimes, when analysed in this light can be seen as performing a service for their members by reducing 
transaction costs and helping members cope with uncertainty. See Keohane 1982, op cit especially pp 336- 
345.
Haggard and Simmons, op cit p497.
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organisation by participants, and a highly socialised and loyal membership. 
REGIME THEORIES
A number of theoretical perspectives on regime development and change have been 
identified in the literature on regimes. The most common theories are usually agreed 
to be the cognitive, functional,®^  and structural. More recently a further category, 
termed the structurationist has been developed, although as yet relatively little 
research appears to have been undertaken in this vein. These various approaches will 
be further examined in ascending order of aggregation, beginning with the cognitivist 
approach.
Cognitivism
Cognitive theory, although particularly identified with works on the role of individual 
decision makers,®^  has come to represent a rather eclectic group of approaches. The 
commonalities among various cognitive writings emphasise ideology, belief systems 
and knowledge as explanations of regime evolution and change.®® As Haggard and 
Simmons note:
"cognitivists pose a simple yet profound question: can interests in an 
issue area be unambiguously deduced from power and situational 
constraints? Frequently they cannot. Without shifts in power position, 
interests change as a result of learning, persuasion and divine 
revelation. Knowledge and ideology may then become an important 
explanation of regime change."®^
The concerns of cognitive theory, whilst frequently acknowledged by structural and 
functional theorists, are usually bracketed as subsidiary, less important variables. A
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good example can be found in the work of Jonsson, who briefly discusses cognitive 
concerns, but finds that:
"the differences between the structural and situational (or functional) 
explanations, on the one hand, and cognitive explanations on the other,
should not be exaggerated ....... The obvious conclusion is that
structural and situational theories and cognitive theories are 
complementary rather than mutually exclusive. "®®
Jonsson believes that cognitive theories lack the explanatory power to be regarded as 
independent explanations of regime change. He, therefore, includes actor cognitions 
in his structural and situational analyses, rather than treating cognitive theories as a 
separate mode of explanation. It is difficult to generalise from the central cognitive 
insight which holds that:
"cooperation cannot be completely explained without reference to 
ideology, the values of actors, the beliefs they hold about the 
interdependence of issues, and the knowledge available to them about 
how they can realise specific goals. Cooperation is affected by 
perception and misperception, the capacity to process information, and 
learning"®®
The individualist basis of cognitivist theory, therefore, comes about by virtue of the 
concentration on actor cognitions and learning. It is difficult to see how such factors 
could ever be readily measured in relation to the explanation of regime change, or 
indeed to usage in the social sciences generally. This is not to say, however that 
cognitive theories have no utility at aU. Unlike other approaches, cognitivism accepts 
that cooperation takes place inside complex and very ambiguous issue areas. 
Structural and functional theories usually assume that issue areas are unambiguous 
givens.®^  The prospect that knowledge and ideology (the two most common 
cognitive insights studied in the literature) affect the evolution of international 
cooperation is not difficult to comprehend. The problem for cognitive analysts is how 
to translate the acknowledged effects of ideology and learning into theoretically useful
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generalisations, leading to an understanding of why cooperation develops in an 
anarchic international system.
From a cognitivist stand point, learning and ideology have a direct influence on 
international cooperation by demonstrating the virtue of certain lines of action. 
Further, as a result of their unstructured view of issue areas, cognitivists posit that 
history, knowledge and ideology are important variables in attempting to understand 
why actors (be they individuals or states) respond differently to the same structural 
constraints and opportunities.
The central difficulty of operationalising cognitivist theories becomes apparent using 
this line of reasoning. Essentially, cognitive explanation can never be fully explored 
except via an historicist, post hoc analysis. It has, as a result, been criticised for 
exhibiting traits of contingency and path dependence.®* Cognitive approaches, since 
they deal with what are, in the final analysis, unknowable and unquantifiable factors 
such as individual motivation, learning and perception, are likely to prove quite 
unable to predict when consensual knowledge and values will yield a cooperative 
outcome. Indeed, consensus may not be enough in itself to overcome the problems 
inherent in collective action. It is this problem which led Ernst Haas to note that 
cognitive notions of regime evolution accept the
"existence of power differentials and the importance of hierarchy 
among states without sacrificing to such a view the possibility of 
choice based on perception and cognition inspired by additional 
calculations. "®®
In short, however consensual the basis in cognitive terms, structural or functional 
factors might conspire to prevent the emergence of furtherance of cooperation. 
Cognitive explanations are also ül-suited to explain changes in regimes or cooperative 
procedures in that it is not always possible to maintain that a given regime is the only
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possible structure able to ensure realisation of common values.^ Cognitive theory 
cannot predict with any certainty at what juncture consensual beliefs or knowledge 
will result in actors exhibiting cooperative behaviour, nor can it predict the changes 
fiilly, since cognitive approaches can only provide post justificadoiis for what has 
already taken place. The cognitivist dilemma is that; | |
"historical episodes of cooperation may be inexplicable without 
reference to shared knowledge and meanings, but since future 
knowledge is by definition, impossible to foresee, prediction about the 
substantive content of cooperation is ruled out. Nonetheless, the 
degree of ideological consensus and agreement over casual 
relationships, regardless of the nature of the issue, is an important 
variable in explaining cooperation.
Though it can be demonstrated that the evolution of knowledge and intellectual 
currents can affect concrete strategies,®  ^ it is more problematic in practice to 
ascertain the autonomous influence of knowledge or ideology in the evolution of 
international cooperation.
The preliminary, though by no means authoritative, conclusion on the role of 
cognitive theories in the analysis of regime evolution must be that whilst they provide 
useful insights into the process of cooperation, they are not sufficient m themselves. 
Rather, cognitive insights niust, as . Jonsson realised, be integrated with
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complementary modes of analysis.
"In the realm of politics what is real is what men perceive to be real.
Thus structural and situational factors become functional through the 
mediation of actor cognitions. Changes in the power structure and the 
emergence of bargaining situations as perceived by the principal 
actors, explain the evolution of international regimes."®^
It is to these alternative explanations of how cooperation and regimes emerge that the 
analysis will now turn.
Functionalism
Functional theories as utilised in this context, must be distinguished at the outset from 
functional and neofiinctional theories of international organisation.®  ^ Functional 
theory explains the emergence of cooperation in terms of such an outcome being the 
effect, or function, of certain behaviour or action by institutions. For example, the 
persistence of regimes and compliance with their injunctions may be explained with 
reference to their anticipated consequences. Where the activities of a regime reduce 
information and transaction costs among adherents, they are likely to be reinforced. 
Conversely, should a regime become dysfunctional, it wiU be weakened and perhaps 
modified, or it may begin to decay. Functional theories attempt to account for the 
strength of regimes, and more especially to explain why they should persist when 
their original raison d'etre in a structural sense has changed.
Functional analysis is not particularly suited to explain the causes of any demand for 
a regime, since it concentrates on the functions performed by such a cooperative 
construct, rather than the underlying factors and situations which promote the creation 
and maintenance of regimes. It may provide an insight into the condition necessary 
before a regime wül be demanded, but it is likely to prove less useful in suggesting 
how and when the regime will come about. ®^ Rather than simply taking the process
®^ Jonsson op cit p24. Emphasis in the original 
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by which regimes are created as givens, and examining the functions they assume, 
it is important to investigate the process and specify how this operates. Not to do so, 
risks the teleological imputation that international cooperation is a response to 
presumed "systems maintenance" or equilibrating functions.®® The notional 
equilibrium point is never satisfactorily explained however. Regimes are, according 
to this line of argument, almost an inevitable outcome of the problem of how best to 
promote international cooperation. Notionally, according to functionalist belief, there 
is an overriding desire on the part of members of the system to maintain the 
presumed benefits of cooperation, or at least the equilibrium of the system. Where 
this equilibrium is more efficiently provided by collective, rather than individual 
action, a demand for cooperative structures such as regimes wül develop. This 
sequence of events must, however, be regarded as only one possible response on the 
part of members of the system, to the problem of how to promote their individual 
welfare within an increasingly interdependent system.
Functionalist theorising has drawn heavily from work on transaction costs in 
economics, which posits that organisations evolve in response to the difficulties 
inherent in arms length market transactions, or in conditions of market failure (or 
anarchy). Among these difficulties are opportunism, measurement problems, 
information costs and difficulties in contract enforcement.®  ^ Writers in international 
relations have drawn a parallel between the action of the market and the 
uncoordinated action of states, to demonstrate that regimes reduce transaction costs 
and facilitate decentralised decision making.®* As Haggard and Simmons note:
"we are interested not only in the fact that regimes perform certain 
tasks, but the importance or weight regimes have in motivating and 
explaining states behaviour. The proper test of a functional theory is 
not the mere existence of a regime, but the demonstration that actors’
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See Keohane After hegemony op cit p81.
See Douglas North "Government and the Cost of Exchange in History." Journal of Economic History 
1984, 44:255-64; Oliver Williamson "The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes." Journal 
of Economic Literature 1981, 19: 1537-68; and "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of 
Contractual Relations" The Journal of Law and Economics 1979, 22:233-61, by tiie same author.
®* Keohane After Hegemony op cit Chap 6; Kenneth Oye "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: 
Hypotheses and Strategies" World Politics 1985,38:1-24, especially pp 16-18; and Haggard and Simmons,
op cit p507. I
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behaviour was motivated by benefits provided uniquely, or at least
more efficiently, through the regime."®^
A strong liberal bias is evident in much of functionalist literature, with a presumption 
that institutions "provided" to enhance the collective welfare of the adherents will 
produce optimal or superior outcomes in comparison with conditions of market 
failure. Regimes can, however, result in different distributional outcomes, and cannot 
be seen as invariably providing greater shares of collective goods to all members of 
the system. By emphasising how the intervening role of regimes as facilitating 
structures helps states realise common interests, functional analysis assumes 
convergent states, and downplays differences. Regimes can, however, be the focus 
of conflicts, and may even institutionalise inequalities.^ ®
It was noted above that the functional explanations represented the next rank of 
explanation above cognitivism in aggregative terms. This statement requires 
qualification in light of the above discussions of the assumed liberalism and 
convergent interests of functional analysis. The basic problem appears to lie with the 
attitude of functional theory toward the interfaces between states and the system. The 
neo-reaüst conception of international system structures is important in this context, 
since the functionalist attitude to the agent-structure problem in the creation of 
international regimes is heavily coloured by neo-realist attitudes.
Superficially, neo-realism embraces a strongly structural and anti-reductionist 
theoretical orientation. Following the lead of Ashley, and also of Wendt,^  ^ it is 
possible to characterise neo-realism as exhibiting an individualist conception of the 
international system structure, that is the international system is defined in terms of 
its constituent units; states. Although neo-realism avoids what Wendt terms
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Ibid p508
Seen in these terms, the functionalist view of regimes is to regard them as more or less optimal institutional 
responses to failures in international cooperation. This understanding demotes regimes to a type of conduit, 
performing a function desired by the unit level actors of the system. Far from becoming a focus of the 
analysis, with an independent role as a forum for debate, conflict and negotiation, regimes are relegated 
to the status of little more than the playthings of state actors.
See Richard Ashley "The Poverty of Neo-realism" International Organisation 1984,38:225-86, particularly 
pp238-42; also A Wendt op cit passim.
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"explanatory reductionism"^  ^ due to the acceptance that system structures act as 
intervening variables in the translation of domestic interests into foreign policy 
behaviour, it does so at some considerable theoretical cost. Neo-realism rationalises 
an underlying state centric approach to the agent-structure relationship, by accepting 
that system structures, as well as states, play a causal role in international relations.
This compromise position, which is strictly speaking a systemic rather than a truly 
structural approach, allows neo-realists to utilise their state centric beliefs within the 
systemic logic of systems theory in a coherent whole. Despite this assumption of 
systemic logic, however, neo-realism remains reductionist in its view of the agent- 
structure problem. The international system is seen as reducible to the properties of 
states, that is, to the distribution of capabilities among them. This can be seen as 
representing "ontological reductionism" as opposed to the explanatory reductionism 
discussed above. Ontological reductionism posits that the behaviour of states within 
the international system is determined by their situation, (situational determinism) and 
as a result, system structures are seen as external constraints on the action of states, 
rather than as potential areas for state action.^ ^
The shortcomings of neo-realist theorising has engendered an attempt to develop 
systemic theory purely on the basis of assumptions about the relationship between 
states, their interests and power, and cooperation. Waltz, for example, argues that 
the development of an explicit theory of the state is incidental to the development of 
systemic theories of international relations.^ '^
"The issue .....  is not whether some understanding of the state is
necessary to build systemic theories (it is), but whether that 
understanding follows from a theory grounded in a coherent set of 
propositions with some correspondence to reality, or simply from a set 
of pre-theoretical assumptions, grounded in intuition and ideology.
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Defined by Wendt, ibid p341 as "the kind of reductionism which neo-realists oppose is defined as theory 
which tries to explain behaviour in terms of strictly agent level properties."
Ibid p342.
Kenneth Waltz Theory of International Politics 1979, Reading, Mass: Addison Wesley; and "Reflections 
on Theory of International Politics: A Response to my Critics" in R O Keohane (ed) Neo-realism and its 
Critics 1986, New York: Columbia University Press, especially p340.
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Whatever its advantages in terms of analytical convenience, a reliance 
on untheorised assumptions about primitive terms (in this case states 
and the system) leaves us unable to justify particular conceptualisations 
of interaction situations and leads, therefore, to an untenable "as if" 
approach to systemic theorising."’^
The major criticism operative here, is that neo-realist individualism is falsely 
scientific, since a reductionist approach cannot deliver a satisfactory basis for 
developing an explicit theory of the stat^ i There are two ways of theoriiing about 
particular units, one reductionist, and the other social. A reductionist approach would 
attempt to analyse the individual unit with reference to its internal organisational 
structure.’® By concentrating the analysis at the level of the internal organisation of 
states, it might be possible to explain certain actions or desired ends of the state. To 
explain fully state behaviour however, it is necessary to refer to social relations with 
other non-state actors, rather than to accept states as actors in their own right in an 
unqualified way.
An alternative approach is to develop a social theory of the state which explicates and 
theorises the properties of states with reference to their social relations with other 
agents. Neo-realism however, already reduces system structures to the distribution 
of properties of pre-existing individual units (in this case states). This tautology 
means that:
"the neo-realist’s individualist conception of system structure i s .....
too weak to support a social theory of the state: system structures 
cannot generate agents if they are defined exclusively in terms of those 
agents in the first place. The consequence of making the individual 
ontologically primitive, in other words, is that the social relations in 
virtue of which thkt individual is a particular kind of agent with 
particular casual properties must remain forever opaque and
Wendt op cit p343 emphases in the original.
76 As epitomised by the works of Graham Allison, particularly Essence of Decision 1971, Boston: Little 
Brown; and John Steinbrunner The Cybernetic Theory of Decision Making 1974, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
46
untheorised.
It is just such "social relations" constituting the system, with which the analysis of 
the interorganisational network active in the armaments collaboration issue area is 
concerned. By failing to develop a social theory of the state, neo-realist functional 
analyses of regime development and change are seriously compromised in 
methodological terms. Keohane’s functionalist approach to regime emergence and 
change, attempts to explain cooperation in a post hoc fashion, accounting for the 
emergence of regimes in terms of their anticipated effects, functions, and their ability 
"to overcome the deficiencies that make it impossible to consumate 
even mutually beneficial agreements.
This definition is fundamentally agent oriented. Its unit level focus relies on the pre- 
theoretical assumption that agents, usually coterminus in this context with states, act 
as if to maximise a given value-be it power, wealth, security or stability.
In spite of Waltz’s separation of the theories of the state and of international relations 
however, an understanding of why states cooperate, that is in what situations they will 
cooperate to obtain rewards unobtainable through individual action, cannot accept 
states as given agents. Rather a theory must accept states as theoretically 
problematic, examining in direct terms the generative structures of the domestic and 
international political and economic systems, which constitute states as one particular 
kind of agent with ascribed characteristics such as causal powers and interests.
This conception does not allow the state to be regarded as an ontologically primitive 
variable. The emergence of cooperation and regime formation among states cannot 
be understood in isolation from systemic and structural factors, any more than it can 
without a social theory of the state. Similarly the state itself cannot be properly 
understood without reference to the structural environment within which it is set, and 
carries on social relations.
Functional theories make considerable use of game theory in their analyses of regime 
creation and change. This usage stems from a desire to explain cooperation and
”  Wendt op cit p343.
’* Keohane After Hegemony op cit p83.
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regime formation among egoistic actors, in the absence of any over-arching authority 
to enforce compliance.’  ^ The emergence of these phenomena often appears to be 
the result of a dilemma which posits incompatible choices between alternatives, where 
neither are optimal solutions, and both have desirable and undesirable effects. In 
international relations, the major focus in this vein has involved studies of the security 
dilemma,*® the free rider problem in the provision of collective goods*^  and the 
prisoners dilemma scenario, used by many disciplines as an approximation for a 
variety of social interactions.*^
It is not the purpose of this study to examine game theory in any detail, as the 
literature is rather extensive, and not central to the problem. It does, however, merit 
further examination, since certain studies treat game theoretic explanations as a 
separate factor in explaining regime formation and change.*  ^ Superficially game 
theoretic approaches to the creation of regimes are attractive, and theoretically 
economic methods of analysing very complex patterns of interaction. To avoid 
needless repetition of the basic features of prisoners dilemma or, as they are also 
known "Staghunt",*^  types of explanation, it is apposite in this context to examine 
the salient factors, encouraging a game theoretic approach, followed by a critique of 
such representations in the creation and development of regimes.
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See in particular the special edition of World Politics 1985, Vol 38 edited by Kenneth Oye. See also R H 
Wagner "The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation" American Political Science 
Review 1983 , 70:330-46. Once again, it is apposite to note that regimes and cooperation are not 
coterminus, since cooperation can take place without regimes. The attraction of game theory is that it 
purports to deliver a parsimonious explanation of why regimes should arise in cooperative environments.
Robert Jervis "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma" World Politics 1978, 30: 167-214, in particular 
pl69, whereby an increment in the level of security of one state decreases the security of, or is seen as a 
threat by, other states.
Especially as applied to collective defence efforts and burden sharing in multi-lateral military alliances. 
See M Olson and R Zeckhauser "An Economic Theory of Alliances" Review of Economics and Statistics 
1966, 48(3): 266-279.
Robert Axelrod The Evolution of Cooperation 1984, New York: Basic Books; and "The Emergence of 
Cooperation Among Egoists" American Political Science Review 1981, 75: 306-18.
See Haggard and Simmons, op cit pp504-06.
The term "staghunt" was originally used by Rousseau, see however Jervis 1978 op cit pl67; "if they 
cooperate to trap the stag they will all eat well. But if one person defects to chase a rabbit - which he likes 
less than stag - none of the others will get anything."
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The logic of prisoner’s dilemma (PD) and staghunt games delivers a potentially 
negative view of the opportunities for promoting cooperation among egoistic actors. 
Indeed realists can argue that the PD game epitomises the inevitability of conflict 
among actors, since if a state decided to defect, it gains at the expense of other 
actors. More detailed analysis of PD, especially by neo-realists such as Keohane, 
Jervis and Axelrod however, suggests that cooperation is stül possible. Whilst 
individually it may be very rational for an actor to defect in a PD game, this would 
result in a sub-optimal solution for the whole system; that is it would result in a 
collectively irrational outcome. Stein sees regimes as basically a response to the 
dilemma of collectively irrational outcomes, a facilitating mechanism for producing 
collectively rational outcomes from individually rational decisions to cooperate.*®
This point is reached via the iterated, or multiple play, PD game. Iterated games are 
dependent upon the "long shadow of the future"*® to stabilise cooperation by making 
the short run gains of defection less attractive than the long terms gains of 
cooperation, and the long terms losses of mutual defection. As Oye notes:
"the immediate gains from multilateral defection relative to unrequited 
cooperation must be balanced against the cost of diminished 
cooperation in the future. In both PD and staghunt, defection in the 
present decreases the likelihood of cooperation in the future. In both 
therefore, iteration improves the prospects for cooperation.*’
The dilemmas inherent in PD type games, characterised by interdependent decisions, 
uncertain actions by other actors and a mixture of conflictual and cooperative 
behaviour, can be seen to represent bargaining situations. The dilemma of common 
interests described by Stein** is one of securing mutual cooperation in an issue area 
requiring multiple transactions or iterated play, and represents a bargaining situation
*® Arthur Stein "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World" International Organisation 
1982, 36:299-324, notes that: "Sovereign nations have a rational incentive to develop processes for making 
joint decisions when confronting dilemmas of common interests or common aversions. In these contexts, 
self interested actors rationally forgo independent decision making and construct regimes."
*® Axelrod, op cit pl74
*’ Kenneth Oye, 1985 op cit pl4. Emphasis in the original.
** Stein, op cit p314.
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which may result in the formation of a regime. As Jonsson notes:
"an international regime may provide a normative and institutional 
framework for future negotiations,"*^
Prisoner’s dilemma can, therefore, appear to be a suitable method to reveal the types 
of conditions which enable cooperation and stability to emerge. Chances of a 
bargaining situation resulting in a new regime are enhanced with reference to the 
opportunity costs associated with future interactions, as well as immediate payoffs. 
Incentives to cooperate are thereby increased, since mutual cooperation becomes more 
profitable than one party cooperating while the other defects. Simultaneously, 
incentives to defect are decreased in relation to the gains of mutual cooperation. 
Mutual defection is still less attractive, due to its inherent tendency towards an 
anarchic state of nature.^
At least, in principle, game theory can cope with a high degree of complexity by the 
use of graduated games, extended or linked games and the integration of sub- 
games.^  ^ A number of problems are attendant on the use of game theory, however. 
Despite its utility in explaining the conditions under which regimes may result from 
cooperative behaviour, game theory has little to say about organisational structures, 
scope or change. Further, although game theory is parsimonious, it runs the risk of 
oversimplifying the complex dynamics of regime creation. Game theory copes with 
complexity by reducing the "choice sets" of actors into straightforward either/or 
decisions such as defect or cooperate. In reality choices in virtually all issue areas 
are continuous, highly complex and interdependent. Negotiation and bargaining 
involve, by their very essence, changes in preference, positions and timing which 
game theory appears ill-suited to explain.
As if problems of identifying and coping with the re-ordering of preferences were not
89 Jonsson, 1987 op cit p22
^  Jonsson further notes that "actors are more likely to agree on a regime the more they win and the less they 
risk by cooperating on the one hand, and the less they win and the more they risk by defecting on the 
other." ibid p23
91 Haggard and Simmons, op cit p505.
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enough however, the intensity with which players of the game are attached to theif' 
preferences is also important. Specifying such variables presents prodigious 
problems. >
"This effort must consider all relevât factors of the game 
environment: economic and technological conditions, domestic politics, 
transnational relations and the rules under which the game is played.
Deciding what the game is may be as difficult as solving it. One is
fjtempted to construct the payoff in tight of the outcomes, \yhich throws 
into question the predictive value of the exercise.
Unfortunately, therefore, the temptation to construct the payoff in tight of the 
outcomes results in determinism, the belief that what occur; is predetermined or 
inevitable. I
Attempts to extend game theory to cope with increased comj^ lexity have also been 
criticised, in that introducing sub-games, and linkages across games to other issue 
areas, detracts from the ostensible parsimony of the explanation. Overconcentration 
on the use of empirical methodology can obscure the subject at hand behind layers 
of inaccessible mathematical analyses.”
IAs was noted above, the development of iterated PD became attractive as it helped
to explain how egoistic actors could cooperate. The logic of complexi finterdependence, however, suggests that the dilemma inherent in many game theoretic
scenarios is redundant, or at least, much diminished. Many international actors, and
especially advanced industrialised democracies, already exhibit such high levels of
finterdependence that the "shadow of the future" is quite plain.^ Although PD 
provides useful insights into how regimes help prevent sub-optimal outcomes (by 
encouraging a healthy concern with the opportunity costs associated with future f
transactions outweighing immediate non-cooperative behaviour) it is not as useful in ^
”  Haggard and Simmons assert that "empirical studies too often lapse into descriptive history followed by
I
elaborate, and perhaps redundant, game theoretical argot" ibid p505. ,
Discussed by Joanne Gowa "Cooperation and International Relations" International Organisation 1986, 40: '
1<#46  ^ §
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explaining how regimes evolve and develop. Indeed there are, as Haggard and 
Simmons note, no really compelling theories of regime evolution at all.”
Finally, most studies of PD and game theory in the analysis of international 
cooperation tacitly assume the dominant role not only of unified and rational state 
actors, but also the predominance of the international over the national or domestic 
games. Little, if any, consideration is given to the effects of domestic processes, 
which are usually regarded as exogenous factors. This is not to say that game 
theoretical studies are of no value, since they do demonstrate the conditions which 
enable cooperation and stability to develop, and which may lead to the formation of 
regimes. A rejection of the closed system, rational actor typologies however, 
presupposes a game theoretic approach which takes account of the linkages between 
the domestic and international arenas, and also recognises explicitly the role of non­
state actors.”
Structuralism
Structural explanations have been the most common form of political analyses in work 
on regime variance and change. At a basic level, structuralism holds that changes in 
the structure of international power will engender the evolution of, or changes in 
existing, regimes. Conceptually, structural explanations represent the next level of 
aggregation after functional theories. Two modes of explanation are usually 
associated with structural analysis. First is the theory of hegemonic stability, which 
has been employed by both realist and neo-reahst analysts.” Although hegemonic
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Haggard and Simmons op cit p506.
For a review of the problems of game theoretic analyses, see D Snidal "Coordination versus Prisoner’s 
Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes" American Political Science Review 
1985, 79:923^2.
Keohane and Nye, 1977, op cit pp42-49, outline the realist vision. Realism emphasises the importance of 
power structures and predicts a strong tendency toward congruency in issue areas, that is an actor who is 
strong in general terms will be able to exert power across the board. As global power structures change, 
so will the regimes based on the previous distribution of power. Realism is strongly tied to the notion that 
states, seen as unitary, rational actors, remain predominant within the international system.
The neo-realist vision (ibid pp 50-51) holds that power, though still very influential, is not a wholly fungible 
commodity, especially in conditions of complex interdependence. Different issue areas can therefore be 
expected to exhibit different power structures, and linkages across issue areas may not be effective since 
power in one issue area may not be transferable, or even useful, in another.
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stability theory will be examined in more detail below,” it is apposite at this point 
to perform the more limited task of examining the structural credentials of hegemonic 
stability theory, and to briefly assess its utility as an explanation of regime 
development and change.
The central propositions of the theory are that regimes are typically created by a 
single dominant power, or hegemon, and that the maintenance of these regimes 
requires continued hegemony.” The concomitant of this belief is that declining 
hegemony produces weak or unstable regimes. Only a hegemonic actor is seen to 
have the resources and the desire to maintain regimes, and carry the cost of providing 
the collective goods needed to make the regime work effectively.
In recent years hegemonic stability has been heavily criticised however, both in 
theoretical and empirical terms, and to such an extent that doubt has been cast on the 
utility of the basic precepts of the theory.^ ®® Attempting to explain the structure of 
regime dynamics is made all the more problematic by the difficulties involved in 
analysing the effects of power. As Haggard and Simmons note:
"inferring interests from capabilities implies that there is some 
unambiguous way to assess the distribution of capabilities"^ ®^
Equating possession of a larger part of the distribution of capabilities with the ability 
or even interest in promoting a given international outcome is fraught with danger, 
since such an inference does not necessarily follow. An objectively weaker actor may 
be able to exhibit greater issue-specific power, or be more committed to obtaining a 
given outcome, such that it can prevail, or at least modify an outcome.
Further, since simple structural variables cannot be relied upon to predict regime 
characteristics, structural theories have tended in the past to utilise domestic
See Chapter 4 below which applies the various explanations of regime change set out in the present chapter 
to the armaments collaboration issue area. The intervening chapter will entail a description of regime and 
change within the said issue area.
”  Keohane 1985, op cit p31.
®^® See the more detailed critique of hegemonic stability theory in the following chapter.
®^^ Haggard and Simmons, op cit p501.
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explanations in m  ad hoc way to help explain the character of international 
regimes.^ ®’ By relying on the domestic political policies of the state, rather than 
its position in the international system however, the pre-eminence of structural theory 
is seriously damaged. At a more basic level, hegemonic stability theory can be 
challenged for its faüure to bring within its rubric consideration of the international 
system as a whole. Despite an obstensible desire to examine international structure 
as an explanation of regime maintenance and change, hegemonic stability theory has 
in fact been much more limited.
"The relevant structure is usually defined as the distribution of power 
within the international capitalist system rather than within the world 
political system as a whole; regimes are seen primarily as responses 
to the problems of collective action among advanced capitalist 
countries rather than as an integral part of high politics, and alliance 
solidarity."^ ®®
Linkages between economic and müitary-security concerns have been aü but ignored, 
and the effects of the structure of military cooperation on the economic cooperation 
habitually covered in hegemonic stability theory are seldom even recognised. It is 
even possible to criticise the supposed structural credentials of hegemonic stability 
theory, seeing it rather as a systemic rather than truly structural perspective. 
Hegemonic stability theory, in common with the functional perspective discussed 
above, presupposes its ontologically primitive unit - the state, and theorises regimes 
as a product of state action. It is difficult to reconcile this perception with the 
rejection of state-centric analyses attendant on post behaviouralist models as outlined 
in the previous chapter. Hegemonic stability theory engenders a limited conception 
of regimes, their make up, and their effects.
A more thoroughly structuralist perspective is apparent in the works of world systems 
theory, ^ ®^ which exhibits a much more explicit theoretical commitment to the
Ibid p501-02.
®^® Ibid p503. Emphasis in the original.
®^^ See Wendt, op cit pp344-49.
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structural aspects of the international system, whereas Wendt believes that neo-realist 
individualism, and the reductionism inherent in making states the ontologically 
primitive unit, represents a failure to understand structure as anything more than a 
distribution of capabilities. World systems theory represents a progressive shift in 
scale over neo-realism in that it offers a non-individualist and non-empiricist 
understanding of systems structures and structural analyses.^ ®® The basis of world 
system theory, exemplified by the work of Immanuel Wallerstein, is the proposition 
that the only meaningful unit of analysis in comparative and international political 
economy is the whole world system.^ ” In contrast to neo-realists, who see system 
structures in terms of observable relations between, or observable properties of, states 
as their ontologically primitive units, world systems theorists define the structure of 
the world system in generative terms.
A generative approach means that the fundamental structural ordering on the 
international system constitutes, or is seen to generate the unit level participants in 
the system. Wendt characterises this belief in the following way:
"The existence and identity of agents as agents, and therefore of their 
causal powers and real interests, is produced and therefore explained, 
by their relation to the totality of the capitalist world system. Thus, 
state agents are effects of the structure of the world system in much the 
same sense that capitalists are the effects of the capitalist mode of 
production, or slaves are the effects of the master-slave 
relationship."^”
In marked contrast neo-realist conceptions, world systems theory can, as a result 
make agents theoretically and empirically problematic. The state is regarded as an 
effect of its internal relations to other states and actors in the international system,
°^® Ibid p344.
Immanuel Wallerstein The Politics of the World Economy 1984, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
and The Modern World Svstem Vol 1 1974, New York: Academic Press, especially Chapter One. World 
systems theory, and particularly its approach to the agent-structure problem, has been linked to structural 
Marxism, and notably to the work of Althusser, who held to the theory that the whole had absolute 
ontological priority over the parts. See Steve Smith Reading Althusser 1984, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press pl77.
Wendt op cit p346. Emphasis in the original.
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rather than simply as an untheorised, given cause of international events.^ ®*
»
Structural explanations do, however, exhibit one similarity with functional theories, 
that is they make their basic theoretical unit (ip this case the Structure side of the 
agent-structure relationship, represented by the international sysfim) ontologically 
primitive. This reification, defined by Wendt as the belief that:
"certain social relations are irreducible and constitute the state and
class agents which are their elements, but that these relations are f
analytically independent of, and ontologically prior to, those
agents,”'® t^ ?can be seen as representing the ’opposite extreme to the neo-realist reductionism 
discussed above. In practice, world systems theorists treat the system as independent 
of state action, and characterises agents such as states as little more than passive 
bearers or enactors of systemic imperatives.
This tendency toward reification of the system at the expense of the state agents can 
be criticised for ignoring the dynamic role of agents within the system. The world 
systems theory explanation of why particular structures develop is deterministic in 
that although it can help explain behavioral conformity to the demands of a pre­
existing structure, it has little to say about how that structure developed. In éhort, 
world systems theory treats its ontologically primitive units as given and 
unproblematic, just as neo-realism treats states as given and unproblematic. Neither 
view can be accepted as an accurate description of the relationship between agents and 
structures. Î
An internal relation is defined as a necessary relationship between two entities, such that the entities depend 
upon the relation for their very identity, such as parent-child, master-slave, state-international system. The 
existence of each entity is dependent upon the other. An external relation describes a relation which is 
contingent between the two entities, that is, not a precondition of the existence of either party. Thus 
external relations may be reduced to the properties of the member elements, whereas internal relations 
cannot. See Wendt, ibid p346.
Ibid p347.
Evidence of this can be found in Wallerstein’s rather simplistic explanation of the fiindamentally important 
change from the feudal to capitalist modes of production, in The Modern World Svstem op cit. Since his 
structural framework prohibits a casual linkage ontologically between system structures and state agents, 
which would describe the transition as a combination of endogenous factors within the state, and exogenous 
factors conditioning the structure of relations, Wallerstein is forced to attribute the change to external 
shocks and the teleological imperatives of an imminent capitalist mode of production. -I
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The separation of the operation of system structures from the activities of agents 
within the system, is every bit as unsatisfactory as in its functionalist counterpart.
Structurationism
Structurationist theory has its roots in the field of sociology, being particularly 
associated with the work of Anthony Giddens and Roy Bhaskar,^ ^^  The approach 
is firmly based on the precepts of realist philosophy of sc ience ,a  doctrine which 
has prompted fierce debate within the philosophy of science community but has, as 
yet, made little impact in the realm of political science. For Wendt, the use of 
structurationist analysis in international relations theory avoids the shortcomings of 
neo-realist individualism and structuralist reification
"by giving agents and structures equal ontological status. This 
conceptualisation forces us to rethink the fundamental properties of 
state agents and system structures. In return it permits us to use 
agents and structures to explain some of the key properties of the 
other, to see agents and structures as codetermined or mutually 
constituted entities.
This explanation is deterministic, in that it posits that system structures are not ontologically dependent on 
state and class agents, but that they are inevitable, and could not have developed any alternative structure. 
Similarly, world systems theory tends to view general systemic wars as direct results of the reproduction 
requirements of the world system, seeing such requirements as prior to, and casual of, state conflicts. See 
Christopher Chase-Dunn and Joan Sokolovsky "Interstate Systems, World-Empires and the Capitalist World 
Economy: A Response to Thompson" International Studies Ouarterlv 1983, 27: 357-67.
Further, world systems theory encourages the view that the rise of socialist states, and their means of 
production, are consistent with, and indeed inevitable results of, the changing reproduction requirements 
of the world system. See Christopher Chase-Dunn Socialist States in the World Svstem 1982, Beverley 
Hill: Sage Publications, pp21-56.
Anthony Giddens Central Problems in Social Theorv 1979, Berkeley: University of California Press; The 
Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theorv of Structuration 1984, Cambridge: Polity Press; Roy Bhaskar 
The Possibility of Naturalism 1979, Brighton: Harvester Press.
Care must be exercised in distinguishing this "scientific realism" from the more common usage of realism 
and neo-realism as terms in political science.
As Wendt notes, op cit p366 footnote 4, the few extant treatments of scientific realism in the field of 
political science have emerged in the United Kingdom rather than the United States, for example; John 
Maclean "Marxist Epistemology, Explanations of Change and the Study of International Relations" in B 
Buzan and R Barry Jones (eds) Change in the Study of International Relations; The Evaded Dimension 
1981; 46-67, London: Frances Pinter; Richard Little "The Systems Approach" in Steve Smith (ed) 
International Relations: British and American Perspectives 1985: 79-91, Oxford: Blackwell.
Wendt, op cit p339.
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Structuration theory is potentially very important to the development of international 
relations theory, and sheds interesting new light on the development of the post- 
behaviouralist insights discussed in the previous chapter. Indeed structurationism may 
prove to be complementary to the inter-organisational concerns of post-behaviouralism 
derived from organisation theory, although both perspectives begin from different 
preconceptions.
It is apposite, therefore, to examine the basis of structuration theory. Wendt delivers 
a concise summary of structurationism, and highlights its implications for 
international relations. He also sets out a useful guide to the scientific realist 
precepts on which it is based. Structurationists hold that existing functionalist 
and structural analyses are inadequate as a result of their empirical basis. According 
to scientific realism, the empirical approach to natural science, upon which the social 
sciences have their foundation, is fundamentally flawed. As a result it will never 
result in a satisfactory mature theory, no matter how rigorously it is applied. The 
behaviouralist critique of the underdeveloped state of social science theories, resulting 
from their lack of scientific approach appears, to scientific realists, misdirected. The 
problem lies not with a failure to apply scientific principles, but with the conception 
of these principles in the first place.
Empirically based theories, as was noted in the previous chapter’s discussion of 
whether states could be said to act, lead to the logical assumption that entities cannot 
exist if one cannot, at least in principle, have direct sensory experience of them. 
Scientific realists term this "the problem of the ontological status of unobservables", 
"(empiricists) argue that we should remain, at most, agnostic about the 
existence of unobservable entities like quarks, utilities, or generative 
structures and what we should instead interpret the theoretical terms 
describing such entities, and the theories in which these terms are 
embedded instrumentally rather than realistically.
Ibid pp 350-61 and passim
Ibid pp350-55.
Ibid p351. Emphasis in the original.
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An instrumentai usage implies that the theory building and terminology can most 
practically be used as an instrument for organising and predicting experience. It 
cannot be used to justify abductive inferences about non observable entities, since this 
would run the epistemic risk of theorising about false entities. Abduction would hold 
that theoretical terms can refer to real but unobservable entities, and may therefore 
be legitimately utilised as a basis for theory building. Scientific realists then, unlike 
empiricists, do not subordinate ontology to epistemology. “*
Structurationist theory shares some basic assumptions with structural theories,but 
it diverges in its insistence that social structures differ in two important ways from 
natural structures. First is that social structures, unlike natural structures, do not 
exist in an independent sense apart from the activities they govern.^ ’® Social 
structures are only recognisable through the practices of agents, thus the state system 
exists only by virtue of the actions, practices and recognition of rules by states. The 
social structure is ontologically dependent upon its elements in a way that natural
A detailed analysis of structuration theory would necessitate a lengthy treatment outwith the scope of the 
present study. A further difference between empiricists and scientific realists is important enough, 
however, to merit further discussion. It concerns their competing conception of the nature and requirements 
of scientific explanation (see Wendt, op cit p353-54). The empiricist or nomothetic view holds that 
explanation of phenomena requires their subsumption under a law-like regularity. In contrast, the realist |
or retoductive approach, requires the identification of underlying casual mechanisms which physically |
generate the phenomena in the first place. As Wendt notes: -
I
"whereas the empiricist explains by generalising about observable behaviour, the realist explains
by showing how the (often unobservable) causal mechanisms which make observable regularities ]
possible work" (ibid p354). Emphasis in the original. ;
There are three implications of the different approaches of empiricists and realists for structuration theory: j
(a) Scientific realism concerns the analysis of what practising natural and social scientists in fact do, 
which is to constantly use abduction to posit causal mechanisms which are possibly unobservable.
Scientific realists, unlike empiricists, are not interested in prescribing on the legitimacy of certain
research practices as opposed to others. I
i
(b) Scientific realism can make legitimate use of unobservable generative structures, which are |
irreducible to, and generate their elements. ;
(c) Finally, although problems exist in translating natural scientific practices and discourse directly ?
to the social sciences, the basic scientific realist conception - that scientific explanation consists ;
in the identification of underlying causal mechanisms rather than in making generalisations on ?
observable regularities - does in fact apply to the social sciences.
As for instance in their view of structure as an irreducible entity which generates its elements and their ‘
possible transformations.
’^® Bhaskar op cit pp48-9.
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structures are not.
Second, social structures are dependent upon human self understandings. They do 
not, unlike natural structures, exist independently of the agents conception of what 
they are doing in their activity.
"This discursive quality does not mean that social structures are 
reducible to what agents think they are doing, since agents may not 
understand the structural antecedents or implications of their actions.
But it does mean that existence and operation of social structures are 
dependent upon human self understandings; it also means that social 
structures acquire their causal efficacy only through the medium of 
practical consciousness and action.
In structuration theory, social structures are ontologically dependent upon, and 
constituted by, the practices and self understandings of agents. The concomitant of 
this however, vital to the structurationist approach, is that the causal powers and 
interests of such agents are constituted and explained by structures, whether external 
social structures, or internal organisational structures. The internal organisation of 
an agent has important implications both for the goals it is likely to pursue, and its 
actual performance. Similarly certain interests, goals and causal powers of agents are 
dependent upon the external, or social structural context in which they are 
embedded.
Wendt op cit p359.
Ibid pp359-61. Wendt notes that: "the causal powers of the state - to maintain control over the resources 
and violence potential in a given territory, to act in an international environment free of legal compulsion, 
and so on - are conferred upon it by the domestic and international social structures in virtue of which it
is a state in the first place Thus, the balancer in a balance-of-power system, or a core state in the
capitalist world economy, has certain powers, responsibilities and interests which it possesses only in virtue 
of its social structural position." (ibid p360). Emphasis in the original.
Therefore in the case of the United States, any examination of its supposed declining hegemony must 
address itself, in structurationist terms to both the internal and external organisation and social structures. 
It is possible that the attempted drive by the Reagan administration to re-establish American predominance 
globally, and leadership within the Alliance, as well as in more specific areas such as armaments 
collaboration, ignores the external social structures within which the United States is embedded, and which 
have changed markedly since the era of outright American hegemony in the fifteen years after 1945. Seen 
in this light, it is unlikely that the resurgence of the United States will re-establish its former predominance.
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The innovation of structurationist theory is to posit that agents and structures are 
mutually constitutive, co-determined entities, which are however ontologically 
distinct. Structuration theory attempts to avoid the shortcomings o% individualist 
reductionism and structuralist reification by
"conceptualising agents in terms of the internal relations that define 
them as such, and by conceptualising social structures as existing only 
through the medium of the agents and practices that they 
constitute."^”
Structurationist theory has not, as yet, been developed in any great depth, and 
especially not in relation to the study of international relations. It does, however, 
elucidate the relationship between agents and structures as an explanation of state 
action. As such, structurationist theory echoes the concerns of this study, namely the 
emergence of multinational cooperation within a high politics issue area, in which 
states cannot be regarded as the only, or evendhe Most important, structures for 
bringing about desired outcomes. Account must also be taken of non-state actors, the 
interaction of domestio and international systems, linkages across issue areas and 
across the arbifrary functional areas into w^cli international society has been divided, 
such as politics, economics and so on.
CONCLUSION
Examination of the contending explanations of regime evolution, maintenance, and 
change has not delivered, and indeed was not intended to produce, a definitive 
statement on what constituted a regime, or whether regimes in fact matter in terms 
of the behaviour of the agents or structures of the international system. Jervis noted 
in his analysis of security regimes that
"if patterns of international relations can be explained by the 
distribution of military and economic power among the states, then the <■ 
concept of regime will not be useful. But if the connections between 
outcomes and national power are indirect and&ediated, there is more 
room for choice, creativity and institutions to regulate behaviour and
Ibid p360. !
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to produce a regime.
It is the contention of this analysis, that enough doubt exists on this problem of 
connecting national power to outcomes, to validate the study of armaments 
collaboration as an issue area, exhibiting high political content and cooperative 
behaviour.
The basic object of the analysis is to examine extant approaches to the emergence and 
perseverance of cooperation in the international system, in an attempt to ascertain 
how well they explain such behaviour. It may be objected that the concept of regimes 
cannot be fruitfully applied to issues of national security and high politics, such as 
armaments collaboration. Following from the analysis above however, the riposte to 
such an admonition must be that it is anomalous to attempt to utilise a theoretical 
concept which explains phenomena in one part of an academic field, but lacks utility 
in others. The analytical underdevelopment of regime theories can hardly be used as 
a justification for their lack of utility in areas of high politics.
The following analysis will posit the operation of a regime within the issue area in 
question. The next chapter will involve a discussion of regime evolution in the 
armaments collaboration issue area, with special reference to the debate on declining 
American hegemony. It will be followed by a chapter examining to what extent 
changes in the said regime can be accounted for by the theories outlined above.
Robert Jervis "Security Regimes" International Organisation 1982, 36: 357-78, p357.
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CHAPTER THREE 
REGIME EVOLUTION IN ARMAMENTS COLLABORATION
HEGEMONY AND ARMAMENTS COLLABORATION
The debate on the status of the United States’ perceived hegemony in the international 
political economy has produced an apparently perverse classification of the opposing 
schools of thought on the subject of hegemony within the academic community. 
Since the late 1960’s the accepted wisdom in international relations, and also among 
many historians and political economists, has held that the United States is undergoing 
a long term decline in its hegemonic position in the international system. Further, 
this descent from power is seen as a major determinant of instability and aimlessness 
in the international political economy.^  This realist conception, typified in the works 
of Keohane, Snidal, Gilpin, Wallerstein and Kindlegerger to name only the more 
influential proponents, exemplifies a changing, not to say dynamic, view of the 
development of the international system.
Strangely however, the groups of writers who have, relatively recently, begun to 
challenge the conventional wisdom, actually epitomise a conservative view of the 
prospects for the continuance of American hegemony. Despite this conservative 
outlook, these analysis remain sufficiently exceptional, to deserve the epithet radical, 
when studied in conjunction with the more conservative traditionalist school. Radical 
scholars such as Strange, Gill, Russett and Arrighi, argue that the United States 
retains as much, as possibly more, structural influence in the international system as 
it ever did in the past. Further, the radical critique rejects the inevitability thesis of 
hegemonic stability theorists, by arguing that the United States centrality in the global 
political economy represents a departure from earlier historic incidences of 
hegemony, as a result of the very different environment of the contemporary 
international system. The current American hegemony is, therefore, seen as
1 Susan Strange discusses the theoretical bases of the belief that the United States has lost her hegemony in 
"The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony." International Organisation 1987, 41: 551-574.
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fundamentally healthy, if not actually immortal.^
Before examining contending approaches to hegemonic stability theory, it is apposite 
to examine the theoretical implications of this debate in the armaments collaboration 
issue area, and particularly in the process of regime evolution in the North Atlantic 
area post 1945. The progress of, and prospects for, collaboration in the production 
of armaments both across the Atlantic and within Western Europe are profoundly 
influenced by the condition of American hegemony in the international system. This 
is true both directly in political-industrial terms, but also more indirectly in areas such 
as economics, technology and finance. If the realist analysis of hegemonic decline 
is accepted, there is likely to be greater scope for armaments collaboration, both as 
an attempt by the USA to reduce costs, and due to the incentive it would give the 
Europeans to increase cooperative efforts lest the Americans cut their overseas 
commitments. Conversely, if the "radical" assessment of the enduring structural 
nature of American hegemony is more accurate, there may be reduced scope for 
collaboration in armaments production. Where one stands on this question depends 
on where one sits, but a definitive answer presupposes greater in depth study both of 
the nature of American hegemony, and on the problems of promoting armaments 
collaboration.
In recent years collaboration in armaments production® has come to be seen as the 
litmus test of a more equitable relationship within NATO. As Strange notes,'^  the 
security structure which the United States dominates constitutes one of the four sides
Bruce Russett alludes to this problem in his article "The Mysterious Case of Lost Hegemony; Or, Is Mark 
Twain Really Dead?" International Organisation 1985, 39: 207-31. He maintains that: "Mark Twain did 
die eventually, and so will American hegemony. But in both cases, early reports of their demise, have been 
greatly exaggerated." ibid p231.
The term production will be preferred throughout the analysis in preference to procurement, since the latter 
denotes the more restricted process of how particular systems are chosen, rather than the more extensive 
process of identifying needs, planning, prototype design, testing, financing, research and development 
which make up the overall production process.
Strange, op cit pp565-66. The other 3 sides of the structure of the pyramid of American hegemony are 
deemed to be; first influence and control of knowledge, information and communication. Second, 
determining the structure of finance and credit, and finally controlling the system of production of goods 
and services. These structures are not unique to regimes according to Strange, but apply equally to 
families, villages and the world at large.
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of the pyramid of American structural hegemony. Notwithstanding the debate on the 
status of the said hegemony, armaments collaboration represents an important aspect 
of one of these four supporting sides. It is the contention of this analysis that the 
experience of armaments collaboration within the Atlantic Community over the past 
30 years may highlight some important points for the general debate on hegemony, 
as well as on the processes of regime formation and change.
The debate has, as Strange further notes,® assumed an ideological aspect, inasmuch 
as the liberal realist consensus chiefly associated with hegemonic stability theory, and 
the radical critique, both have preconceived notions on the progress of, and prospects 
for, armaments collaboration as a result of their general differences on the health of 
American hegemony.
The present analysis will argue that while hegemonic stability theory has some serious 
deficiencies, which are highlighted by the radical critique, the latter fails to take into 
account the very real constraints operative on the United States in the contemporary 
international system. Indeed the radical position may be mistaking a short term, and 
very conscious increment to American power resulting from the policies of the 
Reagan administration since 1980, for evidence of their preconceived position that in 
the long term the basis of American hegemony remains substantially intact.
Neither approach now appears to be a convincing account of American hegemony in 
and of itself. It is naturally important not to confuse and reify cause and effect in this 
regard. Maintaining that recent increases in armaments collaboration demonstrate 
ipso facto the decline of US hegemony, is no more defensible than arguing that the 
failure to achieve greater European cooperation in the production of armaments is 
evidence of continued American dominance. The armaments collaboration issue area 
represents only one facet of the hegemony question. It is nonetheless important, in 
that an analysis of its progress over the past three decades may contribute toward a 
more complete understanding of the overall picture.
5 Ibid pp555-59
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After examining the debate on the status of American hegemony, this Chapter will 
conclude with an analysis of the process of regime evolution in the armaments 
collaboration issue area, in terms of observable episodes of regime change between 
1949 and the present.
AMERICAN HEGEMONY: REFLECTIONS ON MARK TWAIN AND KING 
CANUTE
It is unexceptional that the conventional wisdom of the decline in American hegemony 
is under increasingly sophisticated attack within the international relations community.
The thesis that American economic, and even military, power has declined in relative 
terms since its apogee in the decade following 1945 seems to be confirmed by the 
daily spectacle of American budgetary and trade deficits, and increasing pressure on 
the defence budget. What are the fundamental causes of these apparent weaknesses?
Is the United States on the top of a slippery slope of vanishing hegemony, or do such 
scenario’s underestimate the great extent of American power and influence?
Traditionalist Conventional Wisdom
To an extent, it is misleading to talk of a traditionalist school or conventional wisdom 
in relation to hegemony, since the approach denotes a heterogenous body of opinion, 
revolving around the connection between the hegemon of a system and the stability 
of the said system.^  There has been little consensus on the attributes of a hegemon, 
since certain indicators are poor explanations for the ability of a state control I
outcomes.^  A body of theory has, however, been developed, which purports to 
explain what constitutes a hegemon, and how hegemonic power is used. It is known 
as hegemonic stability theory. As Duncan Snidal notes:
"The theory (of hegemonic stability) to state it baldly, claims that the presence 
of a single strongly dominant actor in international politics leads to 
collectively desirable outcomes for all states in the international system.
6
7
Ibid p554
Russett appears to be the first writer in this context to stress the fundamental distinction between a state’s 
power base and its ability to control outcomes. Russett op cit p208. David Baldwin stressed the 
importance of the "policy contingency framework" in his "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends 
versus Old Tendencies" World Politics 1979, 2:161-193.
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Conversely, the absence of a hegemon is associated with disorder in the world 
system, and undesirable outcomes for individual states.
The theory has assumed two different forms. The strong version contends that a 
hegemon will exert its power to impose stability within the global political economy. 
The weak version, on the other hand, allows that while a hegemonic power is a 
necessary precondition of order, it is not always sufficient, since disorder and 
instability can still occur in the system in spite of the presence of a hegemonic actor.^  
Snidal has pointed out that it may be simplistic to equate to lack of a hegemonic actor 
with instability, or the presence of such an actor with stability. Hegemons are 
capable, according to this thesis, of using their power and influence in a number of 
ways. The hegemony exercised may be beneficent, using example and persuasion, 
it may be beneficent but exercised with recourse to coercion, or it may simply be 
coercive and exploitative.
Proponents of hegemonic stability theory frequently exhibit a favourable view of the 
post war period of the pax Americana, regarding it as beneficial not only to Western 
interests, but to those of the international system as a whole. The formation of many 
international regimes during the American hegemony is frequently cited as evidence 
of the ability of the United States to use a combination of coercion, persuasion and 
her centrality in the global political economy, to promote her own interests as well 
as stability and continuity in relations between states and other transnational actors.
Increased disorder in the international system came to be associated, to hegemonic 
stability theorists, with the relative decline in American power. The apparently 
aimless and humiliating nature of American foreign policy during much of the 1970’s
9
Duncan Snidal "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory." International Organisation 1985,39:579-614. 
Emphasis in the original.
Strange, op cit pp554-55.
Duncan Snidal "Hegemonic Stability Theory Revisited" in Robert Gilpin US Power and the Multi-national 
Corporation: The Political Economv of Foreign Direct Investment. 1975, New York: Basic Books p34.
For example see Stephen Krasner (ed) International Regimes. 1986, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
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coincided with an increasingly unstable international political economy. The 
destruction of the Bretton Woods financial system, established in the immediate post 
World War Two period, and the move toward the non-convertability of the dollar for 
gold in 1971, appeared tantamount to an admission of defeat by the United States. 
A casual link between increased instability and dwindling American power was 
quickly assumed by hegemonic stability theory.
The loss of Britain’s hegemony in the early part of the 20th Century was seen in this 
context as a profoundly disturbing example, since it was believed to have contributed 
to the outbreak of World War One. Similarly, the failure of any one state to establish 
itself as a hegemon in the inter-war period was regarded as contributing toward the 
deepening of the Great Depression, and to the outbreak of World War Two.^ ^
Concern on the possible dangers of hegemony in the international system are 
frequently mitigated with reference not only to the dangers of anarchy in a non- 
hegemonic situation, but also to the concept of non-selfish leadership. This altruism 
is regarded as a precondition for the provision of certain institutional public goods, 
such as free trade, requiring the direction of a benevolent despot}^
"Thus hegemonic stability theory provides a strong normative justification for 
maintaining that American decline is unfortunate from the perspective of all 
the members of the international system.
12
13
14
15
See, for example, Snidal 1985 op cit p581 fii.l; Strange op cit p555.
Kindleberger saw the Great Depression as a systemic episode, rather than as the fault of the United States, 
although he believed that America’s lack of action exacerbated the problem. Charles P Kindleberger The 
World in Depression 1929-1939. 1973, London: Allen Lane, pp291-94. As Strange notes, op cit p556; 
"What such an integrated financial system really needed at such times of crisis .... was a leader or 
hegemon, which would maintain an open market for other countries’ surpluses, especially in primary 
products. The hegemon would also maintain a steady outflow of capital for productive investment and, as 
international lender of last resort, would keep an open discount window for distressed banks." See also 
Paul Kennedy The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Militarv Conflict from 1500- 
2000. 1988, London: Unwin Hyman, especially pp 151-158 on Great Britain as hegemon, pp224-232 on 
her pre-1914 position, and Chapter 6 pp275-346 on the coming of the Bipolar World.
Kindleberger op cit Chap 14, also "Systems of International Economic Organisation" in Dayid Calleo (ed) 
Money and the Coming World Order. 1976, New York: New York University Press, by the same author.
Snidal op cit p580
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Realist conventional wisdom in international relations is informed by an essentially 
Weberian conception of hegemony as power over,^  ^which colours the way in which 
problems involving changes in hegemony are posed and theorised. To realist 
commentators, American hegemony is in decline, and this process is inevitable as the 
lesson of historic hegemonies demonstrates.^  ^ This belief has done much to 
stimulate interest in the ability of regimes, or cooperative action, to substitute for a 
single actor hegemony.
What are the roots of the realist understanding of hegemony? Taking the Weberian 
definition referred to above as benchmark, realists equate hegemony with the 
dominance of one state in the inter-state system. The unequal distribution of political, 
economic and military capabilities will have important effects on the ability of a given 
state to impose its will on others, although it is accepted that a distinction must be 
made between potential and realised state power.
Realist views on power have considerable utility in examining aspects of interstate 
relations and foreign policy, but their overt concentration on state rather than civil 
society, weakens their applicability to the role of non-state organisations and forces 
which transcend national boundaries. Their narrow view of the .state refers to the 
institutional arrangements producing order as a result of the monopoly of legitimate 
coercive leadership capabilities, rather than to the state as more broadly understood, 
signifying the polity as a whole. In realist terms orderly peaceful relations
16
17
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20
Stephen Gill "American Hegemony: Its Limits and Prospects in the Reagan Era" Millenium 1986, 15:311- 
36.
The most recent exposition of the inevitability of hegemonic decline can be found in the work of the 
historian Paul Kennedy, who examines the collapse of great powers over the past 5 centuries. See The Rise 
and Fall of the Great Powers. 1988, op cit pp514-535,
For the theoretical basis of the realist approach, see Robert Cox "Social Forces, States and World Orders: 
Beyond International Relations Theory." Millenium 1981, 10: 126-55, particularly pp130-35.
See Gill, op cit p313.
Cox op cit pl26 for example asserts that: "the distinction between state and civil society made practical 
sense in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when it corresponded to two more or less distinct 
spheres of human activity or practice: to an emergent society of individuals based on contract and market 
relations which replaced a status based society, on the one hand, and a state with fiinctions limited to 
maintaining internal peace, external defence and the requisite conditions for markets on the other......
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between actors require the constant use, or threat of use, of sanctions or rewards by 
one of the actors who is relatively more powerful. In the domestic arena such an 
actor will be the state, but in the international arena the corresponding actor will be 
the hegemon. This is necessary since in a Hobbesian state of nature, which the 
international anarchy is deemed to represent in this view, order must be imposed and 
cannot simply be expected to develop in a vacuum.
Wallerstein sets out an important definition of hegemony in a collection of essays on 
the capitalist world economy. He regards hegemony as a continuum, rather than a 
static state of being, within the general rivalry in the positions of the great powers. 
Hegemony is seen as a rare and unstable situation;
"in which the ongoing rivalry between the so-called great powers is so 
unbalanced that one power is truly primus inter pares; that is one power can 
largely impose its rules and wishes (at the very least by effective veto power) 
in the economic, political, military, diplomatic and even cultural arenas. The 
material base of such power lies in the ability of entire enterprises domiciled 
in that power to operate more efficiently in all three major economic areas - 
agro-industrial production, commerce and finance.
American hegemony in the post 1945 era is viewed by realists against this background 
of studies in the rise and fall of previous hegemonies, and the sequence in which the 
hegemon attains, and subsequently loses its position. If hegemony is seen as the 
ability to maintain an order in the international system conducive to continued 
domination by a state with superior utilisable resources of power, then hegemonic 
decline must similarly involve a range of factors exhibiting the inability of the 
hegemon to perpetuate its dominion.
A number of studies, including those of Wallerstein on the United Provinces (Dutch)
Today however, state and civil society are so interpenetrated that the concepts have become almost purely 
analytical and are only very vaguely and imprecisely indicative of distinct spheres of influence."
Immanual Wallerstein The Politics of the World Economv: The States The Movements and the Civilisations 
1984, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p39.
22 Ibid pp38-9.
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hegemony in the seventeenth century, which he applies to the nineteenth century 
British and twentieth century American cases,Gilpin on the rise and fall of various 
empires, great powers and hegemonies throughout history,^ and particularly the 
seminal work of Braudel,^  have examined the development of hegemonies. The 
latter portrays the relationship between social forces, and the changing nature of 
relations within and between the state and global systems, on a vast canvas 
encompassing the whole world. Braudel suggests that there is a pattern in the rise 
and decline of hegemonies. The only considerable change observable in the modem 
era is in the relative speed of the process. Whereas in the pre-modem period many 
centuries might be needed for the rise and decline of a hegemony, the same 
phenomenon in the contemporary intemational system for the American hegemony 
is deemed to have taken little more than a generation.^ **
As both GUI and WaUerstein note,^  ^ the historic pattem has been of superiority in 
agriculture and industry, leading to dominance in commerce and invisibles such as 
transport, communications and insurance. Commercial primacy in tum leads to 
control of the financial sector. This process is the bedrock upon which hegemony is 
constructed. However;
"At some point in the evolution of hegemony the costs and benefits of 
expansion reach an equilibrium, and thereafter a tendency emerges for the 
costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the capacity of the 
dominant state to finance its maintenance.
23 See I Wallerstein The Modern World System Vol 2, 1980, New York: Academic Press, especially pp 38- 
39; also Wallerstein 1984, op cit pp39 - 43. Wallerstein believes that these are the only true hegemonies 
which have emerged. In addition see Mark E Rupert and David P Rapkin "The Erosion of US Leadership 
Capabilities" in P M Johnson and W R Thomson (eds) Rhythms in Politics and Economics. 1985, New 
York: Praeger.
24 Gilpin, 1975 op cit ppl56-79.
Fernand Braudel Civilisation and Capitalism 15th - 18th Century. 3 Vols, 1984, London: Collins. 
Gilpin op cit pp157-66, contends that the pax Americana began to decline after barely 40 years. 
Gill op cit pp 314-16, Wallerstein 1984 op cit pp37-50.
Gill ibid p314. See also Kennedy 1988 op cit pp432-35, 525-535.
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A number of internal and external factors can be identified as contributing toward the 
erosion of hegemony. Gilpin offers four major explanations.^  ^ Two of these are 
internal and two are external. First is the internal inability of the hegemon to finance 
its military commitments in the long term, as a result of structural changes in the 
economy of the state. Stagnation of the domestic economy and loss of dynamism in 
the face of challenges from rapidly growing, innovative economies abroad, twinned 
with an over-extended military stance, leads inevitably to fiscal crisis. Budgetary 
deficits and difficult choices in the priorities for funding and policy making are seen 
as organically linked to a loss of technological dynamism.
A second and closely related internal change is the movement from agriculture 
through manufacturing into service sectors of the economy. Again this is held as 
evidence of loss of dynamism, in that the innovative sectors of the economy come to 
be less important than the invisible, non-productive service sectors, which cannot 
serve as motors of technological innovation or competiveness even if they are 
profitable.
The remaining two explanations are external but inter-related phenomena. First is the 
increasing cost of political dominance. The benefits which accrue to the role of 
hegemonic policeman to the intemational system are outweighed by the costs, 
especially in view of the free rider problem in intemational security.^ ® Second is 
the loss of economic and technological leadership to competitors, who are unburdened 
by the costs of acting as hegemon, and therefore enjoy better growth rates, lower 
security costs, a competitive edge, and the ability to take advantage of military and 
technological innovations which the hegemon has neither the will or the ability to 
keep to itself.
According to this perspective, hegemony is a temporary and increasingly short term
29 Gilpin op cit pl79.
Mancur Olson in his analysis of the provision of public goods explained how America’s allies could act 
with apparent impunity as free riders on the security provided by the United States, largely at American 
expense, in The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theorv of Groups. 1965, Cambridge 
Mass: Harvard University Press. See also M Olson and R Zeckhauser "An Economic Theory of 
Alliances" Review of Economics and Statistics 1966, 48(3): 266-279.
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occurrence in the intemational system. In relation to contemporary American 
hegemony, the implication is that, not only is this hegemony being eroded, but that 
the process is inexorable, A combination of the loss of economic primacy and the 
rise of competing centres of military and economic power, as well as growing 
American interdependence with the intemational system, make it apposite to question 
not whether American hegemony is in decline, but how far this inevitable decline has 
progressed.
To realist analysts evidence of hegemonic decline follows from diminution of the 
ability of the United States to maintain what Kindlegerger has identified as the three 
basic duties of a hegemon. First is the maintenance of a relatively open market, what 
Strange calls a predisposition toward liberalism. Second is an outflow of capital 
for investment, and lastly the provision of a stable intemational currency.Before 
pronouncing on the utility of realist approaches to hegemony however, it is important 
to deal with the radical challenge.
The Radical Critique of Hegemonic Stability
The radical critique of the prospects for American hegemony in the contemporary 
intemational system outlines a very different perspective from the traditional 
hegemonic stability model. An analysis of its main points also usefully highlights, 
and provides more detail on, the main precepts of hegemonic stability theory. 
Although hardly numerous, proponents of the radical school are subjecting the 
conventional wisdom of hegemonic decline to an increasingly challenging and 
sophisticated critique. Bmce Russett, Giovanni Arrighi, David Calleo and especially 
Susan Strange are all indicative of the radical challenge.^  ^ Their findings have
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Strange op cit p536.
Kindleberger maintains that: "the 1929 Depression was so wide, so deep and so long because the 
international economic system was rendered unstable by British inability and United States unwillingness 
to assume responsibility for stabilising it in three particulars: (a) maintaining a relatively open market for 
distress goods; (b) providing counter cyclical long term lending; (c) and discounting in a crisis." 
Kindleberger, 1973 op cit pp291-92. See also Chap 14 passim for a more detailed discussion.
Russett, 1985 op cit; Susan Strange "Interpretations of a Decade" in Loukas Tsoukalis (ed) Intemational 
Relations in the 1970’s. 1985, London: Groom Helm, and her "Still an Extraordinary Power: America’s 
Role in a Global Monetary System" in R E Lombra and W E Witte (eds) Political Economy of International 
and Domestic Monetary Relations. 1982, Ames 10: Iowa University Press. Strange also contributed the
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thrown a considerable degree of doubt on the validity of hegemonic stability theory.
To radical analysts there are significant structural continuities in the character of 
American hegemony in the post 1945 period. Despite an admitted decline in the 
"material aggregates of US power",^  the very scale and centrality of the American 
political economy allows the USA to exert extensive and continuing influence within 
the global system. Indeed, Stephen Gill argues that American hegemony and its 
centrality in the global political economy has been re-emphasised and even, in certain 
important respects, enhanced.^  ^ Further the notion that hegemonic decline is 
inevitable has been rejected by the radical school, who regard the hegemony 
established by the United States as distinct from previous patterns. The pax 
Americana is seen as being of an altogether more comprehensive and permanent kind 
that its precursors. What indications of this longevity can be discerned however?
The most important factor, as recognised by GiU, is the ability of the hegemon to 
control outcomes,^ ® or as Deutsch puts it, the ability to "prevail in conflict and 
overcome obstacles. To an extent unprecedented in world history, the United 
States was able to use her overweening, if not absolute dominance in the immediate 
post-war period^ * to establish the parameters of the liberal intemational economic 
order (LIEO). The fundamental characteristics of the capitalist system which so
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solitary dissenting article in an otherwise traditionalist orientated special issue of Intemational Organisation, 
"Cave, Hie Dragones! A Critique of Regime Analysis" Intemational Organisation 1982. 36: 479-96. See 
in addition her "The Persistent myth of Lost Hegemony" 1987 op cit; Giovanni Arrighi "A Crisis in 
Hegemony" in S Amin, G Arrighi et al Dynamics of Global Crisis. 1982, New York: Monthly Review 
Press: 55-108; Stephen Gill 1986, op cit; David Calleo Beyond American Heeemonv: The Future of the 
Western Alliance. 1988, New York: Basic Books.
Gill ibid p311.
Ibid p312.
Gill op cit p321; Russett op cit p213 contends that: "surely it is control over outcomes that really interests 
us. If we are to have a matter worth investigating, we must identify hegemony at least with success in 
determining and maintaining essential rules, not merely with power base or resource share. Hegemony is
a condition in which one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate
relations, and willing to do so.
Karl Deutsch The Analysis of International Relations 2nd edn 1978, Englewood Cliffs NT: Prentice Hall. 
Wallerstein 1984 op cit pp37-44, notes that total omnipotence cannot exist within an interstate system.
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dominated the international economy, was a reflection of American ideals, supported 
by the integral strength and stability of the US system, her lack of domestic damage 
as a result of war, and her vastly greater relative strength compared to other actors 
in the system in 1945.^  ^ The United States had delivered to the international 
community, security, in terms of peace among the advanced industrial states, and 
prosperity in the sense of developing and maintaining the conditions for, and the 
regimes which supported the LIEO.'^
Russett discusses the pacification of relations among capitalist states, and the 
existence of a de facto security community among the OECD states. While conceding 
that the stable peace between the capitalist states, and between the superpowers has 
been of little benefit to the Third World, Russet argues that it has allowed 
transnational expansion of corporations into the less developed states within a reliable 
legal framework. In addition, certain states and elites have benefitted from the 
resulting development. Although the system is far from perfect, it is argued that it 
does demonstrate the continued centrality of the United States, and American 
multinational corporations over an extended period. Finally, superpower deterrence, 
even if it cannot be characterised strictu sensu as a regime, exhibits the centrality of 
the USA in establishing norms and rules of behaviour. Russett goes as far as to claim 
that:
Immanuel Wallerstein "The Reagan Non-revolution, or the Limited Choices of the US" Millenium. 1987, 
16; 467-72. Wallerstein concentrates on American hegemony in relation to four arenas; the United States 
itself, the Third World, the USSR and Communist bloc, and other industrialised democracies. He argues 
that hegemonic control of all four areas began to diminish in the late 1960s and that the so called Reagan 
revolution has failed: "The lesson of the Reagan era is that machismo as a response to US decline is 
certainly not more, and probably a lot less, effective than the Nixon-Ford-Carter realist approach. 
Objective reality sets limits on policy makers. One can defer negatives, minimise losses, manoeuvre to 
retain some (if less) advantage, but one cannot command the waves to halt" ibid p472. Emphasis in the 
original. Hegemonic dominance in relation to the USSR and Eastern Europe signifies the ability to contain 
the spread of communism. The acceptance of the Iron curtain across Europe meant that American 
hegemony could do little to help communist dominated satellites, except insofar as this weakened the Soviet 
Union. The end of the Cold War changes the rules in this regard.
40 Arrighi op cit p77 notes that: "The pacification of capitalist interstate relations and the imperial guarantee 
against nationalisation created a reliable world legal framework which reduced the risks of transnational 
expansion; decolonisation opened up the entire periphery to primary transnational expansion based on 
competitive advantage rather than monopolistic privileges with which rival metropolitan states had 
increasingly enmeshed their colonial possessions; the gold-dollar standard restored the possibility of 
capitalist accounting on a world scale, thus enhancing secondary transnational expansion which depends 
decisively upon reliable calculations of the cost advantages of alternative locations of production."
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"The element of building rules and norms was especially 
important during the era of detente, and then it seems the term 
regime fits as well as it does in its wide implication in political 
economy.""*^
Despite growing complex interdependence with her allies in Europe and Japan, and 
their growing relative strength, the balance remained in favour of the United 
States.'^  Revisionist scholars have proposed the existence of an organic alliance 
structure between these states by virtue of their common security systems, and
Russett op cit p217. It might be argued that it is not possible to be hegemonic and part of a dualistic 
relationship, such as the US-USSR duality. In this case however, the USSR plays such an insignificant part 
in the intemational political economy that it cannot be characterised as being in the same league as the 
United States in hegemonic terms. Whatever her military strength, the Soviet Union is hardly capable of 
replacing the USA as hegemonic power.
Russett op cit p218.
Wallerstein 1987, op cit pp469-70 notes: "The institutionalisation of US hegemony worked marvellously 
well in the 1950’s, the Eisenhower days. The world economy was steadily expanding and the US was 
economically flourishing. The standard of living of almost all strata was rising. Internal dissent was first 
crushed, then coopted out of existence. On the world scene, the US construction of its alliance network 
and its containment of the USSR was translated into the very visible automatic majority on everything in 
the United Nations. There was to be sure a very nasty war in Korea, but it was a draw and could be seen 
as the last part of a phase establishing hegemonic institutions, not really a challenge to them.
Decolonisation had gotten off to a splendid start in the British, Dutch and US empires ........  and to
somewhat weaker start in the French. Generally speaking, despite Bandung, US benign neglect of the 
Third World seemed to be working. "
44
In terms of international prosperity, or even more broadly the economy, the i
achievement of the United States lay in forcing the pace of decolonisation of the Third j
World, opening new markets and raw materials to the capitalist system. Similarly, i
1the USA succeeded in containing the spread of communism into her major allies in j
Western Europe, Japan, and the Mid-East, dominating the United Nations for a long
Iperiod, and assisting the economic recovery of her allies. As the "most efficient |
capitalist",the United States engineered the regimes in intemational trade and IIfinance, and in security, creating thereby enormous economic opportunities on an I
intemational scale. The USA was naturally, and according to the revisionist school I
remains, at the hub of the system."^  ^ j
See R Keohane and J Nye Power and Independence: World Power In Transition 1977, Boston: Little 
Brown.
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politico-economic interdependence/  ^ Gill believes that a subsidiary effect of this, 
apart from facilitating the expansion of (mainly American) transnational corporations, 
was to ensure the growth of the military-industrial complex in the USA, which 
assumed an increasingly important part in the American economy and polity. Taken 
together, these powerful vested interests perverted the model of liberal democracy. 
Capitalism became, in the eyes of many, oligopolistic and militarist, supporting a 
foreign policy which gave succour to dictatorships and repression, rather than 
promoting liberal-democracy.'^
The creation of an institutionalised political framework for world capitalism virtually 
presupposed US hegemony.'*'^  The novel factor according to the revisionist critique, 
and where they diverge from the realist model, is that the organic alliance, based 
upon the dovetailing of political, economic and military structures of the advanced 
capitalist states, implies a structural change in the process of intemational relations, 
exhibiting considerable continuity in US hegemony. As Gill notes:
"central to this was the compromise between the gradual liberalisation of the 
world capitalist economy and the interventionist imperatives of domestic social 
democracy, and a general military commitment to contain the spread of Soviet 
communism. This congmence enabled the institutionalisation of US 
hegemony, and the careful construction and maintenance of intemational 
regimes embodying the principles and values favourable to the US."***
In short, a series of trade-offs were operative between the USA and her allies, 
involving pragmatic compromises on both sides. The end result, however, was
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See Gill op cit pp321-22; and Russett op cit pp217-18.
Gill op cit p322.
Arrighy (1982, op cit p65) considers that US hegemony derives from a number of factors, including: the 
core position of the US national economy in the global economy, its internal reserves of energy and natural 
resources, the great size of its internal market and the density of its contacts and their complexity with other 
capitalist economies. There is according to these factors a basic asymmetry between the US economy and 
other national economies, since conditions in the US economy affect those abroad much more than vice- 
versa. This asymmetry remains, although in a lessened form, and in any case, Arrighy attributes any 
decline in US hegemony not to a diminution of US power, but to external factors.
Gill op cit p322.
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institutionalised US political and security domination, tacitly accepted by the other 
states, as long as the Americans were willing to tum a blind eye to their free-riding 
on US military commitments. This allowed the Europeans and Japanese to divert 
scarce resources to social welfare expenditure, research and the promotion of their 
economic welfare.
Clearly radical analysis of contemporary American hegemony represents a 
fundamental challenge to one of the accepted phenomena of intemational relations. 
If, as radical doctrine insists, US hegemony remains substantially intact, the 
implications are profound. The radical critique raises a number of important 
questions for traditional realists to ponder, even if it is, as yet, somewhat 
underdeveloped theoretically.
Perhaps the most fundamental of these points, refers to the concomitants of a decline 
in hegemonic power. According to the radical schema, it ought logically to be the 
case that if conditions of decline actually pertain, then relations among the 
industrialised countries should change, and that the organic alliance referred to above 
would exhibit breakdowns, or at least a shift in balance away from the declining 
hegemon. To radicals, this has not happened, and is strong evidence against the 
realist percention. Although realists emphasize the mitigating roles played by 
regimes, intemational organisations and domestic political systems in promoting 
continued cooperation in conditions of lost hegemony,**^  radicals insist that some 
change should still be evident if the realist case holds tme.
Russett argues, on the contrary, that despite common problems, the bases of the 
organic alliance can hardly be said to be less strong than in the past. Continued US 
nuclear predominance over her allies, their inability to establish their own nuclear 
deterrent on a joint basis and possible development of ballistic missile defence (BMD) 
systems by the superpowers, actually increased US bargaining power vis-a-vis her
See Keohane op cit p34.
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Western allies/® certainly in the pre 1989 context.
Another point put forward by radicals is that the structure of a relatively open world 
economy has not been significantly challenged. It remains relatively intact. Out and 
out trade wars have been quite rare, and despite voluntary export curbs, particularly 
by the Japanese, the increased pressure has not led to any major derogations from the 
basic principles of trade liberalisation, GATT, and the convertibility of currencies.^  ^
If the United States can no longer exert unilateral pressure to obtain her preferred 
goals, radical analysis attributes this to the adoption of a more realistic mixed 
strategy, which combines elements of multi-lateral cooperation, unilateral action and 
increasingly, bi-lateral agreements, within a general framework of continued 
American dominance. The hegemony may be more indirect, more diffuse and 
flexible than in the past, but this is, according to radicals, the result of a conscious 
American decision. Such a strategy is regarded as more efficient and effective in the 
long term, rather than being indicative of weakness or imperial overstretch on the part
50
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Russett op cit pp219-20. It is notable in this context that Strange, 1987 op cit pp565-66 includes security 
structures as one of the four fundamental props of hegemonic power, noting: "The fundamental asymmetry 
in the security structure of the non-communist world that is often and easily overlooked in contemporary
discussion of international economic issues ....... The preponderant power of the United States in die
security structure operates on land, at sea, in the air and (most markedly) in space. There is no comparison 
between such a universal basic force and the very limited naval preponderance which was the main backing 
to British economic power in the earlier period of supposed hegemony." ibid p566.
Keohane (op cit p213) accepts that trade wars have not taken place despite economic distress and an erosion 
of the trade regime, but attributes this to the actions of mitigating factors and growing complex 
interdependence. Susan Strange has pointed out that world trade since 1945 has fallen only once, in 1982, 
and then by a scant 1 %. Further the increase in world trade, adjusted for inflation, between 1973-83 was 
between 6 and 7 %, whereas between 1926-35 it dropped no less than 28 %. See "Protectionism and World 
Politics." Intemational Organisation. 1985, 39 passim. Strange also analysed (1987 op cit pp566-71) 
continued US dominance of the worlds’ production structure, finance and credit availability and "knowledge 
structure".
Russett notes that: "The United States can use the attractiveness of its financial markets, with 
high interest rates to finance its military build up with other peoples money." op cit p220.
It can be argued that huge American budget deficit is, in fact, an American tactic to finance 
her continued dominance by using external sources, since she is unwilling to increase taxation 
to do so at home. David Calleo argues that successive American administrations have 
attempted the impossible, to finance military supremacy and national welfare programmes with 
inadequate budgetary resources. See his The Imperious Economv. 1982, Cambridge Mass: 
Harvard University Press. Also David Calleo, Harold van B Cleveland and Leondard SUk 
"The Dollar and the Defence of the West" Foreign Affairs 1988, 66:846-62.
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of the USA, leading to a retrenchment as the realists insist/^
The radicals have also heavily criticised the realist analysis of institutions and |
regimes, especially in respect of their use of collective goods theory. Russett insists Î
'S  ithat: I
" the characterisation of hegemonic American as predominantly supplying itself I
and others with collective goods is inaccurate. Even for those goods which 
can be correctly called collective, the United States has not paid at all I
disproportionate costs. i
Much of the literature on regimes characterises US support for regime building as the ;j
result of enlightened self-interest, that is a mixture of self-interest in terms of i
procuring private goods for its own enjoyment, but also altruism in subsidising the 
provision of collective goods for other states. The implication is that the USA was 
prepared to pay quite a high price in the immediate post 1945 period to establish a 
system which would prevent another war, and return the investment in long term j
benefits.^ :
Gill op cit pp315-16. It should be noted that whereas both realist and radical analysts see the emergence 
of a more flexible, mixed strategy on the part of the United States in its relations with the industrialised 
states, and its attempts to maintain the LIEO, this new strategy is seen to have developed for very different 
reasons. To realists such as Keohane, it reflects inevitable hegemonic decline, and the constraints of 
interdependence, leading the USA to adopt a more cooperative strategy to maintain its, poAtlcal and 
economic hegemony and the stability of the intemational system. (R Keohane AftéV Heeemonv: 
Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economv 1985, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
particularly Chapter 4 "Cooperation and International Regimes" pp49-64).
To radical analysts however, the new strategy, although accepting a relative decline in US 
power, is simply a logical response to changing circumstances in the international system. It 
does not ipso facto represent a loss of the said hegemony, rather a more efficient use of US 
resources from a position of entrenched, structural dominance, the basis of whicW has not 
substantially altered. (Gill op cit pp320-22). American hegemony represents, in this light, a 
new chapter in world history, such that "(The Gramscian metaphor) of an organic alliance 
implies that US post war policies have produced a structural change in^intemational relations, 
one that has a great deal of permanence and continuity." (ibid p322).
Russett op cit p231. See also Gill op cit pp222-28. This conception also casts serious doubt on the 
perennial problem of burden sharing, and American complaints that the Europeans are "free-riding" on 
American defence efforts.
Keohane After Heeemonv. op cit p270, and "The Demand for Intemational Regimes." International 
Organisation 1982, 36: 325-56; B M Russett and J D Sullivan "Collective Goods Theory and International 
Organisation" Intemational Organisation 1971, 25; 845-65. See also the special edition of International 
Organisation (Spring, 1982) on regimes, later published, edited by Stephen Krasner as: International
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As Russett notes, the application of collective goods theory to the construction of 
regimes involves a number of questionable implicit assumptions/  ^ First is that the 
collective good wiU be provided to a sub-optimal degree, since even a hegemon will 
be unable to force other members to pay adequate contributions toward the provision 
of the goods. Second, the cost of providing these goods will be carried to a 
disproportionate degree by the hegemon, despite the goods being as important to the 
free-riders as they are to the hegemon.
Lastly is the common indirect application of collective goods theory to questions of 
hegemonic stability, which holds that the hegemon must be willing to shoulder the 
short term costs typically incurred in the provision of collective goods (even if these 
are unequally distributed), in order to ensure the long term g a i n s . T o  realist 
analysts the United States has, increasingly, neither the ability nor the will, nor 
indeed the resources necessary to act as hegemon. America has weakened herself by 
bankrolling those unwilling to share the costs of providing collective goods.
According to radical analysts however, this approach represents a faulty application 
of collective goods theory, and a misperception of the extent to which the goods at 
stake are not public, but private.^ "^  A collective (or public) good must fulfil two 
basic criteria. One, it must exhibit nonrivalness, which means that it must be able 
to be enjoyed simultaneously by different actors, such that no individual’s 
consumption of the good will lead to a reduction in the supply available to others. 
Second, the collective good must exhibit nonexclusiveness. This involves the inability 
of actors to prevent non-contributing actors from participating in the collective good. 
This is likely to depend both on the technical characteristics of the goods in question,
Regimes. 1986 (4th edn) London: Cornell University Press.
Russett, 1985 op cit p223.
Deterrence, security communities and the LIEO have all been characterised as long term collective goods 
which merit considerable initial investment. Joseph Nye, in "US Power and Reagan Policy" Orbis 1982, 
26:391-412, makes the important distinction between long term, irreversible and short term, reversible 
causes of the relative US decline.
Russett 1985, op cit pp223-24. See also Snidal op cit pp590-95.
58 Nonrivalness is also known as "jointness of supply", ibid pp590-91.
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and more importantly, on the nature of the political order in which they are 
produced/  ^ Private goods lack both of these qualities.
In practice of course, it is virtually impossible to find any collective goods which are 
perfectly nonrival or nonexclusive. Rather, the goods must be conceptualised as lying 
along a continuum, being either more or less nonrival or nonexclusive. Radical 
analysts have held that the collective goods of deterrence, stable peace, and the liberal 
trading order, when seen in these terms, represent not only goods which are private 
to the United States, but that as a result, the conclusion that US hegemony is 
declining, is illogical. The American ability to secure these goods remains strong.^
The stable peace operative especially among the industrialised states, can be 
characterised as nonrival (although the literature of the dependencia theorists would 
argue that the peace in the industrialised "North", has been achieved by the 
exploitation of the Third World or "South").It can hardly be seen as nonexclusive 
however, since the decision can be made to exclude certain areas or individual actors.
In examining prosperity, as represented by an open world economy, a mixture of 
rival and nonrival components can be discerned. An open intemational trading 
system, with prosperous, stable and expanding markets produces general prosperity, 
which is nonrival. In a capitalist system however, competition will ensure that certain 
actors WÜ1 suffer, and others will profit from this; which is therefore not nonrival. 
Similarly, prosperity has exclusive and nonexclusive elements. States may refuse to 
trade with other states, or introduce most favoured nation systems^  ^ or free trade 
agreements. Also, even in a relatively open economy, quotas and common markets
59 Ibid p592.
^  Russett 1985 op cit pp223-24.
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On the dependencia school, see the special edition of Intemational Organisation 1978, 32:1, entitled 
"Dependence and Dependency in the Global System". See also Tony Smith "The Underdevelopment of 
Development Literature" World Politics 1979, 31: 247-288. One of the earlier dependencia theorists was 
André Gunder Frank who wrote; On Capitalist Underdevelopment 1975, Bombay: Oxford University Press 
and Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment 1978, London: MacMillan.
A A Stein "The Hegemon’s Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States and the Intemational Economic 
Order," Intemational Organisation 1984, 38: 355-86.
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may still exclude certain actors from the enjoyment of the collective good.
Deterrence cannot be characterised as exclusively nonrival or nonexclusive either, 
although it satisfies both criteria to an extent. However, deterrence is an element of 
security,**^  and must be twinned with the willingness to defend, and defence is much 
more of a private good. Defence can be seen as rival, as for instance during the 
Vietnam War, when the Europeans voiced concerns that the US preoccupation in 
South East Asia adversely affected European security. In addition, areas can be 
excluded from a defensive or deterrent agreement.
As Rasler and Thompson have noted,^ there are particular private benefits for a 
commercially extended hegemon, such as the USA in providing defence for others, 
which have little to do with an altruistic desire to provide collective goods.**^  There 
is a strong incentive for states to provide their own security by substantial investment 
of resources, due to the private goods nature of defence. Further, such provision 
pays important indirect dividends including internal security, stimulation of high 
technology industries, employment among defence contractors, exports of military 
equipment, and even more unquantifiable effects such as prestige. Therefore, 
although certain aspects of security policy can be regarded as collective goods, this 
is not the major incentive for a state to allocate resources to its defence.^
63 Russett 1985, op cit p224.
^  Karen Rasler and W R Thompson "Global Wars, Public Debts and the Long Cycle" World Politics 1983, 
36: 489-516.
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Susan Strange (1987, op cit p562) characterises American liberalism, and therefore willingness to provide 
collective goods, as expedient rather than altruistic: "it is hard to see American liberalism in the 25 years 
after World War H as genuine doctrine rather than as an ideology, that is a doctrine to be used when it was 
convenient and filled the current perception of national interests and one to be overlooked and forgotten 
when it did not. Moreover, if it were a genuine doctrine, it is hard to explain why it should have been 
quite so summarily abandoned in the space of about five years between 1968 and 1973." ibid p562.
It is important to take into account the argument put forward by Rasler and Thompson in "Defence 
Burdens, Capital Formation and Economic Growth." Journal of Conflict Resolution. 1988, 32(11): 61-86. 
This notes that military expenditure is a relatively inefficient method of financing growth and capital 
formation in the hegemon. This echoes the concern about the concomitants of a military industrial complex 
on the American economy, and recent doubts about the utility of the funds used for SDI research as a motor 
for innovation and growth in non-defence industries. Despite these concerns however, benefits do accrue 
to such expenditure, even if not in the most efficient way.
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Gill introduces a potentially important point when he notes that, despite the 
congruence between the interpenetrating political, economic and social structures of 
the advances industrial economies already referred to above, there was no similar 
relationship in the relative strengths of the states involved. The congruence:
"did not however, extend to the capacity for mobilising resources for military 
purposes. What in fact may help to explain the security regime is a hierarchy 
of force activation, or capacity to mobilise resources. In this hierarchy the 
US was predominant followed by the former imperial powers of Britain and 
France, and with West Germany, Japan and the smaller European countries 
mobilising a relatively small part of their GNP for military spending. The key 
contrasts are between the US, the biggest capitalist economy and military 
power, and Japan and West Germany. The latter are the second and third 
largest capitalist economies, but both are third rank military powers." *^
Once again this has implications for the hegemonic position of the USA. The radicals 
already believe that the USA was fundamentally motivated in its support for regimes, 
and in assuming the burdens of hegemon, not by altruistic concerns (although these 
undoubtedly played a part), but by self interest. In terms of the security community, 
the continued American dominance is evident to the radicals when an analysis is made 
of US spending on military research and development (R & D), especially in light of 
America’s dominant position in the hierarchy of force activation mentioned by GIU 
above.
Figures show that US private enterprise accounts for almost 50% of all non-military 
research and development spending in the OECD. When US military R&D (which 
itself accounts for 28% of the total American R&D budget) is taken into account, this 
figure jumps to over 60% of the OECD total R& D expenditure. Further, American 
R& D expenditure as a percentage of her GNP exceeds that of both Japan and West 
Germany by a ratio in excess of 3:1.®^  The Reagan administration has greatly
67
68
69
Previously discussed above p71.
Gill op cit p322. Emphasis in the original.
Figures from P Marsh "A Disturbing Outlook" The Financial Times 3rd Dec 1985.
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increased funds available for scientific education and basic research, in addition to 
granting generous tax incentives for R&D in an attempt to encourage technological 
innovation/®
The huge scale of US investment, and the role of the Pentagon in promoting what has 
come to be known as the military-industrial policy of the USA, exhibits considerable 
grounds to believe that the Americans remain dominant in this field, with little 
apparent hope of the Europeans or Japanese challenging this position/^ An 
interesting implication of this, following the work of Harvey, who noted the growing 
internationalisation of the American economy,^ is that rather than acting as a 
constraint on American policy in line with the complex interdependence model, such 
internationalisation can equally be seen as giving the USA a major new opportunity 
to reassert its dominance. Intemational transactions now amount to one quarter of 
the US GNP, while in the fifteen years ending in 1985, the nominal value of US 
intemational transactions (ie the net figure of all transactions by the American 
govemment, residents or foreigners in the USA) jumped firom $146 billion to $1 
trillion in real terms.^ ^
As GÜ1 argues,^ '^  this transnationalisation of the US political economy may in fact 
provide a springboard for the USA to constmct a more liberal and transnational 
hegemony than was previously the case, and one which is more in keeping with the 
growth of its giant transnational corporations, and the dynamic nature of the changing
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intemational economic order. The apparent novelty of the radical belief in the 
continuity of American hegemony, can be partially explained by the realist attachment 
to the inevitability of hegemonic decline.^  ^ Since realists regard states as the central 
referent of the intemational system, with regimes and IGO’s seen as little more than 
mitigating factors, they assume that the relative decline in American power and 
influence is a direct concomitant of growing complex interdependence. This assumed 
linkage, between hegemonic decline and the perceived shift from the centrality of 
states within the intemational system, is of prime importance to this study.
The radical response to this position is that the state centric nature of realist models 
has blinded them to the mixed strategy employed by the United States to achieve its 
goals. This has always involved, according to the realist school, a mixture of 
unilateral, bilateral and multilateral methods depending on the circumstances. As a 
result, the contemporary condition of American hegemony, far from representing an 
inevitable decline, merely represents a readjustment of this mixture. Whereas 
unilateral action may be of less utility than in the past, bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements can still be effectively utilized from a position of entrenched power, to 
maintain the hegemony by other means.^ ®
Taken as a whole therefore, the radical analysis posits that it is impossible, on 
balance, to claim that the United States "lost out" in the provision of collective goods, 
and that the costs and benefits are much more evenly balanced than realists imagine. 
Bruce Russett argues cogently that costs incurred by the United States were more than 
offset by gains, both in the short and long term:
"The balance sheet of costs and benefits to all parties coupled with a
rigorous application of the criteria for collective goods, casts a good
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deal of doubt on the proposition that the United States provided 
disproportionate benefits to others. The major goods provided by
American postwar hegemony .....  (stable peace, deterrence and the
LIEO) were obtained in degrees that were not markedly sub-optimal 
from the American point of view. The burdens were not grossly
unfair to the United States relative to the gains or to the burdens
borne by many other non-communist countries.
He continues:
"Indeed, from many radical and even liberal perspectives American aid 
and rearmament expenditures - both in themselves and as a stimulus 
in a wider and more open world economy - prevented a repetition of 
the Great Depression. For Americans it was the ideal outcome: one 
could do well by doing good.
SUMMARY - THE STATE OF AMERICAN HEGEMONY: MARK TWAIN OR 
KING CANUTE?
The radical critique has served, if nothing else, to cast doubt on certain 
presuppositions of hegemonic stability theory. Chief among these have been the twin 
assumptions that hegemonic actors are Liberal by inclination, and that by virtue of 
their predominance, can influence or coerce other actors to be more liberal than they 
might otherwise have been.’  ^ A growing body of work has criticised the assumed 
liberal nature of hegemons, both in the case of historical examples, and with 
reference to the United States.®® Strange has argued that:
"after the war, when the United States used its persuasive powers, backed by
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coercive leverage, to get others to help establish liberal economic 
arrangements, the evidence throws even more doubt on the effectiveness of 
US hegemonic dominance .... Yet as Alan Milward’s recent study of the 
negotiations between the Americans and Europeans has shown in considerable 
detail, the West Europeans were successful in resisting attempts to insist on 
a full blown customs union between the recipients of Marshall Aid"*^
There is much to commend the view that US policy represented a somewhat 
opportunistic form of liberalism, rather than an unwavering commitment to liberal 
ideals.®^  This equivocal attitude suggests not only that the United States was not 
invariably successful in imposing its views on the system, as Strange pointed out (and 
by extension may not have been as strongly hegemonic as the traditional realist model 
supposes), but also that a commitment to liberalism in trade is a poor indication of 
the state of the hegemony in question.
Much more influential, according to radical analysts, are the ability to provide an 
outflow of capital for investment and the provision of a stable intemational currency 
supported by discounting facilities (often known as lender of last resort facilities) in 
times of financial crisis.®^
Finally, the radical critique has highlighted the latent state centric bias of hegemonic 
stability theory, which overlooks the important interdependencies operative within the 
contemporary intemational system. Further, it is apposite to question the apparently 
uncritical application of historical models of hegemony to the present day. The global 
political economy of the post 1945 period is significantly different from that of the 
nineteenth century, and still more from that of previous centuries. Drawing direct 
parallels between the British hegemony of the nineteenth century, and that of the 
United States since the end of the Second World War is fraught with methodological
Strange 1987, op cit p561; A Milward The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51. 1984, London: 
Methuen.
Strange 1987 op cit p563.
Idem.
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danger.
The radical critique has alerted analysts to the continued centrality of the American 
political economy within the global system. The problem, however, lies in 
convincingly demonstrating that this continuing centrality signifies the continuance of 
the previous hegemonic position. Strange, Gill and the radical school, insist that the 
character of the hegemony is all that has changed; from a direct, relational 
predominance to a more indirect, embedded, structural hegemony. To the radical 
school, the structural hegemony is now less powerful today than was the case in the 
25 years after 1945.®^
On closer inspection, it becomes difficult to discern any great difference between the 
change in the character of American hegemony outlined by the radicals, and a simple 
decline in the said hegemony as favoured by realist tradition. Although the radicals 
may have warned, not without justice, of the dangers of underestimating the basis of 
American power, they have failed to convincingly demonstrate that American power 
is not, in fact, in decline. If relational power is no longer as important, in terms of 
forcing others to do your will, the United States ought still to be able to use its great 
structural power to bring about desired ends. This being so, the period since the loss 
of outright hegemony, usually identified by realists as the period between 1968 and 
1973,®^  ought to exhibit continued American dominance.
Examination of the intemational system since the early 1970’s casts serious doubts 
on the radical case. A direct relationship between structural power and continued 
hegemony cannot be realistically posited. Therefore this analysis will focus on the 
ability of the hegemonic power to bring about its desired policy goals, with reference 
to the issue area of armaments collaboration in the North Atlantic area and, using the 
device of discrete episodes of regime formation and change within the issue area, 
assess whether US hegemony is indeed in decline. The effects of this process on the 
evolution or otherwise of an armaments collaboration regime in this period will be
84
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examined.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and liberation of Eastern Europe, the Gulf War of 
1990-91, the growing prominence of the newly united Germany and apparent advance 
of the European Community, both economically with the introduction of the single 
market in 1993 and politically with its recent role in Yugoslavia, beg important 
questions about the role of both the radical and realist cases in the analysis of the 
intemational system.
The organisation of the post-Cold War intemational order lies outwith the scope of 
the present analysis. It is pertinent, however, to speculate that the dramatic political 
and strategic changes of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s will have an equally 
dramatic impact on the armaments collaboration issue area, and on the position of the 
United States as hegemon of a rapidly changing system.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EXPLAINING REGIME FORMATION: A FIRST CUT
EXPLANATIONS OF REGIME CHANGE
The causes of regime formation and change within a given issue area can be 
examined from a number of different angles. Perhaps the most basic level contrasts 
the normative and the empirical approach. The normative explanation of regime 
formation and change attempts to outline desirable regimes, with a view to 
encouraging a qualitative alteration in the behaviour of states, international 
organisations and individuals, and thus promoting the evolution of a world order. 
This has led to the epithets idealist, evolutionary holist, and world order being applied 
to proponents of a normative approach.^  The following analysis will prefer the 
empirical route, concentrating on the identification and explanation of regime 
evolution and change within the armaments collaboration issue area, to the normative 
task of suggesting suitable regimes.
Among empirical explanations, the causes of regime formation and change can be 
broadly separated into either economic or political explanations.^  In an attempt to 
apply these factors to a specific instance of regime formation or change however, it 
is useful to posit a number of discrete episodes of such evolution. Toward this end, 
a "first cut" will be made at reconciling the economic and political explanations which 
have been put forward. Such discrete episodes are a framework for analysis rather 
than an ex cathedra classification however. The motivations for change are unlikely 
to permit clear identification of when one period ends and another begins. In short, 
the process is likely to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary.
Although it is tempting to suppose that changes in the relative and general levels of 
power between regime participants will be mirrored by changes in the structure of the
2
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regime, a direct correlation cannot be assumed. The same complex of actors may not 
always be operative within the specific regime, or the external environment may 
affect the regime in ways which magnify or diminish changes in hegemonic power. 
Within the armaments collaboration, or indeed any, issue area, a number of inter­
related and not necessarily complimentary factors must be taken into account. Before 
proceeding to identify discrete episodes of regime formation and change therefore, 
it is necessary to examine the main explanations of regime evolution and change, and 
to ascertain whether these can account for such events. Amongst economic 
explanations two factors will be examined: Firstly technological change and secondly 
the existence of surplus capacity. Jonsson notes that:
"Economic modes of explanation see regime evolution as adaptation to 
new volumes and new forms of transnational economic activity. New 
regimes emerge, as non-regime situations or old regimes prove 
inadequate to cope with increased and diversified transactions."^
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Few other issue areas exhibit as close an association with technological innovation as 
armaments production. Throughout history defence industries have been intimately 
linked with the cutting edge of industrial development. This is not to say that a direct 
correlation can be drawn between military strength and technological development. 
As Kennedy notes however, the interwar period demonstrates how technological 
advances in armaments systems presupposed an advanced economy, both in terms of 
financing military spending and in terms of producing the types of modem weapons 
required.'^
"Without a flourishing industrial base and, more important still, 
without a large, advanced scientific community which could be 
mobilized by the state in order to keep pace with new developments in
ibid pl5. See also R Keohane and I Nye Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 1977, 
Boston: Little Brown p40.
P Kennedy The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500- 
2000 1988, London: Unwin Hyman, pp291, 295-96. He also discusses advances in the period 1850-60 in 
pp 183-4, 192. Kennedy pays particular attention in his discussion of technological development to the 
relative backwardness of Italy when compared with the other Great Powers.
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weaponry» victory in another great war was inconceivable. If the 
future lay (to use Stalin’s phrase) in the hands of the big battalions, 
they in turn rested upon modem technology and mass production.
Those advances which can be identified in military technology both between the wars, 
and post 1945, whether in the development of modem fighters and heavy bombers, 
the use of jet engines, improved ship design, more effective aircraft carriers, the use 
of radar, radio and navigation equipment, did represent formidable challenges both 
in cost terms and in production terms.
It is, however, difficult to support the contention that such technological developments 
in and of themselves precipitated regime evolution or development. Jonsson affirms 
that the introduction of the first jet aircraft, and subsequently wide bodied long haul 
aircraft, did not necessitate alteration to existing stmctures of the aviation regime:
"once the new aircraft were integrated the industry seems to have been 
able to make the necessary adjustments without fundamental regime 
change.
Similarly, within the armaments collaboration issue area it is not plausible to point 
to any particular development which led to any demand for the establishment of an
armaments collaboration regime. This is not to say that no differences existed .1between the United States and its European allies, or that relative technological I
capacities were unimportant. It is certainly possible that increasing technological {
sophistication in modem armaments may increase costs so dramatically, that increased I
collaboration becomes a matter of necessity. There is evidence, particularly in the I
case of the United Kingdom, that the failure of domestic weapons programmes during I
the 1960’s necessitated the purchase of American systems.^
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Kennedy argues that uneven growth patterns and the spiralling costs of weapons and 
armed forces, both of which are driven by the dynamics of technological change, 
have potentially damaging effects on national economies/ It is impossible to forsee 
what the future of technological development wiU hold for armaments collaboration. 
The end of the Cold War has already increased pressures on NATO members to 
reduce their expenditure on military forces to realise a "peace dividend". The 
nightmare scenario of decreasing defence expenditure but increasing technological 
costs may, in future, increase the motivation for collaboration in the armaments issue 
area. In the period after 1945, however, technological change cannot be seen as 
either a necessary, let alone sufficient, condition for regime change within the issue 
area.
SURPLUS CAPACITY
The second economic explanation centres on the dynamics of supply and demand, and 
more particularly the existence of surplus capacity, either as a result of increased 
supply and/or decreased demand. Such an imbalance is deemed to provide pressure 
for regime formation and change, especially in terms of the potential for eroding 
liberal regimes.® In the immediate post 1945 period, it is not correct to say that the 
situation was one of surplus capacity. There was undoubtedly a large amount of war 
material which was surplus to requirements, mostly in the United States. This 
material found a ready market in Europe, however, to re-equip the armed forces of 
western Europe. In addition the Cold War meant that the United States, although it 
demobilized quickly after 1945, retained and developed her defence production
9
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Cowhey and Long define surplus capacity as being
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facilities. The possible pressure which could, therefore, have built up to encourage 
regime change was diverted as a result.
A similar picture can be painted for later developments. As European economies 
recovered, and their armaments industries were recreated or stimulated by 
rearmament, a further escape valve was found by use of arms exports or transfers to 
other parts of the world. The ability to sell large quantities of armaments in the 
Middle and Far East, Africa and Latin America offset the problems of retaining 
armaments production capacities which far exceeded national requirements in western 
Europe. Once again the problem in terms of supply/demand dynamics, as for 
technological explanations, lies in convincingly demonstrating that excess capacity 
resulted directly in regime formation or change. There is little evidence that 
conditions of serious imbalance existed either in increased supply or decreased 
demand in the supply of armaments.
Beer notes that there was a tension between sellers and buyers of armaments, since 
the former wanted to move existing products off the shelf, whilst minimising 
production participation by third parties, conversely the latter typically desired 
extensive participation in production and in research and development phases. To 
complicate matters further the main seller states in NATO, the United States, France 
and Great Britain, had competing policies.However, there was little pressure 
from seller states to change the armaments collaboration regime since surplus capacity 
could be exported and there was no great decrease in demand for armaments. The 
buyer states, principally the Federal Republic of Germany but also the smaller NATO 
members, were interested in maintaining a share in high technology via licence 
agreements, but had little chance of changing the regime in the face of opposition 
from the major sellers.
Surplus capacity cannot be regarded as a particularly useful explanation for regime
10 The scale of American military aid to the states of western Europe is discussed in greater depth in Chapter 
7 below.
Francis Beer Ihtegratioa and Disintegration in NATO: Processes of Alliance Cohesion and Prospects for 
Atlantic Community 1969, Columbus: Ohio University Press pl75.
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formation or change in this context. Unlike the international aviation issue area 
detailed by Jonsson, the armaments collaboration issue area does not unequivocally 
exhibit the surplus capacity conditions which precipitated the attempted regime change 
in international aviation during the 1970’s.*^
Jonsson notes that:
"Li short, this surplus capacity no doubt contributed to the attempted 
(international aviation) regime change in the late 1970’s. However, 
the proposed changes were not in the direction predicted by the model.
The United States pressed for a more, rather than less, liberal 
regime.
In the armaments collaboration regime, the free market aspects of the aviation regime 
were absent. As a result the regime was less prone to external environmental upsets 
than, for example, the international aviation regime. It is amongst the political 
explanations of regime formation and change that an explanation must be sought.
STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS
In attempting to account for regime formation or change in structural terms, both 
overall power structures or issue specific structures may be used. The most common 
generalisation which follows from this focus is that changes in power distribution, 
especially military power, entail regime changes. The direct linkages between 
military power and the armaments collaboration issue area would appear to make this 
model a priori applicable.
The liberal hegemonic type of regime which emerged after 1945 in the armaments
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collaboration issue area^  ^ may, at first sight, appear to reflect the general power 
structure of the international system, with the United States at the apex as hegemon. 
Closer examination, however, casts serious doubt on this initial judgement. Jonsson 
notes that within the international aviation regime the post 1918 regime reflected the 
absence of a hegemon within the international system. As a result the regime which 
emerged focused on unrestricted state sovereignty and had a strongly egalitarian 
cast.^ **
In the case of armaments collaboration in the North Atlantic area post 1945, it is 
certainly the case that only the United States had any realistic claim to the position 
of hegemon. The real issue in this case is to what extent regime formation or 
change in the said issue area can be attributed to the structure of hegemonic power. 
As the discussion in the succeeding two chapters wül indicate, major shifts in 
structural power within the international system were only imperfectly mirrored in the 
armaments collaboration issue area. The United States was frequently unable to 
achieve her desired policy objectives despite her hegemonic position, whilst the 
European allies were often able to achieve their aims despite an apparently weak 
position.
In addition, the overall structural model cannot account for the less than successful 
attempts at regime change during the 1950’s and I960’s. Declining American 
hegemony in a general sense has tended to obfuscate the continuing power of the 
United States within the armaments collaboration regime. It is at least arguable that 
the perceived decline in America’s general hegemonic position is far less marked in
Discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6 below. 
Jonsson 1987 op cit pp44-45.
17 It is important to note, however, that
"in the late 1940’s when German industry was being dismantled, when the 
American Army and war machine were being hastily demobilized, and when 
Russian defence production was still struggling to recover from the ravages of 
the war, Britain may have had for a brief while the strongest military 
production system of any of the powers: certainly for the first few years after 
the war she was the largest exporter of military equipment and aircraft."
Harlow 1967 op cit p7. See also J L Sutton and G Kemp "Arms to Developing Countries, 1945- 
65" Adelohi Paper 28, 1966. London: Institute for Strategic Studies.
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military and armaments production terms than in economic and international trade 
terms/® Seen in this light, the failure of the United States to achieve the preferred 
policy agenda set out in the late 1940’s during the early to mid 1950’s appears 
anomalous. Further, American attempts to promote collaboration during the 1960’s 
cannot be readily explained using even a modified structural model. As Jonsson 
notes, despite a recasting of the structural model to emphasize economic rather than 
military hegemony, structural explanations continue to be unreliable indicators of 
regime change, especially since:
"the hegemonic stability theory does not predict initiatives for regime 
change from a declining hegemon."^ ®
Issue specific structural explanations posit that the effectiveness of power bases is 
likely to vary from one issue area to another. In order to determine whether such 
explanations are more useful than general structural explanations, it is necessary to 
investigate the determinants of national power specific to the armaments collaboration 
issue area.^ ® Three major attributes appear particularly pertinent in this regard. 
Firstly, the possession of a defence-industrial base allowing the development and/or 
operationalisation of high technology armaments systems, together with a research 
and development (R&D) infrastructure to support such an industry.^  ^ Secondly, the
See G J Bcenberry "Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony" Political Science Quarterly 1989, 
104(3): 375-400; Robert Gilpin "American Policy in the Post-Reagan Era" Daedalus 187, 116: 36-67; 
Kennedy 1988 op cit and also David Calleo Bevond American Hegemonv: The Future of the Western 
Alliance. 1987, New York: Basic Books.
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economic position, but that it was the United States which pushed for a change in the regime rather than 
its economic competitors Japan or Germany.
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possession of a market for armaments which allows economies of scale or unit prices 
in production runs, and which encourages the development of defence industries j
which can produce weapons systems which are competitive in domestic and |
Ïinternational markets, preferably both. Finally, is the ability to devote a proportion |
of the governmental budget to armaments procurement sufficient to allow production |
or purchase of weapons systems commensurate with defence objectives. This ability ]
is obviously related to the general economic "health" of each particular state, since j
in difficult economic circumstances states will be tempted to restrict the funds jIavailable for defence procurement.^ ^
Bajusz notes that:
"the US acquisition experience, for example, suggests that the cost of 
a major weapons system can now be expected to increase tenfold every 
twenty years. Development expenditures alone can be projected to 
increase by a factor of 5.4 to 1".^
In addition, the inflation rate for major defence procurement items has been measured 
as 6-10% above the rate for other prices.^ No really satisfactory explanation has 
been advanced for the disparity between general price inflation and the rate for 
weapons procurement inflation. The role of high technology is probably a 
contributing factor, since such systems are both more expensive in absolute terms.
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25and more expensive to maintain and support.
The introduction of the issue specific element into structural explanations would 
appear to be an improvement over the general structural model. Reflecting the 
neorealist origins of the approach,
"different issue areas are assumed to have different power structures, 
and power bases in one issue area are not necessarily effective when 
applied to others. Therefore, no congruence is to be expected across 
issue areas.
In relation to the international aviation issue area, Jonsson found that issue 
structuralism did indeed account for the strong position of the United States after 
1945, and for the American attempts to change the regime during the 1970’s. 
Further, issue structuralism accounts for Britain’s strong position in the post World 
War Two regime, despite overwhelming American superiority in aeronautical 
technology and traffic generating ability, by virtue of issue specific geographical 
assets.^ Jonsson asserts that:
"In short, Britain’s issue-specific geographical assets in combination 
with the state of technology in 1945 explain why the postwar 
international aviation regime did not turn into an American
25
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Robert Dean notes that detailed comparative cost data is conspicuous by its absence in this area. This 
paucity of reliable source material makes it difficult to gauge the economies which may accrue from greater 
collaboration, since the original data is difficult, if  not impossible, to verify. In general. Dean points out 
that:
"As a proportion of total defence expenditures over the past decade manpower 
and operating costs have risen while allocations for equipment have generally 
fallen. The trend is likely to continue. Moreover, the new systems have been 
considerably more expensive than those they are designed to replace. Though 
subject to qualification, the choice, simply put, is between a qualitative decay 
of force structures or modernizing at the cost of reduced numbers."
See Robert Dean "The Future of Collaborative Weapons Acquisition” Survival 1979, 21(4): 155-163. 
Quote pl56.
Jonsson 1987 op cit pl6.
ibid pp47-49.
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hegemony. Il 28
The pattern of events in the armaments collaboration issue area was somewhat 
different from that operative within the international aviation issue area. However, 
only the United States had the issue specific power after 1945 to impose an 
hegemonic solution in the armaments collaboration regime. The liberal hegemony 
which did evolve, however, was a result both of American policy decisions such as 
helping to revive European allies defence industries^ ® and of the cooperative nature 
of the relationship between the United States and the European allies. This restricted 
American ability to operationalize the issue specific power available to it within the 
issue area.^ °
In terms of the three national power determinants specific to the issue area detailed 
above, the United States was well endowed in all three areas. The American defence 
industrial base, and level of technological advancement, together with large research 
and development effort, dwarfed those of the European allies, particularly in the 
1950’s and 1960’s. The size of the domestic market in the United States also 
conferred advantages, since longer production runs for systems reduce unit costs; it 
also encouraged competition between American defence contractors. Finally, since 
1945, American defence expenditure has remained higher than her European allies, 
both in percentage of GNP and in absolute terms due to the size of the U.S. economy 
relative to those of western Europe.
The regime which emerged during the 1950’s in the armaments collaboration issue 
area cannot be characterised as a simple American hegemony. As the succeeding 
Chapters will demonstrate the United States was frequently unsuccessful in attaining
28
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ibid p48.
For a further discussion of American policy in this regard see Cindy Cannizzo "Procurement via the Two- 
way Street: Can it achieve its objectives? in Martin Edmonds 1981 op cit pp53-70, especially pp60-65.
On the potentially important impact of the cooperative nature of the relationship between the United States 
and the Western European states, see Nikolaj Petersen "Bargaining Power among potential allies: 
negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty, 1948-49" Review of International Studies 1986, 12(3): 187-203, 
especially pp193-194.
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desired policy goals in relation to the armaments collaboration issue area. Although 
American policy, or simply structural strength within the issue area, can explain the 
failure of an integrated armaments collaboration regime to develop up to a point, 
issue structuralism is not a sufficient explanation in and of itself. Such an explanation 
would predict a regime in which American hegemonic strength invariably succeeded 
in bringing about the regime favoured by the United States. This prediction does not 
equate to the reality of the issue area under discussion.
FUNCTIONALIST EXPLANATIONS
According to functionalist, or as Jonsson terms them situational,^  ^ explanations, 
regimes are deemed to emerge:
"as ways to overcome the deficiencies that make it impossible to 
consummate even mutually beneficial agreements.
As a result of this understanding, functional explanations have tended to concentrate 
on the choice of individuals between cooperation and defection from common 
action.^  ^ This, in turn, has engendered particular theoretical concern with game- 
theoretical "prisoners’ dilemma" type situations, the theory of collective goods and 
on how to promote cooperation between egoistic actors in the absence of any superior 
authority.^ In a more general sense the evolution of cooperative strategies amongst 
egoistic actors with no acknowledged superior authority can be characterised as a 
dilemma. That is to say, the choice whether to cooperate or to defect is an either/or
Jonsson 1987 op cit p 18 explains that:
"To avoid the ambiguity and teleological implications of the term "function",
I shall instead refer to situational explanations. This means that the question 
I pursue is "What kind of situations trigger the creation and revision of 
regimes?" rather than "what functions do regimes perform?"
R Keohane After Hegemonv: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economv 1985, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. Quote p83.
See A A Stein "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World" International Organisation 
1982, 36:299-324, especially pp304-308.
On security dilemmas and the game theoretic approach see, for example: R Jervis "Cooperation under the 
Security Dilemma" World Politics 1978,30:167-214, also Keohane 1985 op cit p82; Stein 1982 op cit 
discusses collective goods theory specifically in relation to regimes p307, while R Axelrod and R O 
Keohane discuss how cooperation can be achieved in their "Achieving cooperation under Anarchy: 
Strategies and Institutions" 1985, World Politics 38:226-254.
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decision between incompatible alternatives where neither alternative is optimal, and
both have positive and negative effects. |J
Jonsson posits that in the international aviation issue area the initial dilemma was j
between either an "open skies" regime, or the state sovereignty of national airspace. jÎLater a number of "sub-dilemmas" emerged in relation to whether the issue area |
should be subject to an international authority, or remain a national prerogative, and I
whether the economics of air transport and commerce should be regulated either ]
nationally or internationally, or whether the free market should be left to regulate the iIsystem.^ * |I 1If, as Jonsson asserts: |
"actors are more likely to agree on a regime, the more they win and j
the less they risk by cooperating on the one hand, and the less they I
win and the more they risk by defecting, on the other" 1
the functional model can help explain the type of situations which are likely to trigger 
the creation or transformation of international regimes. Within the armaments 
collaboration issue area functionalism can give valuable insights into why the 
perceived advantages of cooperation and disadvantages of defection change. Stein
notes that in a bargaining situation exhibiting a "dilemma of common interests" within
an issue-area requiring continuous negotiations, then an international regime may 
provide a normative and institutional framework for future negotiations.^ ^
During the liberal hegemonic period discussed below the armaments issue area 
appears, at first sight, a promising candidate for the establishment of a regime. The 
United States had an incentive to agree to a regime for the production of armaments 
in as much as the risk of defecting were high and the benefits low. Had the United 
States not encouraged the reestablishment of European arms production capacity 
during the 1950’s, and transferred large amounts of surplus American equipment to
Jonsson 1987 op cit pp50-56.
ibidp23.
^  Stein 1982 op cit p307.
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the western European allies, the perception was that Europe would be destabilized and 
possibly succumb to direct or indirect Soviet aggression. If Europe fell under the 
Soviet sphere of influence, or if it collapsed into chaos, this would obviously have an 
adverse effect on the global security of the United States. Similarly, the United States 
had much to gain from the establishment of a regime within the issue area. The 
structural strength of the United States in armaments production terms would provide 
opportunities for the sale of American weapons systems in Europe, and offered the 
inviting, and apparently quite realistic prospect of American leadership in the 
collaborative production of armaments.
jSimilarly, for the European allies, the functional model would seem to promise that j
the prospects of a regime forming in the issue area were good. The risks of I^attempting to take an autarchic stance vis à vis armaments production in the 1950’s, |
and to reject American aid, particularly military aid in this context, were potentially I
high. With the exception of Great Britain, the European allies during this period |
were in such dire economic and military straits that their armed forces required I
virtually total re-equipment. Without large measures of American aid, both economic Iand military, the Europeans could not hope to defend themselves. There was little |
or no prospect of gains for the Europeans if they decided to defect. Conversely, I
there were significant potential benefits for the Europeans in agreeing to an 1Iarmaments collaboration regime. IiI
Collaboration, whether within Europe or across the Atlantic, offered the prospect of î
a larger market for domestically produced military hardware. Further, such i|
collaboration might help offset budgetary constraints by producing savings when j
compared to individual development and procurement, and provide access to high j
technology areas.^ ® The risks of collaboration would appear to be rather low, in that
38 Dean 1979 op cit passim, especially ppl55-159. The sources discussing these issues are relatively few. 
As it notes in the preface to Dean’s article:
"The actual state of collaboration in weapons acquisition within NATO is too 
seldom described. Much of the writing on the subject is hortatory, decrying the 
diseconomies that result from too little collaboration and exhorting NATO allies 
to do better" ibid pl55
Dean attributes lack of collaboration to the constraints of economic factors and the difficulty in managing 
projects.
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questions of retaining national defence industrial capabilities^ ® were outweighed, at 
least in the 1950’s, by the urgent need for American aid.
The 1960’s represent a somewhat different picture. As the rearmament phase of the 
1950’s ended, the liberal hegemonic regime underwent change. Facer asserts that: 
"It was American unwillingness to pay a price for the cooperation of 
European NATO countries, coupled with European fears of American 
commercial domination, which was the primary cause of the failure of 
NATO interdependence and standardization policies in the 1960’s".'*^
The changing situation of the European NATO states and the United States as 
hegemon was reflected in the armaments collaboration regime. In functional terms 
the payoff structure altered as the risks of collaborating appeared to increase and the 
benefits of defecting also increased. The Europeans became alarmed at the spectre 
of American domination,'*^  whilst the United States began to push for increased sales 
of American systems to help overcome balance of payments problems and to offset
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Dean, ibid pl56, notes that: "The process of collaboration has been governed by the desire to Umit 
dependence as much as possible, to ensure that technological progress deriving from collaboration results 
in the maintenance of national technological diversity, not in rationalization and specialization”. In effect. 
Dean argues that, during the 1960s in particular, national governments have been willing to pay a premium 
to avoid permanent dependence on European joint defence projects. See in particular pp156-157 and 162.
R Facer "The Alliance and Europe: Part HI Weapons Procurement in Europe, Capabilities and Choices" 
Adelohi Paner 108. 1975, London: Institute for Strategic Studies p32.
Amongst the most famous examples are Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s The American Challenge 1968, 
London: Hamish Hamilton and Harold Wilson’s frequently quoted speech at the Lord Mayor;s Banquet at 
the Guildhall, London on 13th November 1967. The then Prime Minister said:
"diere is no future for Europe, or for Britain, if we allow American business and 
American industry so to dominate the strategic growth industries o f our individual 
countries that they, and not we, are able to determine the pace and direction of Europe’s 
industrial advance, that we are left in industrial terms as the hewers of wood and drawers 
of water while they, because of the scale of research, development and production which 
they can deploy based on the vast size of their single market, come to enjoy a growing
monopoly in the production of the technological instruments of industrial advance..........
this is the road not to partnership but to an industrial helotry."
Quoted in Facer 1975 op cit p32.
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42 ithe costs of keeping forces in Europe.
Regime choices within the armaments collaboration issue area can be seen, to some 
extent, as the result of either/or choices made by the participants. These reflected 
dilemmas between incompatible alternatives as discussed by both Stein and 
Jonsson.'*^  The basic problem lay in reaching a mutually satisfactory result, and 
specifically in demonstrating that cooperation was the optimal strategy for aU the 
parties concerned.^  In the immediate post World War Two period the dilemma was 
essentially a choice between American participation in the organisation of Europe’s 
security, or Europe developing as an independent force in its own right. The initial 
negotiations which established the liberal hegemonic regime are discussed in Chapter 
6 below with particular reference to the establishment of the Brussels Treaty 
Organisation (BTC), and negotiations leading up to the establishment of NATO.
In armaments collaboration terms the dilemma at this important juncture can be seen 
as whether the armaments necessary to equip western Europe were produced by each 
state, or whether such production was to be organised by another body, whether 
established specifically for that purpose or in addition to other more general defence 
and security functions. Indeed, this dilemma was to be a recurrent theme in the 
armaments collaboration issue area, and remains even today as a central problem in 
the national security policies of the member states of NATO,'*^
Between the conclusion of the Brussels Treaty and the signature of the North Atlantic
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Beer 1969 op cit Chapter 4, pp 131-175 discusses the change in American policy from roughly 1958 
onwards, and the concerted American export drive of the 1960’s, but see also Facer 1975 op cit pp28-35.
Jonsson 1987 op cit ppl8-23; Stein 1982 op cit pp307-310.
For a discussion of the problems of attaining such a result, see K Oye "Explaining Cooperation under 
Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies." World Politics 1985, 38: 1-24; O Young "Anarchy and Social 
Choice: Reflections on the International Polity" World Politics 1978, 30: 241-263, and Jervis 1978 op cit.
It is at least arguable that economic pressures on NATO members will actually increase demands for 
armaments collaboration as a result of the strategic charges engendered by the end of the Cold War and 
changing nature of the defence priorities of member states in the 1990s. If defence expenditures decrease 
as a result of these changes a major reassesment of present measures may be unavoidable. The current 
position appears to be one of "wait and see", but it is unlikely that potentially difficult decisions on the 
future of European, and indeed American, defence related industries can be put off indefrnately.
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Treaty, a period of little more than 12 months,'*^  the foundations of the future 
armaments collaboration regime were laid. Neither structural nor 
functional/situational factors offer particularly cogent explanations of the type of 
structures which emerged. Further, they are less than convincing in explaining why 
a truly integrated armaments collaboration regime was not developed. Chapter 6 
below demonstrates, using the process model developed in Chapter 5, how the United 
States became much more closely involved in Europe’s defence than American policy 
between 1941 and 1948 would predict. The Europeans were adept at using their 
apparently weak negotiating positions to achieve outcomes which cannot be accounted 
for in strictly structural or situational terms.
Similarly, the operation of the liberal hegemonic regime discussed in Chapters 7 and 
8 cannot be adequately accounted for with reference only to the extant models. 
Toward this end Chapter 5 will develop a process model of regime evolution and 
change, which will be applied in the analysis of different episodes of regime change 
in succeeding Chapters. The process model does not deny the validity of certain 
aspects of the structural or functional models discussed above. It does, however, 
explicitly reject the claims of such models to exclusivity in the explanation of 
episodes of regime formation and change, highlighting certain potentially important 
factors not heretofore examined.
^  The Brussels Treaty was signed on 17th March 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty on 4th April 1949. For 
the detailed discussion of this period see Chapter 6 below.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DEVELOPING A PROCESS MODEL OF REGIME EVOLUTION
INTRODUCTION
Of the various theoretical perspectives used to examine regime creation and change, 
all but the structurationist model can be seen as essentially static. None convincingly 
absorb the dynamics of political processes. Whilst the structurationist model appears 
to be moving in the right direction, it remains theoretically underdeveloped, 
particularly in relation to international relations. In outlining a process based model 
of regime creation and change, the concerns of the structurationist model discussed 
above* wiU be incorporated into the newly developed model.
PRECURSORS OF THE PROCESS MODEL
Concern with the dynamic or process based aspects of existing models is hardly 
revolutionary. Such concerns have rarely been analysed in the depth which they 
deserve however, and certainly have never been developed into a model explaining 
regime maintenance and change in and of themselves.
Following the formative work of Jonsson,^  two main components of a process model 
of regime dynamics can be deduced from existing regime literature. First, bargaining 
and coalition building across, and within state boundaries, appear to be essential in 
the formation, maintenance and change of international regimes. Second, 
organisational context, and hence organisation theoretical concepts, are important in 
explaining bargaining and coalition building.
In the former case, bargaining and coalition building have been recognised as 
important aspects of regime creation and change by many authors in the field, who 
highlight the "sunk costs" involved in the formation of international institutions, and
1
2
See Chapter 2 above.
C Jonsson International Aviation and the Politics of Regime Change 1987, London: Frances Pinter. 
Chapter 4 passim, particularly pp57-61.
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their resistance to change once formed/ The importance of regimes as intervening 
variables was most forcefully posited by Keohane and Nye'* in their international 
organisation model, which did much to undermine the predictions of overall structural 
theses, which held that regimes would reflect underlying patterns of state power and 
capabilities. According to Keohane and Nye, a regime once formed will be resistant 
to change, and the costs of change will be perceived as greater than those of 
maintaining existing structures, since "a set of networks, norms and institutions, once 
established will be difficult either to eradicate or drastically rearrange".^
Essentially, the international organisation model is a negative explanation, since it 
explains why regimes do not develop at all, or why they do not change once 
established. It is, therefore, ill-suited to explain regime formation or change. 
Keohane later revised his earlier work,^  emphasising the more positive aspects of 
organisation, whether formal or informal. The earlier work posited that regimes 
would encourage an appetite for increased cooperation as a result of their value in 
facilitating the exchange of information.^  A process of spillover can, therefore, be 
identified, along the lines of that put forward by Leon Lindberg in his analysis of the 
European community as a political system.®
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8
See the following: C Lipson "The Transformation of Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime Change" 
International Organisation 1982, 36: 417-455, especially pp 420 & 453; O R Young "Regime Dynamics: 
The Rise and Fall of International Regimes" International Organisation 1982, 36:277-97, especially pp 280; 
S D Krasner "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables" International 
Organisation 1982, 36: 497-510 particularly pp 499; A A Stein "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes 
in an Anarchic World" International Organisation 1982, 36: 299-324, especially 322-323.
R O Keohane and J S Nye, Power and Independence: World Politics in Transition 1977, Boston: Little 
Brown p55.
Idem
R O Keohane, "The World Political Economy and the Crisis of Embedded Liberalism" in J Goldthorpe (ed) 
Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism: Studies in the Political Economv of Western European 
Nations 1984, Oxford, Clarendon Press p97.
R O Keohane. "The Demand for International Regimes" International Organisation 1982, 36: 325-355. 
See particularly p 348
L Lindberg "The European Community as a Political System: Notes Toward the Construction of a Model" 
Journal of Common Market Studies 1966-67, 5: 344-387, passim
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Concern with the bargaining and coalition building activities within a regime, taken 
in conjunction with the international organisation model and Keohane’s later 
development, suggests that organisational context may play a vital role in the process 
model. Transnational and trans-govemmental links are assumed to be those which 
transcend state boundaries and are not under die control of government or 
governmental sub units in the case of trans-govemmental relations.®
These linkages are deemed to contribute toward regime creation and maintenance. 
Utilising organisation theoretic principles appears a logical approach in this area, and 
yet remains seldom studied in the existing international organisational literature.
A number of common concerns do, nonetheless, emerge from both international 
organisation and organisation theoretic studies into the problem of international 
cooperation. First, is a lack of unitary goals amongst potential collaborators. 
Second, is the importance of information and resource exchanges between 
organisations and their participants. Lastly, both traditions view the prime goal of 
collective action as the reduction of uncertainty**.
BARGAINING AND COALITION BUILDING
Concern with bargaining processes and the new perspective which arises from 
studying such a process, suggests that additional insights not sufficiently covered by 
existing functional or structural theories may be uncovered by using a bargaining 
perspective. The bargaining process is ipso facto a product of the bargaining 
situation, but the process by which parties attempt to combine conflicting beliefs and 
positions into a single agreement highlights the vital role of unpredictability in regime 
dynamics. As Jonsson notes:
"The outcome of a bargaining process is of course conditioned, but not
10
® See R O Keohane and J S Nye (eds) Transnational Relations and World Politics. 1973, Cambridge Mass, 
Harvard University Press. See, in particular, the Introduction and Conclusion, both written by J S Nye.
L Gordenker and P R Saunders "Organisation Theory and International Organisation" in P Taylor and A 
J R Groom (eds) International Organisation: A Conceptual Approach 1978, London: Frances Pinter; B 
Crawford and S Lenway "Decision Modes and International Regime Change: Western Collaboration and 
East West Trade" World Politics 1985, 37: 375-402.
** Crawford and Lenway ibid p 377
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yet determined by the bargaining situation. Bargaining is more than 
automatic responses to particular situational stimuli".*^
Bargaining is also a method by which the weak can offset their relative lack of power 
to produce outcomes which appear unlikely or impossible if weakness and strength 
were the only factors which mattered.*^  The main points of the bargaining 
perspective are as follows:*'*
(a) States Cannot be Treated as Unitary Actors
The individual rational choice assumed by static game theoretic models of 
bargaining situations is ill suited to the examination of processes of 
bargaining. According to the cybernetic paradigm*^  the decision process is 
chiefly concerned with the elimination of variety and reducing uncertainty. 
As a result of this process, the positive search for common perceptions, 
compromises and formulae becomes more important than the negative 
exchange of concessions. The search for a bargaining formula (defined as "a 
shared perception or definition of the conflict that establishes terms of 
trade"*•*), therefore, involves or presupposes the formation of coalitions.
*^  Jonsson 1987 op citp61
15
16
pp 61-68.
On cybernetics see J D Steinbrunner The Cybernetic Theory of Decision 1974, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press
The definition is from Zartman and Berman 1982 op cit, p95
*^  See for example D Baldwin "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies"
World Politics 1979, 2:161-193, who highlights the importance of the context of a "policy contingency 
framework" and adds that:
"Instead of talking about the distribution of power resources underlying the international power 
structure, students of world politics could more profitably focus on the multiple distributional 
patterns of a wide variety of resources related to a number of significant issue areas."
hi addition, see his "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis" International Organisation 1980,
34(4): 471-506 and Paradoxes of Power 1989, Oxford: Basil Blackwell; Donald Puchala also discusses the 
relationship between international political goals and action in their pursuit in "Power as the Capacity to 
Act" in James Barber and Michael Smith (eds) The Nature of Foreign Policy: A Reader 1974, Milton 
Keynes; Open University Press pp289-303. On bargaining see I W Zartman and M R Berman The 
Practical Negotiator 1982, New Haven Conn: Yale University Press. See p204.
*'* The basic structure of the bargaining perspective has been most succinctly covered by Jonssen 1987 op cit, |Ï
I l l
mediation processes and brokerage both within and across national boundaries. 
Such activities may involve official bodies, individuals and informal 
subgroups.*  ^ Bargaining is a process which adjusts initial expectations and 
interpretations*®, which can be derailed by incompatible belief systems, 
misperceptions and deception.*®
(b) Bargaining Explains Why Regimes are not Created or Changed
The bargaining perspective, via its use of actor cognitions, can help explain 
why regimes are not created or do not readily change once formed. Although 
functional and structural theories can predict such situations occurring, they 
cannot hope to accommodate explanations which concentrate on dynamic, 
process based factors. Regime creation and change is the product of mutual 
concessions to reach agreement.
(c) Issue Linkage
Linkage between issues tends to cut across issue specific structural or 
functional factors to effect regime creation or change. The bargaining
perspective broadens the scope of regime discussions beyond immediate
functional or structural explanations which regard regimes as responses to 
specific well defined situations. Put simply:
"Issue linkage represents an attempt to exploit one’s relative 
issue specific power in an extraneous issue area to compensate 
for one’s weakness in the issue area that is the subject of 
negotiations.^ ®"
IS
*^  "Cognition can be seen as central in this regard, since information processing can be seen as the link 
between interstate bargaining and decision making within the state" Quoted in Jonsson 1987 op cit, pp 63- 
64.
C Jonsson "A Cognitive Approach to International Negotiation" European Journal of Political Research 
1983, 11: 139-50.
*® See R Jervis Perception and Misperception in Wemational Politics 1976, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press pp 291-296
Jonsson 1987 op cit, p65
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The linkage of issues may, therefore, be beneficial in promoting agreements, 
but can also have a negative effect, especially if such linkage amounts to 
blackmailing (threats) rather than backscratching (promises)/*
(d) Regimes Result from Compromises
Far from being direct rational responses to functional or structural factors, 
regimes invariably result from a process of compromise. Unlike the precepts 
of game theory and rational actor models presupposing complete information, 
the bargaining perspective presents the regime as a compromise solution.
These solutions result from the interaction of various different actors who 
occupy different positions. Their cognitions play a vital part in coalition 
formation, issue linkage and the dynamic process of solving a series of 
dilemmas which underlie regime creation and change. Seeing this as a 
rational problem solving series, deriving from either/or choices as to whether 
one should cooperate or not, is highly misleading.
ORGANISATION THEORY AND ITS ROLE IN THE PROCESS MODEL
The precepts of organisation theory are perhaps a less obvious focus for analysis in 
relation to regimes than the role of international organisation. Increasingly however, 
the subject of organisation theory is seen to have utility in research relating to regime 
dynamics. It is essential to recognise that until recently the relation between general 
organisation theory and the study of international organisation has largely been one 
of mutual neglect,^ ^
Major works of organisation theory fail to mention, let alone critically discuss, j
21
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See R Axelrod and R O Keohane "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strageties and Institutions" 
World Politics 1985, 38:226-254. See pp239-240
C Jonsson "Interorganisation Theory and International Organisation" International Studies Ouarterlv 1986, 
30: 39-55 especially pp39-40. See also J Pfeffer Power in Organisations 1981, Marshfield, Mass: Pitman 
Publishing Inc, who contends that "organisational politics and organisational power are both topics which 
are conspicuous by their absence in management and organisation theory literature" Ibid, p i.
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international organisations.^  Similarly studies of international organisations have 
signally failed to utilise organisation theoretic analysis.^ Conventional wisdom 
holds that the two areas cannot be readily synthesized. Haas, for example, concluded 
after attempting to link functionalist models of integration to organisation theory that 
it was "impossible to place our model clearly and firmly within the categories and 
classifications of current theorising about organisations",^  while Gardenker and 
Saunders believed that "International relations and international organisation in 
particular employ peculiar forms and processes which the available organisation 
literature does not discuss."^ ** Despite such an unpromising introduction, interest in 
linking the two areas has been heightened by recent developments in both fields. 
Unfortunately, scholars from both the organisation theory and international 
organisation fields have, hereto, been more concerned with the unsatisfactory status 
quo, than with the potential of theoretical linkages.
If, as Jonssen asserts,the international setting is not as anarchic and disorganised, 
and the national setting not as hierarchical and ordered, as is traditionally supposed, 
such grey areas as exist between the two arenas merit further study. A less simplistic 
and more fluid definition of the boundaries between national and international 
organisations, and between organisations and their respective environments is called 
for. Such a perspective suggests the possibility of a convergence in approaches to the 
study of both domestic and international organisations.
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See for example J G March (ed) Handbook of Organisations 1965, Chicago HI, Rand McNally; 
P C Nystrom and W H Starbuck (eds) Handbook of Organisational Design Vols 1 and 2. 1981, New York 
NY, Oxford University Press.
See I L Claude Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organisation 1964. 
New York: Random House; H Jacobson Networks of Independence 1979, New York: Alfred A Knopf; R 
Cox and H Jacobson (eds) The Anatomv of Influence Decision Making in Litemational Organisation 1973, 
New Haven: Yale University Press; C Archer International Organisation 1983, London: George Allen and 
Unwin.
E Haas Bevond the Nation State 1964, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp 95 and 97. Shortcomings 
in functionalist theory discussed above may weaken the case put forward by Haas in this regard.
Gordenker and Saunders 1978 op cit, plOO
Jonsson 1986 op cit, p40. See also Hedley Bull The Anarchical Societv: A Studv of Order in World 
Politics. 1981, London: Macmillan in which the concept of order in the international system is discussed. 
See especially Chapter 2 "Does Order Exist in World Politics" pp23-52.
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Gordenker and Saunders attempt to highlight a similar process in the work of William 
Evan^ * on inter-organisational relations, particularly in relation to the role of 
occupants of boundary positions. This work exhibits strong parallels with the analysis 
of transnationalism in international relations.^ ®
In a similar vein, Jonssen has noted the similarity of work on interorganisational 
relations^ ® by, for example, Frederick Thayer^ *, and work on the increased 
permeability of nation states by John Herz.^ ^
Organisation theoretic studies which concentrate on the relationship of organisations 
to their environment and other organisations appear particularly relevant to the 
analysis of international organisation. However, until recently studies of 
organisational networks, linking pins, individual actors and informal networks have 
failed to elicit any response in the field of international organisation. Students of 
international organisations, like organisation theorists, have traditionally been 
concerned chiefly with intra-organisational phenomena.^ ^
There is growing evidence that international organisation scholars realise the 
important work on interorganisational relations carried out by organisation theorists, 
as a result of their similar concerns, although work on this is still at an early stage. 
As organisation theory developed, the "closed system" theory of self contained.
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clearly defined entities was gradually discarded, since it is frequently aU but 
impossible to say where an organisation ends and the environment begins.^ The 
"open system" perspective, which supplemented the closed focus, places the emphasis 
on the external environment and its influence on individual organisations.^ ^
The recognition of the vital role played by the environment in any organisational 
study led naturally to the identification of inter-organisational interactions as an 
important area of studyespecially in relation to organisation sets. A further 
disaggregation followed as researchers turned to concentrate on informal 
organisations, cutting across the traditional emphasis on formal relations within and 
between units based on authority, concentrating instead on network analysis. Concern 
with social networks has chiefly been the remit of organisation theorists, especially 
Bacharach and Lawler^ ,^ and Aldrich and Whetten^ *. Networks can be regarded 
as theoretical constructs created by analysts to guide research.
Thus an inter-organisational network consists of a structure of recurrent 
transaction^^ between organisations in a population defined and explicitly 
delineated by the investigator.'*® Jonsson makes the important point that regime 
effectiveness can frequently be indicated by the existence of transnational networks, 
especially in respect of wide ranging informal contacts and communications among
^  L Metcalfe "Designing Precarious Partnerships" in P C Nystrom and W H Starbuck (ed) 1981 op cit p505
Cf I D Thompson Organisations in Action 1967, New York: McGraw-Hill; D Katz and R L Kahn The 
Social Psychology of Organisations 1978, New York: John Wiley pp 2-9, and 752-756; L G Bolman and 
T Deal Modem Approaches to Understanding and Managing Organisations 1984, San Francisco: Jossey- 
Bass pp 226-232.
Gordenker and Saunders 1978 op cit plOl; Evan 1976 op cit, plOl; H Aldrich and D A Whetten 
"Organisation-Sets, Action-Sets, and Networks: Making the most of Simplicity" in Nystrom and Starbuck 
1981, op cit.
37
38
39
40
S B Bacharach and E S Lawler Power and Politics in Organisations 1980, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Aldrich and Whetton 1981 op cit; H Aldrich Organisation and Environm ents 1979, Englewood Cliffs: 
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organisations and officials/*
This echoes Keohane’s observations on the generation of demand for international 
regimes being stimulated by transgovemmental networks of organisations and 
officials, fostering increased cooperation/^ Regime creation, and regime 
maintenance and change, can, therefore, have differing explanations, since once 
established a regime may foster an interorganisational network which does not reflect 
the founding rationale or network.
The centrality of transnational networks within the type of bargaining processes 
previously identified as important in the creation and maintenance of a regime, can, 
therefore, not be overstated.
EXPLAINING THE LACK OF SYNERGY BETWEEN ORGANISATION 
THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION
Before examining the major components of transnational networks and what makes 
them important in the analysis of regimes, it is worth briefly examining the reasons 
which have contributed to the lack of theoretical linkage between organisation theory 
and international organisation. Three factors appear to underlie this shortcoming.
Mutual Theoretical Underdevelopment
As a subject in its comparative infancy, organisation theory can be forgiven a degree 
of theoretical underdevelopment. Although its roots can be traced back to the pre 
World War Two period, and the works of Max Weber, Chester Barnard and Elton 
Mayo,'*^  it is only really since the late nineteen fifties that organisation theory has 
been extensively developed. Naturally enough, organisation theorists have been more
41 Jonsson 1987 op cit p70 
Keohane 1982 op cit p349
43 Max Weber The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation 1967, New York; Oxford University Press j
(translated by T Parsons and A Herleson) and also Economy and Society 1947, New York: Bedminster; I
Chester Barnard The Functions of the Executive 1968 (Thirtieth Anniversary Edition) New York: Harvard |
University Press and Organisation and Management 1948, Harvard: Harvard University Press; Elton Mayo I
The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization 1933, London: Macmillan, and The Social Problems of 1
an Industrial Civilization 1949, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. I
^  Archer 1983 op cit, pp 68-125, and Jacobsen 1979 op cit pp 64-80, both contain useful analyses of the 
various theories. It is not the intention of this analysis to provide a critique of contending approaches, since 
this is altogether too broad a topic to be included in the present work, and has been more than adequately 
covered elsewhere in the literature. See, for example, J E Dougherty and R L Pfalzgraff Jr Contending 
Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Studv 1990, New York: Harper and Row; Richard 
Little and Michael Smith (eds) Perspectives on World Politics 1991, London: Routledge, for a more general 
discussion of the different approaches.
Pfeffer 1981 op cit pp 2-6
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concerned with developing the basics of their own discipline than with forging links
to related fields. |i
IIMuch the same can be said in regard to the development of international organisation I
theory. The various "schools" of international organisation theory** which have i
been developed cannot, however, claim to have fully explained the rationale for, and a
dynamics of, international organisation in the political environment. Indeed, aspects |
Iof international organisational study suffer from many of the same theoretical |
problems discussed above in relation to the analysis of regimes. There is little j
itheoretical mileage in "reinventing the wheel" in relation to the shortcomings of
realist, neo-realist, functionalist, idealist and Marxist theories of international organisation. |
1Theoretical Origins |
Organisation theory has been developed chiefly by sociologists and management and j
business scientists, with additional material from social psychologists and economists. I
Input from political scientists has been extremely limited. Thus, although work in |
organisation theory has often examined phenomena closely related to areas of interest iIwithin the political science and international relations community, there has been little
ior no cross-pollination. This neglect may be attributable to the problematic definition {
■iof power within the social sciences as a whole, and to the peqorative connotations of |.1the concept of power as intimately involved with problems in the practice and 1
socialisation of managing an organisation* .^
Competing perspectives which did not emphasise power were held to be more 
persuasive, due to their conformity with the socially acceptable values of rationality 
and effectiveness. It is possible that, following from Pfeffer’s earlier argument, a 
more detailed analysis of power and politics within organisations might highlight the
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role of basic organisation theory within international organisation, and its relevance 
to political science more generally.*^
Differing Analytical Frameworks
A further difficulty in reconciling the two fields of stiidy lies in their differing 
analytical frameworks. A "cognitive gap" exists as a result of the concentration of 
organisation theorists on the national environment of private and public organisations, 
operating concurrently in markets and hierarchies within the national arena,and 
of the concentration on international organisation theorists on transnational systems 
of IGO’s and NGO’s with national networks as subsystems. Gordenker and Saunders 
note that the underlying conception of international organisations has tended to 
emphasise their abstract quality. This encourages the view that they are unique 
structures in political research.
"Governments have more concrete existence than states, incorporating authorised 
persons who at least formally concert their action to gain specific ends on behalf of 
aU subject of the state. In international institutions, governments act formally on 
behalf of states members. The shift of analytic levels from concrete governments to 
clusters of concerted activities along presumably agreed lines gives a certain abstract 
quality to international institutions".*®
The overwhelming majority of international organisation literature treats the 
institutions involved as self contained, autonomous units. (This echoes the "closed 
system" conception of organisation theory discussed above). Little, if any, 
consideration has been given to studying inter-organisational contacts, cross boundary
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relations or the underlying structural forms which could demonstrate any similarities 
with other organisations.*^
The lack of synthesis in organisation theory and international organisation theory can, 
therefore, be seen not as an inevitable result of theoretical incompatability; rather it 
is the result of their relative novelty and theoretical underdevelopment, their different 
intellectual paternities and their distinct intellectual and analytical frameworks. There 
is considerable evidence justifying a theoretical "marriage" between these two 
heretofore distinct approaches. It is important at this point to examine the chief 
components of transnational networks, and what makes such networks important in 
the analysis of regime evolution.
NETWORK ANALYSIS
Three distinct areas have been identified as critical in network analysis.^ ® The first 
concentrates on the actors involved, the second on the relations and transactions 
between actors (also known as cybernetics) and the last focuses on the role of linking 
pin organisations.
Actors
Although the role of organisations as actors in their own right must be acknowledged, 
it must be qualified by the realisation that it is individuals who act within the 
organisation, and who interact with the environment. Such boundary role occupants 
both channel and process information, and represent the organisation externally.^ *
*^  Cox and Jacobson 1973 op cit present a collection of monographs on individual organisations with relatively 
little analysis of overlapping principles. The plethora of literature surrounding integration theory 
particularly in relation to the European Community, is grounded firmly in a "closed system" frame of 
analysis, leaving little scope for an inter-organisational perspective.
Even H J Michelman, Organisational Effectiveness in a Multinational Bureaucracv 1978, Famborough 
Hants: Saxon House, in his study of organisational effectiveness in a multi national bureaucracy shied away 
from a truly interorganisational perspective. Listead he concentrated on career patterns, executive 
leadership, recruitment and advancement, and the role of secretariats within organisations. This leaves little 
scope for the investigation of dynamic operational conduct within international organisations in a 
heterogeneous and fluid environment.
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To some extent boundary role occupants are in a paradoxical situation, due to the 
potentially conflicting roles they are expected to play. Such actors are elements both 
of their "home" organisations, and of the interorganisational network^  ^which they 
must attempt to represent to constituents of their home organisation. Boundary role 
occupants are therefore subject to the varying beliefs and demands of at least three 
distinct groupings: individuals and sub groups in their home organisation, the home 
organisation qua organisation, and finally the external environment.
Boundary role occupants are highly likely to be socialised into the external 
environment at least to a degree. They will frequently become advocates of 
organisational change, since they can examine their organisation from outside and 
compare it with other examples. Despite the importance of individuals, it is vital not 
to divorce actors from their structural context. The bureaucratisation of international 
organisations has been noted by Cox and Jacobson,^  ^ while in organisation theory 
the work of Max Weber remains seminal in this context.^
Bureaucrats seldom enjoy a free hand. Rather, they are constrained by the 
framework imposed upon them by their own organisation and the organisations with 
which they interact. The extent of the control will vary according to the issue at 
stake, but limits are invariably imposed. Jacobson defines this relationship in his 
definition of a "meta bureaucracy".^  ^ According to this analysis, international 
organisations are quite distinct from the political systems of states, where 
bureaucracies usually constitute only one element of the system, in that they are more 
uniformly bureaucratic. In a real sense, international organisations are organisations 
captured by bureaucrats. This has implications for the development of international
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^  Weber 1947 op cit
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organisations, especially for their democratic control/^
The discussion of bureaucracies has obvious linkages with organisation theory. 
Jacobson outlines seven categories of individuals who participate in decision making 
within international organisations and highlights the type of system within which such 
actors participate,^  ^ Similarly Jonsson highlights the work of Graham Allison in 
respect of his bureaucratic politics model, extending it beyond the strictly national 
sphere.^ *
According to Jacobson, international organisations comprise of two sub systems, the 
representative and the participant.^  ^ The former is the basic mechanism linking 
international organisations with the political systems of their constituent units. It can 
therefore be represented as a component part of the political systems of states and of 
IGO’s, as shown in Diagram 5.1.
This representation can be further refined to more accurately reflect its component 
parts. The representative sub-system has a number of distinct sub-units. First is that 
part containing delegates to the IGO, including both permanent missions and 
information departments. This component can be called the representation component 
since it actually interacts with the IGO. The sub units may include members co-opted 
for short periods or even for specific items. The second component comprises the 
bureaucracies which set limits on the activities of the representative component, 
issuing instructions and interacting with the state politically. This bureaucratic or
Idem. "This term (meta bureaucracy) implies a good deal about the political style which prevails in 
international organisations, and their strengths and weaknesses as political systems. International 
organisations may promote greater rationality and greater inter-state equity, but they are also removed from 
popular control and thus risk being unresponsive to popular opinion." See also Dag Hammarslgdld "The 
International Civil Servant in Law and Fact" in D A Kay (ed) The United Nations Political System 1969 
London: John Wiley and Sons Inc. pp142-160, who discusses the importance of a "neutral civil service".
Ibid pp 107-108. The categories are: (1) governmental representatives, (2) representatives of private 
associations, (3) representatives of IGO’s, (4) executive heads, (5) members of secretariats, (6) individuals 
acting in their own capacity, (7) publicists/lobbyists.
Jonsson 1987 op cit p76. See also G T Allison Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 
1971 Boston, Mass: Little Brown.
Jacobson 1979, op cit pp 120-124
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"control component" transmits information on IGO activity to the governments of 
member states and to domestic interest groups. The control component can therefore 
be represented as closer to the state side than the IGO side of Diagram 5.1. A third, 
lesser component can be identified, containing a different cast of actors depending on 
the specific issue involved. Specialist interest groups, legislators, prondnent 
individuals and ministries other than foreign ministries may all be represented. In 
practice, virtually all systems will include an "an hoc" issue oriented component. It 
is now, therefore, possible to add missing detail to the previous diagram.
As Diagram 5.2 shows, the public is only indirectly involved with decision making, 
setting broad outlines. In technical terms, a permissive consensus operates.^ Since 
direct interests of the public are seldom at stake as a result of the decisions reached 
in most IGO’s, the limits defined are not usually detailed.^ *
Legislatures, though closer than the general public, are not likely to be intimately 
linked to policy formation. Some control is likely to be exercised over, for example, 
appropriation of funds for IGO’s and setting rules and norms for participation, but the 
functional specialisation of most IGO’s makes it virtually impossible for more than 
a handful of interested legislators to become closely involved.
It is crucial to recognise that the internal coordination process in a representative sub 
system is dominated by, and largely confined to, bureaucracies. The degree to which 
this is true varies according to the system involved. Jacobson notes of American 
practice that: "Few other governments have such an elaborate process of internal 
coordination but none can completely avoid it. The American process can be 
regarded as one extreme example; other governments follow similar procedures that 
deviate only in the direction of greater simplicity".®
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The most consistent exception to this is the European Community. This is attributable to its relatively 
advanced intergrative features, and its scale, since it encompasses a variety of issues which have a direct 
effect on the general public.
Jacobson 1979 op cit p 122
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Executive officials and delegates tend to be bureaucrats themselves, and even when 
this is not the case (for example, lay specialists, legislators etc), these individuals tend
63
The participant sub system shown in Diagram 5.3, describes that part of the overall 
political system composed of those individuals (whether delegates, international 
officials or others) who actually participate in the political process of the international 
organisation. Developing once again on the diagram, the participant sub system can 
be identified as the shaded area within the IGO.
It has been noted that IGO’s in which the participant sub system dominates decision 
making tend to be those involved in less important issues with consequences more 
remote and less immediate to the state system.®* This reflects the desire of 
governments to retain control over decisions touching perceived vital interests by 
ensuring that these are resolved within the representative sub system, as this can be 
more effectively dominated by the state.
Although governments and their representatives tend to exercise final authority over 
representational, normative, rule creating and programmatic decisions, they do not 
wield absolute powers. It is frequently possible for the IGO or its secretariat to play 
a significant role in the minutiae of decision implementation. Alternatively the 
government may be content to issue broad outlines and make the substantive 
decisions. This leaves great scope for enterprising IGO’s to operate.®®
Jacobson’s concern with systemic characteristics appears to go some way to offset the 
concentration of much of Jonssons analysis on the individual. Actors are indeed 
important, but they exist within a framework which is significant to their actions.
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Ibid pp 122-124 and pl40
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to become socialised into the system and are bound by its norms and rules. |
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Cybernetics
Relationships and transactions are the next important aspect of network analysis. This 
approach is commonly call cybernetic, after the science of control and communication 
in animals and machines.®® Interdependence among participating units leads to the 
establishment of networks. As Sharkansky notes,®^  hierarchical authority 
relationships, decision making by command and fixed accountability are inimical to 
an interdependent relationship, since interdependence relies on bargaining, negotiation 
and compromise. Transnational networks should ideally be characterised by formally 
autonomous authority relations, diffuse accountability, and decision making by 
negotiation. Decision making typically requires the participation and coordination of 
several organisations at both the international and national level®*. Thus both 
organisation theory and international organisation have strong inputs in the analysis 
of the relationships between these two levels. Certain developments in international 
relations literature demonstrate a greater concern with a structural approach as 
opposed to the previous concern with leadership based studies.®^  In order to cope 
with what threatens to become an overwhelmingly complex environment externally, 
decision makers are forced to adapt problem solving devices.^ ® Haas’ concept of 
fragmented issue linkage^ * posits an essential interconnectedness of the decision 
making process, as opposed to previously conceived disconnected ad hoc decisions. 
As a response to growing interdependence and complexity in modem politics, 
Gordenker and Saunders believe that international organisations would respond by
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developing "structural sloppiness" In this situation, control might come from 
several super ordinates or even from another unit at the same level.
A growing concern with the importance of networks corresponds closely with the 
belief noted above that the international setting is not as anarchic and the national 
setting not as structured as is commonly supposed.^ ® Since organisations can no 
longer realistically be seen as harmonious normatively integrated systems,^ * and 
fragmented issue linkage and complex interdependence appear increasingly important 
internationally, scope for network analysis increases. As Steinbrunner notes^ ® 
complexity within the decision making process leads to the dispersion of power in an 
attempt to effect outcomes. This is likely to involve a variety of bargaining, coercive 
and cooperative behaviour, which is difficult to reconcile with an oversocialised view 
of organisations. Just as individual organisations can be depicted as political 
bargaining systems, so too can organisational networks.
The greater complexity in the case of the latter is more a matter of degree than of 
substance. These processes taken together reinforce the case that organisation theory 
and international organisation are concerned with the analysis of compatible areas of 
study.
Linking Rn Organisations
The centrality of what are known as linking pin organisations has been noted by 
students of interorganisational networks since the beginning of such research. Within 
a given population of organisations, those individual organisations which have 
extensive and overlapping ties between sub systems in the organisational network, and
A structure which graph theorists call a "sem-lattice" ibid plOO. 
Jonsson 1986 op cit p40. See also Bull 1977 op cit pp23-52.
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with more than one action set, ® can be characterised as linking pin organisations.
Within the local environment of an organisation can be found clients, members of the 
organisation, action sets to which it belongs, other organisations and unorganised 
elements. The greatest proportion of the resources within an environment are more 
likely to be controlled by a combination of action sets and other organisations, since 
unorganised elements and the individual organisation will have relatively 
underdeveloped machinery to exert influence.
Aldrich and Whetten point out that new organisations frequently adapt their activities 
(for example, organisational goals, technologies used and the definition of domains) 
to take account of pre-existing organisations.^  This can assume such importance 
that overt conflict between new and established organisations is uncommon. The 
comparative smoothness of such adaptive behaviour can result in a relatively complex 
network within a given sub system. This does not necessarily mean that a network 
WÜ1 exist on the supra systemic level. The ties of a linking pin - organisation 
between sub-systems invests it with a nodal position within a given network.’*
Linking pin organisations thus serve three particularly important functions:
(1) As communication channels between organisations.
(2) Performing general services linking third parties as a go-between or 
intermediary for the transfer of resources, information or clients.
(3) Actively directing the behaviour of other organisations, either as a result of 
the dependence of other organisations on them to direct the behaviour of the 
action set in a way they could not manage themselves, or by serving as 
models for imitation.
Aldrich and Whetten 1981 op cit, define an action set as: "a group of organisations that have formed a 
temporary alliance for a limited purpose." See also J Boissevain Friends of Friends 1974, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, pp 170-205
”  Aldrich and Whetten 1981 ibid p390
’* A graphic representation can be found in Aldrich and Whetten ibid p398
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Baumgartner et al refer to this as "meta-power".’  ^ Exercise of such power is 
defined as substantially oriented towards shaping social relationships and social 
structures through the manipulation of the components of the interaction system.*® 
This implies an ability to manipulate the organisational "game" in order to realise the 
goals of the organisation over opposition within the social structure, although not 
necessarily the power to change the type, or the rules, of the game.
It is the ability to manipulate the inherent characteristics of the network** rather than 
formal authority in most cases, which defines the position of linking pin 
organisations. As Jonsson notes however, the risks attending this manipulative 
approach must be recognised. The status of the linking pin organisation as impartial 
broker or mediator may be called into question, since the organisation has an interest 
in the issue at stake. The very survival of the status of a linking pin organisation 
hinges on the confidence that other organisations have in its functional value.
Stenelo warns that other actors may become uncertain whether their interests are 
being mediated or manipulated.*’ As Aldrich and Whetten note however, a critical 
examination must be made of the domination of analyses of interorganisational 
relations by an orientation favouring co-ordination,*® since "interorganisational 
relations are conceived as part of an overall interorganisational system which has 
emerged from members voluntarily choosing to form a union for accomplishing
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mutually preferred objectives."®* Issues such as coercion, force, bargaining and 
conflicts of interest have been inadequately covered in the literature. Dynamics like 
these must be more thoroughly examined if interorganisational systems are to be more 
fully understood.
There is a tension between part and system caused by the desire of the individual 
system member to retain its autonomy, and the desire to promote integration. 
Gouldner suggests a number of strategies used by both system and member to achieve 
their goals.®® The system might (a) only admit members who pledge allegiance to 
the goals of the system, or (b) it might expand the system to engulf new members 
sympathetic to system goals. Finally, (c) it might delegate critical functions to trusted 
subsystems. The member might (1) withdraw from the system, (2) spread risks by 
fulfilling critical needs through membership of several systems, or (3) attempt to 
reorganise the system to better suit its own goals.
I
There is of course a danger that coordination can become dysfunctional, since a 
system with too many members may prove unstable and inefficient, being too 
unwieldy to react rapidly to the emergence of environmental change.®®
Attempting to identify linking pin organisations, and to analyze their actions and 
performance in this role is complicated by the apparent complexity of the task. 
"Designers (of networks of interorganisational relations) or investigators face an 
overwhelming analytical problem, they must deal with a population of organisations 
as a whole, where the appropriate place to begin appears completely arbitrary".®’
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Networks may, however, be disaggregated into their constituent units, in order to 
highlight those particular organisations which are concerned with particular issue 
areas, which other organisations they maintain links with, and how they interact to 
reach decisions. Aldrich and Whetten referred to organisation sets, defined as those 
organisations with which the focal organisation has direct links, and action sets, 
defined as a group of organisations in temporary alliance for a limited purpose.** 
Similarly Jonsson identifies the analagous concepts of potential and mobilised 
networks. The former is defined as a set of organisations which tend to become 
involved in the preparation, making and implementation of decisions within an issue 
area which maintain direct links. The latter is defined as that part of the potential 
network which becomes operative in the handling of a specific issue.*’
THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT
From the above it can be seen that the organisational context of bargaining and 
coalition building, informed by organisation theoretic concepts, is the second 
important parameter of the process model of regime dynamics along with bargaining 
and coalition building. Both parameters share a number of related concerns. 
Communication is central to relations between organisations within a network,’® 
whilst bargaining and coalition building between participating organisations in a 
transnational network are as prevalent as they are within an individual 
organisation.’* The function of boundary role occupants is vital in both 
conceptualisations, placing such actors as essential elements in both horizontal and 
vertical bargaining, the conduits through which information and communications flow 
between the external environment and individual organisations, and also from one 
organisation in a network to another. Finally, network analysis reinforces a more 
open system view of states as less hierarchical and rational than is commonly
88
89
90
Ibid pp 386-387
Jonsson 1986 op cit p43 and 1987 op cit pp73-74 
Aldrich and Whetten 1981 op cit p385
’* Bacharach and Lawler’s depiction of individual organisations as bargaining systems cannot but be applied 
in an interorganisational context. There are no legitimate theoretical grounds for restricting their precepts 
to individually based research. Op cit 1980 passim. See also Sharkansky 1981 op cit p462.
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supposed, whilst simultaneously suggesting that the international environment is less 
anarchic and more structured than it frequently appears. Linking pin organisations 
may reduce the opportunity costs of promoting international understanding, and 
possibly of regime dynamics, by facilitating coalition building, compromise and 
information coalition building, compromise and information exchange. The 
construction of transnational networks can be regarded as a "sunk cost", which 
participants have an interest in preserving due to the resources expended in its 
construction. Hence networks may also act as barriers to regime change once 
established.
The Process Model - A Summary
The process model elucidated in this chapter integrates elements of interorganisation 
theory and bargaining theory to produce a dynamic model. It concentrates on the 
importance of bargaining as an intervening variable between the dilemma type 
situations confronting actors trying to decide whether to cooperate, and on the 
creation or transformation of an international regime. As Jonsson notes: "The
existence of transnational networks is of crucial importance in such multiple level 
bargaining. Networks facilitate the distribution of information, which is considered 
a key element in the process of a regime dynamics, and are instrumental in building 
coalitions and mediating divergent interests. Networks rest on interorganisational 
links through individuals in boundary-role positions".”
”  Jonsson 1987 op cit pp 74-75
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CHAPTER SIX 
NEGOTIATING THE LIBERAL HEGEMONIC REGIME
"EMPIRE BY INVITATION"': ENTRAPMENT OF THE HEGEMON 
The armaments collaboration regime which was developed in the immediate post 
World War Two period was a result of developments both planned and unforseen, 
which might under other circumstances have resulted in a radically different structure. 
There was nothing inevitable about the pattern of the armaments collaboration regime 
which emerged. Rather the process of regime formation and change reflected the 
hegemonic power of the United States on the one hand, and the ability of the 
Europeans to influence American policy toward European reconstruction and 
redevelopment generally, and vis a vis security in particular, on the other hand.
It is the contention of this analysis that the armaments collaboration regime which 
emerged in the post 1949 period reflected the very real limitations of American 
hegemonic power. Furthermore, changes in American policy between the early years 
of World War Two and the early nineteen fifties, resulted in the emergence of an 
ongoing and direct American political and security presence in Europe which 
paradoxically indicated not American hegemonic domination as is commonly 
supposed, but the limitations of American power and the European "craving for 
dependence. It is pertinent, therefore, to analyse the formation of the armaments 
collaboration regime in terms of the process model developed in Chapter 5. The aim 
of such an analysis is to establish the extent to which the said model can produce 
fresh insights into the issue area.
The analysis which follows is predicated on a particular conception of American 
hegemonic power, the methods by which the said power was operationalised, and the 
ability of the hegemon to control outcomes. Whilst accepting that the United States 
emerged from the Second World War in an unequivocally hegemonic position, and
1
2
A term used by Geir Lundestad in "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe 1945- 
1952". Journal of Peace Research 1986, 23:263-277.
The phrase was coined by David Calleo Bevond American Heeemonv; The Future of the Western Alliance 
1988, New York: Basic Books p35
132
that it subsequently used this position to bring about the postwar international order, 
there was considerable input from other sources. Whereas literature on hegemonic 
power and stability emphasises the use of coercion, this was not a very obvious 
feature of American policy vis avis  European defence and security after 1945.
American policy aimed to buüd a postwar liberal multilateral system. As Ikenberry 
notes:
"Domestic considerations, moreover, made a large-scale peacetime 
military commitment to Europe and a spheres-of-influence policy 
difficult to sustain. A liberal, multilateral system would allow the 
United States to project its own ideals onto a world where depression 
and war had clearly demonstrated the bankruptcy of European ideas of 
spheres of influence and economic nationalism. If the United States 
could no longer isolate itself from the affairs of Europe, it would need 
to alter the terms of international politics. Only on this basis would 
congressional and public opinion allow the United States to play an 
internationalist role. A liberal, multilateral system, once established, 
would be self regulating and would not require direct American 
involvement in Europe."®
The United States was, therefore, acting to achieve classically hegemonic objectives. 
As noted in Chapter 3*, and also in the works of Charles Kindleberger and Robert 
Gilpin®, a single dominant hegemonic actor, providing a range of collective goods, 
is seen as fundamental to the creation and maintenance of international economic and 
political order. The problem, and a major shortcoming of the prevailing hegemonic 
stability theory based analyses, lies in explaining two facets of hegemonic power. 
Firstly, how such power is operationalised, since as existing theory is focused almost 
exclusively on the gross measurement of material resources, it omits much which is
3
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G Ikenberry "Rethinking the Origins of American Kfegemony" Political Science Ouarterlv 1989, 104 (3), 
375-400 p382.
See above pp 65 to 94.
Charles P Kindleberger The World in Depression 1929-39 1973, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Robert Gilpin War and Change in World Politics 1981, New York: Cambridge University Press esp pp 
186-210.
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potentially important in the analysis of hegemony. Second is the importance of the 
early phases of supposed hegemonic stability. Existing literature on the construction 
of the institutions of the early postwar period within the issue area is quite extensive, 
and the various approaches utilised are diverse.® These treatments all contribute 
toward an overall understanding of the situations which contributed toward the 
evolution of armaments collaboration in the North Atlantic area. Where they are less 
successful, however, is in their ability to explain the processes underlying such 
evolution. As a result the story of the paternity of the postwar international order 
remains incomplete, a shortcoming which has important implications for the analysis 
of future behaviour within the said order. As the international system moves into the 
uncharted waters of the post Cold War era, an explanation which offers a more 
dynamic, process based, analysis may prove to be particularly valuable. If, as this 
analysis posits, the American hegemony was less successful in achieving its desired 
outcomes and less of an imposed structure than hegemonic stability theory would lead 
one to believe, there is room for debate on the accepted, somewhat monolithic, view 
of the postwar American hegemony.
Existing analyses of the origins and development of the post 1945 international system 
can be divided into a number of different approaches, some complimentary and some 
directly at odds with one another. Indeed, the search for an analytical framework 
which helped to explain the "shattered peace"’ of 1945, shows remarkable 
similarities with the search for a new theoretical construct which might guide present 
day researchers into the unchartered territory of the post Cold War era. It is all too 
easy to forget in the light of forty years of Cold War stability that in the immediate 
post Second World War period, a real sense of uncertainty pervaded debates about 
the construction of lasting postwar peace and security, and that these closely mirrored
The literature ranges from the revisionist school exemplified by William Appleman Williams in his Empire 
as a Wav of Life 1980, New York and The Tragedv of American Dinlomacv 1962, New York, to the post 
revisionist response exemplified by John Lewis Gaddis in The Lone Peace - Inquiries into the Historv of 
the Cold War 1987, Oxford: Oxford University Press, to die more historically informed approaches of Olav 
Riste in his edited work Western Security: The Formative Years: European and Atlantic Defence 1947-1953 
1985, Oslo, and André de Staercke et al in NATO’S Anxious BirÜi: The Prophetic Vision of the 1940’s 
1985, London: C Hurst and Co.
A term used by the revisionist scholar Daniel Yergin in his critique of US policy toward the Soviet Union 
in the late 1940*s and early 1950’s. See his Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War and the 
National Security State. 1980, Pengiun Books: Harmondsworth, Middlesex especially die Prologue: The 
New Lore pp3-14.
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the concerns of modem policy makers. Today the old certainties of the Cold War 
have themselves been shattered, and the way ahead remains uncertain. To quote 
Gaddis;
"History, as anyone who has spent any time at all studying it would surely 
know, has a habit of making bad prophets out of both those who make and 
those who chronicle it."*
It is vital to recognise that the debate analysed in Chapter 3 above on the perceived 
origins of, and prospects for, American hegemony within the international system 
tend to detract from the general context within which the specific debate on American 
hegemony takes place. The impact of general political-strategic factors such as the 
perception of the Soviet threat, the role of nuclear deterrence, and the part played by 
third parties in the basically bi-polar post 1945 international system, have tended to 
be taken as given factors in the preceding analysis. This is partly attributable to the 
subject matter, with its concentration on US-European relations, and the development 
of the security structures within which armaments collaboration could evolve. The 
contextuality of the issue area has, in theoretical terms, necessarily played second 
fiddle to the detailed analysis above.
The evolution of armaments collaboration in the North Atlantic area, and attempts to 
institute a regime in the issue area, did not occur in a vacuum however. It is 
necessary therefore to briefly examine the contending approaches in the large corpus 
of literature which deals with the construction of the world order in the years after 
1945.
Perhaps the greatest problem in analysing the literature on this period, and thereby 
attempting to decide which approach appears most pertinent, is in freeing oneself 
from forty years of accumulated Cold War history. As Yergin notes, much of the 
literature, whether orthodox or revisionist, represents simply a continuation of the 
Cold War by other means, a sterile exercise in "onus-shifting" which does little to 
explain a phenomenon so complex, so wide ranging and so long lived as the Cold
* Gaddis 1987 op cit pt p244.
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War.’
The epithet "orthodox" as used by Yergin denotes a particular view of the origins of 
the Cold War, and therefore of the role of the United States in the construction of the 
post Second World War international system. The isolationism which characterised 
American policy during the inter war period, reinforced a "continentalist" vision of 
the American security. Traditional mistrust of entangling alliances and European 
political in-fighting, reinforced by the disillusionment caused by the outcome of 
World War I, the preoccupation with self sufficiency and economic recovery during 
the 1930’s, and the apparent remoteness of rising tensions in Europe and Asia all 
helped reinforce the prevailing American view that:
"the security of the United States required little more than insulating the 
Western hemisphere from outside influences."*®
The manifest inadequacies of continentalist national security strategy and isolationism 
in international relations, highlighted by the attack on Pearl Harbour and the early 
success of Hitler’s Blitzkrieg, convinced both the American people and their policy 
makers that the security of the United States depended as much on denying any one 
power control of the Eastern hemisphere as in insulating the western hemisphere from 
external interference.
The demise of isolationism left the field open for the competing schools of what have 
been termed internationalism and realism. The former, frequently referred to as 
Wilsonianism due to its close association with Woodrow Wilson, has played a central
10
Yergin 1980 op cit p6-7. Similarly Gaddis notes that:
"To recapture what was in the minds of Western leaders as the Cold War began requires, in 
addition to traditional methods of historical research, somediing o f an imaginative leap. One must 
get a sense o f how things lodced at the time. One must free one’s vision from the accumulated 
impressions o f the more recent past, from die tyranny o f knowing what came next. One must 
avoid at all cost imposing a contemporary frame o f reference upon those >%ho were in no position 
to anticipate the contemporary world."
Gaddis 1987 op cit p21.
Ibid p22. For a useful summary o f die continentalist vision, see Mark Stoler "From Continentalitalism to 
Globalism." Diplomatic History 1982,6:304.
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role in American foreign policy throughout the twentieth century. The liberal 
internationalism which characterised the Wilsonian world view represented a powerful 
statement of American principles, and attempted to apply these universally on to the 
anarchic realpolitik of traditional international relations. As Yergin notes:
"The Wilsonian programme, meant to produce a middle way between reaction 
and revolution, included national self-determination representative 
government, a league of nations, an end to formal empires, non recognition 
of revolutionary change, democratic liberties and human rights, reduction of 
armaments, a belief in an enlightened public opinion, and an open-door world 
economy. The economic objectives were an important element, but only part 
of the picture. The United States saw itself as a disinterested, innocent 
power, whose own desires and aims were thought to express the yearnings of 
all people, and whose responsibilities were to become inescapable and 
worldwide.**
Realism, like internationalism, shared what Gaddis has termed the emphatic goal of 
undercutting isolationism, whatever their differences as to the nature of the postwar 
world.*’ It is important to note that although the "realism" generally seen to be the 
hallmark of American policy from the late 1940’s onwards would appear to obviate 
much of the Wilsonian programme referred to above, the values it aimed to bring 
about in international relations remained constant. The paradox, as Yergin notes, lies 
in the problem that in order to achieve Wilsonian ends or ideals in worljd politics, to 
remove conflict and anarchy, spheres of influence or empires, one must stoop to 
utilise traditional or realist means. 1®
** Yergin 1980 op cit pp8-9. Wilsonianism as a programme is discussed in greater detail in N Gordon Levin 
Woodrow Wilson and World Politics 1967, New York; Oxford University Press, particularly pp2-10. The 
liberal tradition which underlay the Wilsonian view had deep roots in American society and politics, 
recalling the 19th century concept o f manifest destiny in some aspects. The concepts Which formed parts 
of the programme were, o f course, not unique to the United States, nor indeed to the era o f Wilson himself. 
See Lmiis Hartz The Liberal Tradition in America: An tntemretadon of American Political Thought since 
the Revolution 1955, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.
*’ Gaddis 1987 op cit p23.
13 Yergin 1980 qp cit pp9-10 discussed this paradox.
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American attachment to the concept of a liberal hegemonic world order in the postwar I
period had firm historical foundations, permeating large sections of American j
economic and political élites/* Indeed, it is an indication of the strength of such {
ideals within the American administration that the liberal multilateral conception of |
how the postwar international system would operate was unchallenged before 1947. 1jNaturally, the wartime Grand Alliance and Roosevelt’s conviction that such j
cooperation would continue postwar, made alternative options difficult to explore. I
In addition however, postwar American planners were painfully aware of the lessons |
of the interwar period. The isolationist stance of the United States was deemed to I
have contributed to the economic and political conditions which encouraged World I
War Two. There was a great deal of consensus among American government |
officials within both the State and Treasury Departments that the United States had 1
an interest in promoting liberal multilateralism both economically and politically*® I
and, more specifically, in supporting liberal multilateral economic relations via the 
creation of international organisations which would oversee and promote such an 
order. J
In terms of the ideals and hopes outlined in the liberal multilateral world view which 
dominated American policy making between 1941 and 1947, the United States i
achieved much less than its hegemonic position would lead one to expect. j
Conversely, in terms of direct involvement in leading the post war international ;
system, the United States became much more thoroughly entangled than she had 
wished.
As Ikenberry further notes,*® the precepts of multilateral liberalism which guided 1
United States policy, particularly in the period between 1944 and 1947, failed for
three major reasons. First, the economic and political dislocations caused by the war
were much greater than had been predicted. The construction of a unitary framework I
14
15
16
For a full discussion of die historical context of liberal multilateralism, see Richard Gardner Sterling Dollar 
Diplomacy: The Origins and the Prospects o f Our International Economic Order 1969, New York: McGraw 
Hill pp 1-35. See also Gaddis 1987 op cit pp48-71 for a discussion o f the evolution o f American policy 
in the immediate postwar period.
See Gardner op cit p l2 .
See G John Ikenberry 1989, op cit, esp p385
138
for international economic relations, featuring the reconstruction of multilateral trade, 
and a liberal international economy twinned to collective security, were central policy 
themes during both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. These hegemonic 
objectives were not balanced by the power and influence to offset the pressures of 
post war reconstruction. The liberal multilateralist world view assumed an 
approximate balance in the multilateral system which simply did not exist at that time.
Second, major differences remained, particularly between the United States and 
western Europe, on the implications of American liberal multilateralism on the role 
of governments in promoting domestic economic and social obligations of the state.*’
"The Europeans themselves were crucial in recasting the terms of liberal 
multilateralism - if only in resisting, modifying and circumventing American 
proposals. In insisting on the primacy of domestic stability in the 
development of international economic rules and institutions, the Europeans 
(and most importantly the British) successfully recast the character of post war 
economic order. The story of post war international political economy is as 
much that of the triumph of the welfare state as of the halting and partial 
emergence of liberal multilateralism. "**
The third major factor which militated against the liberal multilateral policy was the 
nature of post war US-Soviet relations. The emergence of the Cold War shattered 
wartime dreams of post war cooperation. The growing realisation that the post war 
global political economy would be characterised not by a "one world" but a "two 
worlds" system prompted a reorientation of American policy. From roughly 1947 
until 1950, the United States attempted to establish Europe as an independent Third 
Force in economic and political terms. It must be understood that American policy 
aimed not to establish an American sphere of influence, but to foster European
*’ Richard N Gardener 1969, op cit, pp30-35, p277. See also John Ruggie "International Regimes, 
Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in die Post War Economic Order". International 
Organisation 1982, 36: 379-415, and Robert Keohane "The World Political Economy and the Crisis of 
Embedded Liberalism" in John H Goldtfaoipe (ed) Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism: Studies 
in the Political Economy of Western European Nations 1984, Oxford, Clarendon Press: 15-38.
18 Ikenberry 1989 op cit p398
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economic and political rehabilitation with the aim of avoiding any direct and ongoing 
American military and political presence in Europe. The focus was very much on 
rebuilding the economic, political and social fabric of Europe which would in turn 
inhibit communist progress in Western Europe. The threat of direct Soviet 
intervention was seen as secondary to the more pressing need to avert economic 
collapse.*’
Charles Bohlen, Counsellor of the State Department encapsulated the shift in the 
policy of the administration generally, saying:
"The United States is confronted with a condition in the world which 
is at direct variance with the assumptions upon which, during and 
directly after the war, major United States policies were predicated.
Instead of unity among the great powers - both political and economic 
- after the war, there is complete disunity between the Soviet Union 
and the satellites on one side and the rest of the world on the other.
There are, in short, two worlds instead of one. Faced with this 
disagreeable fact, however much we may deplore it, the United States 
in the interest of its own well being and security and those of the free 
non-Soviet world must re-examine its major policy objectives."’®
Once more however, American policy was frustrated. Ikenberry summarizes the 
problem:
"The United States wanted to encourage an independent Europe - a
*’ George Kennan’s Policy Planning staff was instrumental in formulating what became known as the "Third 
Force" conception o f European recovery. Formed in May 1947, this body emphasized the need for a 
limited, economically integrated Europe, capable of acting independently of both the United States and the 
Soviet Union. Kennan insisted that US aid "should be directed not to combatting communism as such, but 
to the restoration o f the economic health and vigour of European society." (The memorandum is quoted 
in George Kennan Memoirs 1925-50 1967, Boston: Little, Brown: 336). See also Foreign Relations of die 
United States (henceforth FRUS) 1947, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 1973. Vol HI: 
223-230. Amongst the large amount o f literature dealing with this period, the following works are 
particularly revealing as to American attitudes: Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas The Wise Men: Six 
Friends and the World Thev Made 1986, London: Faber and Faber: 402-418, Charles Kindleberger 
Marshall Plan Days 1987 Boston: Allen and Unwin esp pp4-24; Stanley Hoffman and Charles Maier (eds) 
The Marshall Plan: A Retrospective 1984, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press
’® Bohlen memorandum, 30th August 1947 FRUS 1947 1: 763-764.
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third force - and not to establish an American sphere of influence. Yet 
the Europeans could not agree among themselves to organise such a 
centre of global power; the United States, despite its hegemonic 
power, could not see to its implementation. Just as in the earlier 
phase, when the goal of US policy was that of a global, liberal 
multilateralism, severe limits of US power were experienced."^^
The limited steps taken by the Europeans during this period, such as the Congress of 
Europe, the establishment of the Council of Europe and the OEEC can hardly be seen 
as enthusiastic moves toward the formation of an independent third force.
It is indeed quite remarkable how thoroughly the Europeans were able, between 1947 
and 1950, to resist the policy agenda of the United States, and ultimately to thwart 
plans for an independent "third force" in Europe. Despite the American nuclear 
monopoly, the only economy which actually expanded as a result of the war, and 
massive (if rapidly demobilising) armed forces, the United States proved unable to 
achieve her aims. The Europeans, for a variety of different national reasons, 
preferred the certainties of life within an American dominated bi polar system, to the 
uncertainties of establishing a European third force. In short, the so called "empire 
by invitation" rested on the European calculation that more of their economic, social 
and security needs would be achieved under a US dominated hegemonic system. 
Furthermore, tying the United States into a formal commitment to Europe, presented 
a far greater opportunity to influence American policy than would otherwise have 
been the case. Seen in this Hght, the prospects for liberal multilateralism steadily 
decreased during the late 1940*s and, US rhetoric notwithstanding, had largely 
disappeared by the time the North Atlantic Treaty was formulated and signed on April 
4th 1949.
This brief introduction is intended to elucidate the origins and formation of the 
circumstances which resulted in the structure of armaments collaboration regime after 
1949. The limits of US hegemony, discussed above, are directly pertinent to the 
negotiation of the first regime in this area, since they resulted in a much more direct
Ikenberry op cit p390
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American involvement in European security than could have been foreseen at the 
close of World War Two. To an extent, the immediate aftermath of war saw an 
interregnum, caused partly by the sheer exhaustion, dislocation and destruction of 
total war, but also partly by the state of flux discussed above. Until the shape of the 
post war international order became clear, there was a "wait and see" attitude toward 
the establishment of an armaments collaboration regime. Unlike the international 
aviation regime, which had been extensively discussed and mapped out before 
international aviation even began“ , cooperation in the field of armaments had to 
await the clarification of the post war international system, and the establishment of 
the necessary forums for debate.
This is not to say that events in the security field prior to the signing of the North 
Atlantic Treaty were unimportant, merely that with the explicit commitment of the 
United States to the European continent and collective defence, the terms of the 
debate changed, and with it the character of the regime. In a period of little more 
than twelve months, from the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4th April 1949, 
the foundations of the new regime were established. These foundations included a 
clear cut American commitment to the defence of Western Europe, and radically new 
institutional and organisational arrangements which shaped the future of armaments 
collaboration in the North Atlantic area.
The Brussels Treaty: Baiting the Trap
The Brussels Treaty represented an extension of the existing Dunkirk Treaty of 
Alliance between Great Britain and France signed on 4th March 1947 and ratified on 
8th September. This had primarily been aimed at deterring future German 
aggression, but it also envisaged the possibility of extending similar guarantees to 
other states. The Treaty enshrined a commitment to come to the aid of the other 
partly should it be subject to attack, as well as attempting to promote economic 
cooperation.^
Jonsson op cit pp76-83
23 The text o f the Treaty appears in CMP 7217. 1947, London: HMSO "Treaty o f Alliance and Mutual 
Assistance: Dunkirk". See also Maj. Gen. E FursdenThe European Defence Community: A History 1980, 
London: MacMillan Press, pp28-30. A number o f sources discuss the negotiations during this period, 
including; Robert Osgood NATO: The Entangling Alliance 1962, Chicago: University o f Chicago Press; 
Timothy Ireland Creatine the E ntangling Alliance - The Origins o f NATO 1981, London: Aldwych; Robert 
Hunter Security in Europe 1972, London: Paul Elek Ltd; Margaret Ball NATO and die European
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Continuing insecurity in the Low countries, however, led to pressure, especially from 
Belgium, to extend the Dunkirk Treaty to the Benelux states. Ernest Bevin, the 
British Foreign Secretary, stalled for time in face of concern with the details of the 
Marshall Plan, despite the preparation of draft treaties.^ After September 1947 
however, when the sixteen European states which had been meeting in Paris since 
July at the invitation of Bevin and his French counterpart Bidault, sent a detailed and 
comprehensive report on conditions in Europe to the American administration, 
attention turned once more to the security field.
Bevin reflected the intensifying desire of the Europeans to draw the United States into 
some form of security guarantee in his 15th December 1947 discussions with 
Secretary of State, George Marshall,^ outlining a regional European organisation 
consisting of Great Britain, France and the Benelux states, linked to other Western 
European states and to the United States. The American response, though positive, 
remained non committal. This ambiguous attitude reflected both disputes within the 
Truman administration as to whether a firm commitment to Europe should be made, 
and concerns that Congress and American public opinion would not support 
permanent military and political ties to Europe.^
The Europeans were aware that American ambiguity in the matter of a security 
commitment could only be dispelled by cooperative, joint action from the European 
states. The European Recovery Programme (ERP) detailed by Secretary of State
24
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Movement 1959 London: Praeger; Lord Hastings Ismay NATO; The First Five Years 1949-54 1955, Paris: 
NATO; Sir Nicholas Henderson The Birth of NATO 1983, Boulder Colo: Westview Press.
Foreign Office 371,73045, Z322/273/72G, 7 6  May 1947 contains Bevin’s comments on the draft treaties. 
See also CAB 128 (101 F.38;
CAB 54 (471 2. Secret, 17th June 1947: ff 43-44;
CAB 55 (47) 5 . Secret, 19th June 1947: ff 47;
CAB 56 (47) 3. Secret, 24th June 1947. 1947, London Public Records Office.
Memorandum by the British Foreign Office, undated FRUS 1947. HI: 818-819
See, for example, the Hickerson Memorandum, FRUS 1948 HI; 6-7. John Hickerson, Director of the 
office of European Affairs urged military cooperation with Europe on the administration. Others, notably 
George Kennan, opposed such moves considering them destructive to the goal of European unity so often 
espoused by the administration since 1945. See Kennan Memorandum to the Secretary o f State, 20th 
January 1948, FRUS 1948 HI: 7-8, also discussed in Kennan Memoirs 1967 op cit pp 397-406.
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Marshall in his 5th June 1947 Harvard University Speech,^ had explicitly tied 
Marshall Aid to the formulation of a coherent European response, and European 
allocation of the aid. This emphasis reflected strong pressure from within the State 
Department that European political leaders should assume responsibility for 
formulating exactly what type of aid was required, and its disbursement. Marshall 
believed that:
"It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this government to 
undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe 
on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The 
initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country 
should consist of friendly persuasion and in the draughting of a 
European programme so far as it may be practical for us to do so. 
The programme should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not 
all, European nations."^ *
Bevin’s speech to the House of Commons on 22nd January 1948 was the culmination 
of the economic response by the Europeans to Marshall Aid, submitted in September 
1947, but also signalled a new political enthusiasm towards a European initiative in 
response to the ERP. Bevin announced that the Dunkirk Treaty would be extended 
to the Benelux States,^ ® and called once more for an American commitment to
27
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For the full text o f the Harvard address, see la  Quest o f Peace and Security Selected Documents on 
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reorientation o f US policy since as early as August 1947. See Bohlen Memorandum, 30th August 1947.
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Hansard. 5th Series Vol 446 Cols 383-409,22nd January 1948. On the European response which emanated 
from the Paris Conference, see FRUS 1947, HI: 230-232.
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Europe’s security, insisting that:
The treaties that are being proposed cannot be fully effective nor be relied 
upon when a crisis arises unless there is assurance of American support for 
the defence of Western Europe.^
Initial Franco-British pressure against the extended Dunkirk Treaty being based on 
a regional pact with multinational institutions, as advocated by the Benelux countries 
and the United States, was dispelled by the pressing need to tie the United States 
firmly to Europe’s defence, and also by the rapidly worsening international 
environment. Despite the fact that Under Secretary of State, Robert Lovett, refused 
to commit the Americans directly to participation in Europe’s new initiatives as late 
as February 2nd 1948, in a meeting in Washington DC with the British ambassador 
to the United States Inverchapel,^  ^ the Europeans, and especially Belgium and the 
Netherlands, continued to press for American involvement. Following the 
Czechoslovak coup in February 1948, and mounting pressure on West Berlin, Finland 
and Norway from the Soviet Union, differences between the Europeans and the 
United States narrowed in response to the apparent danger of Soviet expansion.
Negotiations on a five power agreement began on March 4th 1948, with a draft treaty 
prepared by March 12th. It was on this date that the United States finally agreed to 
begin a dialogue with the West European states on the formation of an Atlantic 
security system.^  ^ Despite differences over references to Germany and future 
extension of the pact, the Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural 
collaboration and Collective Defence was signed on 17th March 1948, and ratified 
by all parties by 25th August.^ ^
Hansard. 5th Series Vol 446 Cols 396-397, 22nd January 1948. Also quoted in FRUS 1948.111:14. 
"Lovett to Inverchapel", 2nd February 1948, FRUS 1948. Ut: 17-18 
Ibid, ffl:48
33 "Treaty o f Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Self Defence" CMP 7599 Brussels 17th March 
1948 HMSO, London. See also J A S Grenville The Maior International Treaties 1914-73: A History and 
Guide with Texts. 1974, London: Methuen & Co: pp399-401 See also; John Baylis "Britain, the Brussels 
Pact and the Continental Commitment" International Affairs 1984, 60(4): 615-629; Alan Bullock Ernest 
Bevin: Foreign Secretarv 1945-51. 1983, London: Heineman.
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The Brussels Treaty, like its Dunkirk predecessor contained an automatic commitment I
of support to co-signatories in the event of an attack, under Article IV. More !
importantly however, unlike the Dunkirk Treaty, it contained an innovation in the i
creation of a Consultative Council by Article Vn of the Treaty. This was to consist j
of the five powers foreign ministers, and a permanent commission of Ambassadors, j
which could meet regularly. The Council represented a novel institutional departure j
in Europe, and at its formation was the only official political forum for multi lateral I
discussion of defence and security issues in Europe. Another major product of the 
European effort to draw the United States into an Atlantic security system, was for |
formation of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) between i
April and June 1948. Following the passing of the Economic Cooperation Act by I
Congress on 3rd April 1948, sixteen European states met to decide on a basis for 
administering the aid provided under this act. The convention establishing the OEEC |
was signed in Paris on 16th April 1948, and the organisation itself became operational 1
on June 5th, a year to the day after Marshall’s Harvard speech.^
It is important to recognise that throughout this period, the United States remained j
probably the staunchest supporter of European unity. In many ways American policy 
was "more royal than the king", in as much as stated American policy was to |
promote European unity. The institutional responses developed by the Europeans I
were the direct result of US pressure, and it is difficult to imagine such organisations I
being developed by the Europeans in the forms which emerged, without strong input 
from the Americans at each step along the path to the North Atlantic Treaty.
The first meeting of the Brussels Treaty Organisation (BTO) Foreign Ministers on the
17th April 1948 laid the basis for the organisational structure of the new body. In
addition to the Consultative Council and the Permanent Commission, a Permanent i
Military Committee was established, consisting of the Defence Ministers of the five
states. This met for the first time on 30th April. The Military Committee was given I
responsibility for drawing up defence plans, co-ordinating the military resources of
34 The text of the Convention may be found in the European Yearbook Vol I. pp 230-57. Apart from the five 
Brussels Treaty signatories, the following states also signed the convention: Austria, Denmark, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. The convention was also 
signed by the American, British and French commanders in chief on behalf o f tiieir occupation zones in 
Germany.
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the five powers and establishing the detailed organisational framework.^  ^ The 
military organisation established under the aegis of the Brussels Treaty had neither 
the physical, financial or political resources to act as a credible deterrent to supposed 
Russian threats. In any case, the organisation was quickly overtaken by events and 
the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Rather, the importance 
of the BTO lies in the precedent it established in the organisation of European 
security.
For the first time, a peacetime organisation was developed, comprising a Permanent 
Military Chairman, three commanders-in-chief for the services, and an international 
group of officers serving as a joint staff. This framework, later to be extensively 
emulated and developed by NATO, represents the first concrete demonstration that 
a multi national, semi integrated organisation was seen as not only feasible, but 
absolutely essential to ensure the security of Western Europe.
The prevailing state of "organisational flux" at this time is well demonstrated by the 
role of the BTO in the establishment of the Council of Europe. As early as July 1948 
the Consultative Council of the BTO discussed the formation of a European 
parliament including an executive, after representations by Bidault, the French 
Foreign Minister. The Hague Congress of Committees of Movements for European 
Union, which contained delegates from outwith the BTO states, had been pressing for 
discussion of such issues at its May 1948 meeting. At this time, it still appeared 
possible that other states might adhere to the BTO, or even that radical steps would 
be taken on the road toward European integration. The Consultative Council of the 
BTO, therefore, formed an extraordinary "Committee for the Study of European 
Unity" in October 1948, which met in Paris in November.^  Disagreement as to the 
form which any organ of unity should assume, resulted in the adoption of a 
compromise solution at the January 1949 Consultative Council meeting. This called 
for the creation of a Council of Europe, consisting of a public consultative European
For the communique issued by the Foreign Ministers, see "Collective Defence under the Brussels and North 
Atlantic Treaty" CMD 7883. 1950, London; HMSO. Fursden discusses the organisational aspects of the 
BTO op cit pp31-34.
See F L Schuman "The Council o f Europe" A m erican Political Science Review 1951, 45: 724-40, esp 
p725.
147
Assembly, and a private ministerial committee. On the 5th May 1949, at the London 
Ten Power Conference, the statute of the Council of Europe was signed,^  ^ an 
organisational response to the BTC’s desire to see a forum established for the 
discussion and dissemination of information and issues which affected the member 
states. Although defence and security issues were not within the remit of the Council 
of Europe, it is interesting that the main impetus for the new body came from the 
BTO.
From the Brussels Treaty to the North Atlantic Treaty
By mid 1948 the stage had been set for serious negotiations on an Atlantic defence 
framework. Enabling legislation in the United States made it possible for the USA 
to enter commitments^ *, while European efforts toward self help and the deepening 
Cold War provided a political imperative.
Senate Resolution 239, which came to be known as the Vandenburg Resolution after 
the influential senator of the same name, who was chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, is generally considered the precursor of negotiations which 
culminated in the North Atlantic Treaty. The resolution had been passed by the 
Senate by a majority of 60 on 11 June 1948. The idea for the Resolution came from 
a series of discussions between Under Secretary of State, Robert Lovett and Senator 
Vandenburg in early April 1948. Vandenburg was known to be, at the best, 
lukewarm toward the commitment of the United States to any form of security 
guarantee to, or treaty with those western European states which had so recently 
signed the Brussels Treaty.^ ® Lovett succeeded, however, in winning the support 
of Vandenburg for the concept of an Atlantic alliance, which greatly eased the future
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passage of any Treaty through Congress, by ensuring that the wording of the 
Resolution did not amount to an open ended commitment.
The actual recommendation at the heart of Resolution 239 was relatively inocuous, 
calling for:
"Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional 
and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self 
help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security."^
The central role of the Vandenburg Resolution has almost certainly been over 
emphasised in existing analyses of the period. With the adoption of Resolution 239, 
however influential, demonstrates how one potentially troublesome sector of 
opposition within the United States was effectively coopted into a process which had 
begun in March 1948 during the so called "Pentagon Talks".
These talks were held in secret, and involved only the United States, Canada and the 
United Kingdom. The resulting Pentagon Paper, and indeed the very existence of the 
negotiations themselves, were not revealed to those states which later took part in the 
North Atlantic Treaty negotiations.^ ^
At a series of six meetings between 22 March 1948 and 1 April 1948, the basis was 
laid for the discussions which resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty some 12 months 
later. The delegations consisted of high ranking officials from all three participants. 
Canada sent Lester Pearson, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, to head 
their delegation for the first four meetings, afterwhich Hume Wrong, the ambassador 
to the United States took over.
The United Kingdon delegation was headed by Lord Inverchapel, ambassador to 
Washington, although Gladwyn Jebb (later Lord Gladwyn) was the main actor. The 
British delegation also included Robert Cecil and Donald MacLean. The latter was
40
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149
to defect to the Soviet Union in 1951, and is now believed to have kept Moscow fully 
informed of the negotiations/^ The American delegation consisted of their 
ambassador to the United Kingdom, Lewis Douglas in the chair, John Hickerson, 
Director of the State Department European office and his principal aide Theodore 
Achilles. Alfred Gruenther, Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) also took part.
The Pentagon Paper which emerged from the series of talks was endorsed by aU three 
delegations on 1 April 1948.^  ^ The final document was based on discussions 
concerning three working papers, one prepared by each delegation, which had been 
drawn up for the third meeting, and aimed to set out the conditions each delegation 
considered necessary to bring about a "Western Mutual Defence Pact". These three 
working papers were subsequently refined by Jebb, Pearson and Achilles, into a joint 
draft paper which was discussed at the fourth meeting on 25 March 1948, at a plenary 
session of the talks. It was decided at this meeting to refer the draft document to the 
respective capitals for further discussions, and reconvene the talks for the fifth 
meeting on 31 March 1948. The American delegation insisted on quite extensive 
alterations to the draft paper of 24 March, which was rewritten by Hickerson twice, 
before endorsing the finished document. The mam problem areas for the American 
delegation were on the mutual assistance pledge, the indirect aggression clause, and 
the territorial scope and membership of the treaty.^
The Americans were much the most cautious in their definition of an acceptable 
mutual assistance pledge, rejecting both the Brussels Treaty style automatic 
commitment favoured by the United Kingdom, and the more conservative Rio Treaty 
model favoured by Canada. Although the draft paper stipulated that parties to the 
treaty would afford one of the parties subject to armed attack "all the military, 
economic and other aid and assistance in its power"^ ,^ the Americans subsequently
See Wiebes & Zeeman 1983 op cit p361.
FRUS 1948 n i; 72-75.
^  FRUS ibid, details the items o f the Pentagon Pfq>er. See also Wiebes and Zeeman 1983 op cit pp356-362. 
See FRUS m  1948 p73.
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succeeded in substituting a milder version in the final document. This reflected State 
Department disquiet about the definition of an armed attack, who should decide 
whether an armed attack had occurred, and what type of assistance should be 
forthcoming. The Pentagon Paper, therefore, contains the following definition, which 
fully conforms to the American view:
"Provision that each Party shall regard any action in the area covered by the 
agreement, which it considers an armed attack, against any other Party, as an 
armed attack against itself and that each Party accordingly undertakes to assist 
in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or 
collective self defence recognised by Article 51 of the (UN) Charter."'*^
The argument over the incorporation of consultation in the event of "indirect 
aggression" was between the British on one side and the Americans and Canadians 
on the other. The former considered that such references could be considered 
interference in the internal affairs of other states, and favoured the existing wording 
in the draft document. This simply called for consultations if one of the Parties felt 
its independence or territorial integrity were threatened. Once again, however, the 
Americans succeeded in altering the existing wording for inclusion in the Pentagon 
Paper by explicitly including the term indirect aggression, and providing a definition, 
calling for:
"Provision for consultation between all the Parties in the event of any Party 
considering its territorial integrity or political independence is threatened by 
armed attack or indirect aggression in any part of the world.
The issue of the geographical scope and membership of the alliance was resolved 
without the levels of disagreement which had attended the indirect aggression clause 
and the mutual assistance pledge. Britain and Canada were against explicit
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geographical limits being established, and Bevin was known to favour limitation of 
the treaty to those states which actually had a North Atlantic coastline.'**
As a result, the draft paper did not address the issue of geographical scope, and the 
fifth meeting failed to agree, despite additional discussions, on any limitations in 
geographical scope. The decision was reached in the final meeting, and reflected in 
the Pentagon Paper which envisaged:
"Delineation of the area covered by the agreement to include the continental 
territory in Europe or North America of any Party and the islands m the 
North Atlantic whether sovereign or belonging to any Party. (This would 
include Spitzbergen and other Norwegian Islands, Greenland, Newfoundland 
and Alaska).
With regard to membership of the proposed Treaty, the problematic putative members 
were Portugal, Spain, Italy and Switzerland. The Pentagon Paper actually envisaged 
that the President of the United States would announce that invitations had been 
extended to Canada, the BTO member states, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Eire, Italy 
and Portugal*® to participate in a conference to conclude a Collective Defence 
Agreement for the North Atlantic Area. Neither Switzerland nor Spain were included 
in the list, the former since none of the delegates believed they would accept, and the 
latter for ideological reasons, although the United States was in favour of Spanish 
inclusion.*^
The Canadians and British were in general terms against the inclusion of Portugal in 
the list, due to ideological qualms, but the strategic necessity of the Azores and the
** Wiebes & Zeeman 1983 op cit p360.
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Portugese position on the Atlantic seabord carried the day. Similarly, Italy was 
included in spite of British reticence, largely as a result of the instability of that state 
in the run up to democratic elections.*^
The adoption of the Pentagon Paper recommendations on 1 April 1948 was aimed at 
kick starting negotiations on the proposed Treaty in May 1948. In the event, 
negotiations were delayed until 6 July 1948 by the necessity to overcome opposition 
in the United States administration and Congress. This had been largely achieved by 
late June 1948. Senator Vendenburg had been persuaded to support the existing State 
Department policy, the National Security Council had dropped its opposition,*  ^and 
opponents within the State Department such as Kennan and Bohlen had either dropped 
their opposition or been transferred.**
Following President Truman’s directive of 2nd July 1948 that the Vandenburg 
Resolution be implemaited "to the fullest extent possible and at once", official 
negotiations opened between the United States, Canada and the BTO States, on 6th 
July 1948 in Washington DC. The so called Washington Exploratory Talks (WET) 
lasted until 10th September when the participants produced the Washington Paper.** 
Although not considered binding on any of the governments, the basic precepts agreed 
in the Paper were cleared by all the participating governments, paving the way for 
a resumption intermittently until the final signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in 
April 1949.
By late 1948 the substantive problems lay in two major areas. First was membership
52 See Wiebes and Zeeman 1983 op citpp 359-361, for a discussion of membership issues and geographical 
scope.
** FRUS 1948 m  p 140-141
** Kennan discussed his acceptance that the Hickerson/Achilles view would prevail in his Memoirs: 1925-1950 
1967 op cit pp405-413, saying "These were the thou^ts with vdiich I took cognizance of, and followed, 
the course of dealings between Secretary of State Marshall and Mr Lovett and the Senators over the 
Vandenburg Resolution, and later - over the treaty itself. But there was little I could do to affect the course 
of events" quote p409. Kennan does not mention that in April 1948 he was in fact hospitalised for 
treatment o f duodenal ulcers. See Isaacson and Thomas. 1986, op cit, p446.
** FRUS 1948 ni: 237 - 248, see also CMD 7692 op cit p4. The final text of Ûie Wariiington Paper and 
documents relating to it {q>pears in FRUS 1948 ibid.
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of the proposed new organisation, and second the nature of the guarantee clause built 
into the treaty.
Membership
The debate as to whether the new Treaty under discussion should be extended divided 
the participants into two camps. The Anglo-Saxon states favoured inclusion of the 
Scandinavian states, but were generally negative towards Italian membership. The 
French supported Italian inclusion and were negative towards Scandinavian 
participation. The British favoured inclusion of Norway, Denmark and Iceland for 
strategic and political reasons, and also because Bevin feared that the BTO itself 
could not protect the Scandinavian states from Russian pressure.*  ^ The Canadians 
and Americans shared British concerns, especially in relation to Greenland, but were 
particularly interested in the "stepping stones" concept of the North Atlantic as re­
supply routes to Europe.*^
Although the French warned that the extension of the security relationship to include 
Scandinavia would spread US aid and military guarantees too thinly, and that this area 
was too close to the Soviet Union for comfort,** they eventually acceded to the 
insistence of the USA and Britain that the three Scandinavian states under discussion 
be included in the 9th September Washington Paper. Norway received a formal 
invitation to join the discussions on the North Atlantic Treaty on 1st March 1949 
following intensifying Russian pressure which had led the Norwegians to appeal to 
be allowed to join the discussions in late February. The invitation was extended to 
Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and Italy on 8th March 1949.*  ^ The Republic of
56 See Nikolaj Peterson "Britain, Scandinavia and the North Atlantic Treaty 1948-49" Review of International 
Studies 1982, 8; 251-268.
*^  American under Secretary o f State Lovett stated during the WET discussions that "there would be serious 
gaps in any North Atlantic security arrangement ^ tich  did not include Norway, Denmark, Iceland and 
Greenland". FRUS 1948 HI; 159. This view had considerable support in the Senate, see Vandenburg’s 
comments (FRUS ibid: 105) that Scandinavian inclusion "had great vote appeal in the Senate because of 
the considerable areas of the country involving high proportions of Scandinavian voters."
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Ireland, though informally approached in January, was not invited as a result of her 
insistence on negotiating on behalf of a united Ireland.^  Italian membership was 
championed by the French, who tied inclusion of Norway to inclusion of Italy during 
discussions with the USA and Britain. It was widely seen that the French regarded 
the inclusion of Italy as a method of strengthening the case for including the Algerian 
departments of France within the scope of the treaty. The Hickerson group in the US 
State Dqiartment were also positive to Italian membership. This, coupled to French 
intransigence and the acquiescence of the other participants, led to the extension of 
the new treaty to include Italy.*^
The Guarantee Clause
The European powers were anxious to obtain the same form of automatic commitment 
of armed assistance from the United States, as was operative under Article IV of the 
Brussels Treaty. This stated that member states should give other parties "all the 
military and other aid and assistance in their power" in the event of an attack in 
Europe.
The Americans, on the other hand, favoured a looser form of wording, echoing the 
provision of the Rio Pact of 1947 which committed members only to "assist in 
meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self 
defence".® An automatic commitment was constitutionally impossible for the 
United States, since only Congress had the right to declare war, a prerogative which 
it guarded jealously. The Senate was thus particularly hostile to a Brussels Treaty 
style commitment, and probably reflected lingering public concerns with becoming 
entangled in a European conflict over which it had no control. Since any Treaty 
required a two thirds majority in the Senate, such opposition was worrying for the 
Europeans.
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The eventual wording of the security guarantee clause rq>res^ted a compromise 
between the European and American positions, but also between US Senatorial 
sceptics, and administration supporters of a strongly worded, if not automatic, 
commitment to Europe’s defence by the United States.® Article V of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, therefore, committed each of the signatories to: "assist the Party or 
Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other 
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to 
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
The North Atlantic Treaty was finally concluded on 4th April 1949 at Washington DC 
by the seven participants of the Washington exploratory talks and Norway, Denmark, 
Iceland, Portugal and Italy. Final ratifications were received by 24th August 1949.® 
CONCLUSION
The brief period between the signing of the Brussels and the North Atlantic Treaties 
was formative in prospects for the establishment of the armaments collaboration 
regime in the North Atlantic area. The organisational structure of NATO, and the 
debates which presaged their development, both reflect and define a security regime 
which has persisted untü the present day, and which shaped the development of 
armaments collaboration in the North Atlantic area.
Structural and situational explanations are poor indicators of the regime established 
between 1948-49. Both would suggest that due to her overweening economic, 
military and political influence, the USA should have been able to achieve exactly the 
kind of alliance she wanted, and, therefore, also have dictated an armaments 
collaboration regime which suited her purposes. That this proved not to be the case 
was the result of intervening variables which the process model can help clarify. As 
Petersen notes:
63 The draft Treaty drawn up in December 1948, baaed on a document prepared by the BTO states, but 
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"the supreme negotiating position of the United States as measured by her 
enormous resources as well as by the dependence of the Europeans, did not 
translate into total control of the negotiation outcome, as important influence 
capabilities could not be used."®
The process model, as discussed earlier, highlighted bargaining and coalition 
building, along with the organisational context as chief parameters of the new model. 
The process model will demonstrate that it has utility in explaining why negotiating 
outcomes do not necessarily directly reflect the objective or perceived capabilities and 
sensitivities of the participants. Evai the possession of issue-specific as opposed to 
generalised power may not be a sufficient determinant of the outcome.
The above analysis demonstrates that the United States wielded considerable 
"influence capability" during this period. Only the USA possessed the ability to give 
the Europeans what they so ardently craved; a security guarantee against Soviet 
threats and domestic instability, and the desperately needed economic, political and 
military aid to stabilise the precarious post war order. The Europeans were in no 
position to exploit the United States dependence on Europe, evrni had US policy 
makers acknowledged such dependence, thus the United States stress sensitivity to 
European pressures was low. The opposite conditions pertained in the case of the 
Europeans. How then did the United States come to assume the burden of a security 
guarantee to Europe, and participation in a regime which frequently reflected 
European and not American preferred outcomes? This paradoxical result will be 
discussed in relation to both the organisational context, and the bargaining and 
coalition building context of the process model.
The organisational context of the bargaining position comprises both issue specific 
and situation specific factors. The apparently overwhelming issue specific power of 
the United States was curtailed with respect to the particular circumstances of the 
negotiations at hand. The Americans saw the Alliance as a cooperative venture, and 
this drastically reduced their issue specific strength. Whatever the differences 
between the parties, the cooperative aspects of the negotiating game were stressed.
Petersen 1986, op cit p201.
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Further, the negotiations were predicated on the common belief that all the 
participants shared the problem, and the responsibility, of ensuring the national 
security and societal stability of the other parties. In such circumstances the United 
States was constrained to use the carrot far more often than the stick.
Negotiating in cooperative contexts has not attracted the same interest as antagonistic, 
crisis-situation negotiations. There is considerable evidence, however, that 
cooperative, relatively crisis free negotiating processes, place considerable limits on 
the issue specific power of potentially hegemonic actors. In addition, a phenomenon 
which might be called the "strength of the weak" can be observed in such situations. 
Due to the cooperative nature of the game, it was relatively easy for weaker 
negotiators - for example the French in this case - to exploit their very weaknesses 
as common problems. It was not always necessary to threaten breakdowns if a 
negotiator could convince the other participants that their particular problems and 
weaknesses were a risk to the common good. As Petersen notes:
"As France undoubtedly was the party which was most directly threatened 
both military and politically, France itself became a central part of the joint 
problem and through this acquired a disproportionate say over its solution. 
The very weakness of France was thus converted into influence over issues 
which were basic to the French security problem".®
In addition to the issue specific and situation specific factors discussed above, two 
further intervening variables can be discerned. These are the internal cohesion of the 
actors, and their level of commitment. Petersen alerted researchers to the importance 
of these factors.® Throughout the negotiations which culminated in the signature 
of the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States suffered from a lack of cohesion when 
compared to her allies. To an extent this reflected the make up of the American 
political system with its checks and balances. The major bifurcation between 
Congress and the State Department was, however, further complicated by the 
influence of such bodies as the Presidency, the military establishment, the National 
Security Council and the effects of public opinion.
Ibid p200.
Ibid pp200-201.
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Perhaps of more direct importance however was the internal State Department split 
between the relatively pro-atlantidst Hickersons group, and the relatively more 
"isolationist” Kennan group already discussed above. These splits militated against 
the establishment of a cohesive and clear negotiating stance.® This disunity, and 
the fluctuating fortunes of the opposing State Department factions, played into the 
hands of the European negotiators. The more knowledgable British and Canadians 
in particular, were able to exploit their familiarity with the American political system 
and personalities to influence United States policy.^ ® European negotiators 
frequently formed informal networks with sympathetic American officials, especially 
in the Hickerson group, but also within Congress and the White House, to influence 
American positions.
American commitment to a given policy stance was frequently adversely affected by 
this lack of cohesion. The evolution of American policy, as discussed early in this 
Chapter, reflected the varying fortunes of the competing influence groups, as well as 
external factors, but also tended to result in an inability to present particular policies 
with any great clarity or commitment. Admittedly, on those issues which were seen 
as central, such as the provisions for self help and mutual aid as the price of a 
concrete US security guarantee, the United States invariably prevailed. The analysis 
above suggests, however, that in this particular issue area, such issues were relatively 
rare as far as American negotiators were concerned. Conversely French negotiators, 
who enjoyed relatively high levels of internal cohesion in comparison, demonstrated 
a high level of commitment to securing their desired ends, and were thus able to 
prevail on issues such as Italian membership of the alliance and immediate transfers 
of arms and equipment for French fbrces.^  ^ Similarly the British demonstrated that 
by concentrating on those issues they regarded as most important, namely the 
necessity for US involvement in Europe’s security and not becoming inextricably
® There is a potential in such circumstances to turn this apparent weakness to ones advantage, using die 
"agent of limited audiority” gambit. This is a frequently used negotiating ploy and can be effective up to 
a point. In this case however, die effects of American disunity were invariably negative.
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See Petersen 1982 op cit passim.
FRUS 1948 n i; 253. The President approved the re-equipment of three French divisions from stocks of 
US material in Germany in September 1948. This was at least pardy to offset French insistence in the 
previous months to tie acceptance of die long term political solution favoured by die United States, Britain 
and Canada to immediate guarantees and supplies for France.
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linked to Europe, these aims could be realised.
For the period under discussion, the process based model, therefore, appears to have 
considerable explanatory power as a predictor of international regime negotiations. 
Firstly, the role of individuals in the organisational context has been highlighted with 
the concentration on actor cohesion and commitment, and the role of particular 
groupings (particularly within the American political system), especially when they 
acted as linking pins with external negotiators. The Hickerson group within the State 
Department, certain pro-European members of Congress and individuals within the 
administration and White House, frequently assumed boundary roles in the process 
of negotiating the regime.
Secondly, the importance of situation specific power has been noted, particularly with 
reference to the cooperative nature of the negotiating situation. This limited the scope 
of the US to capitalise on its situation-sfpecifrc preponderance. Despite the superior 
agenda setting and veto power of the United States, the "nature of the game" dictated 
that the new regime could not be imposed, rather it had to be agreed in a series of 
compromises. The cooperative nature of the issues at stake, meant that the disparity 
in power between the actors could not be used to exert influence over eventual 
outcomes.
Related to this point is the fact that the issue specific power in the negotiations often 
lay not with the United States, but in many instances with the Europeans. The 
Americans consistently failed to achieve the kind of association or security structure 
they desired in Europe in the two years before 1949, whereas the Europeans achieved 
their main aim of ensuring a direct American security guarantee to Europe, and a 
continuing American military presence.
The bargaining and coalition building aspects of the process model have also been 
underlined by the foregoing analysis. The process model, unlike the structural or 
situational/functional models, does not treat states as unitary actors. The bargaining 
perspective brings to the fore the role of individuals and the forging of coalitions 
within and across state boundaries. Further, new organisations such as the BTO and 
NATO emerged as separate centres.
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Issue linkage was attempted during the negotiation of the liberal hegemonic regime. 
The most overt linkage was used by the United States, in its insistence on self help 
as a precondition for mutual aid. This linkage became the sine qua non of American 
participation in the regime. It is at least arguable that the strong insistence of the 
United States on this linkage actually aided agreement amongst the Europeans. The 
self help "clause" was one of the few issues on which the United States stood firm 
throughout the negotiations. European (and particularly French) demands for a 
unilateral US security guarantee and immediate bi-lateral agreements were refused.
As previously discussed, the influence capability of the United States in this period 
was inherently large, and its sensitivity to European pressure was small and hardly 
pressed by the Europeans. The French also attempted to use issue linkage in the Italy 
versus Norway membership dispute, and in her frequent "boat rocking" to secure a 
hearing for the views of an objectively weak actor which appeared to have little 
influence capability. No issue linkage was really attempted by either the United 
States or the Europeans outside the security issue area. Due to the cooperative nature 
of the association, the parties were constrained to negotiate their differences. Overt 
coercion was out of the question, and even tacit coercion could have proven counter 
productive. As Petersen notes^, non-agreement in the negotiations could have led 
the United States to withdraw her forces from West Germany, or at least threaten to 
do so. This would have had an effect on other areas such as the Marshall Plan. The 
Europeans generally had only the power of the weak, in terms of exploiting the 
Russian military and political threat, and indirectly emphasizing the negative effect 
of a European collapse on the global security position of the United States.
Such issue linkage as there was, remained generally within the issue area and tended 
to promote regime agreements, in as much as the cooperative aspects were stressed 
at the expense of conflictual aspects.
The importance of compromise is evident from the previous analysis, and is the next 
important facet of the bargaining perspective. The formation of a regime is not 
necessarily an either/or choice reflecting direct responses to structural or
Peterson 1986 op cit pl90-191
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situational/functional factors. Rather, the regime will reflect compromises made by 
the participants in the negotiations leading to the establishment or change of the 
regime.
Compromises were undoubtedly made by all the parties involved in the establishment 
of the liberal hegemonic regime. The series of position changes by the United States 
in respect of what type of regime it desired, were the result of compromises both 
within the domestic political system, but also with the Europeans. The United States 
eventually settled for a regime which tied it much more explicitly to the defence of 
Europe than she had anticipated. Conversely, the Europeans had to settle for a less 
automatic commitment than they would have wished for, and a longer term, less 
immediate solution to their problems.
Finally, the bargaining perspective may help explain why a regime is not created or 
changed, or at least why it does not assume the form which structural or situational 
factors would predict. This point will be more fuUy explored below, in relation to 
the failure of an explicit, closely integrated armaments collaboration regime to 
develop.’* The foregoing, however, lends considerable credence to the claim that 
the process model has utility in the analysis of regimes generally, and particularly in 
cases where regimes do not appear to reflect structural or situational power.
73 See Chapter 7 below.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE OPERATION OF THE LIBERAL HEGEMONIC REGIME
INTRODUCTION
The potential of the process model is demonstrated by the consolidation of the regime 
whose referents had been established during the negotiations culminating in the 
establishment of NATO. The particular potency of the model rests in its ability to 
explain why regimes do not form, or at least why a given regime does not assume the 
form which alternative models predict. The previous Chapter did not deal directly 
with the issue of armaments collaboration per se, for the simple reason that during 
this period such collaboration was conspicuous by its absence. Examining this period 
was absolutely necessary, however, to elucidate the themes which have shaped the 
development, or otherwise, of armaments collaboration in the North Atlantic area. 
By April 1949 the scene had been set on which the new regime would be staged. The 
character of the regime which subsequently developed, and progress in armaments 
collaboration in general, owed much to those few brief months between March 1948 
and April 1949.
AN OVERVIEW
From its formation, NATO assumed from the BTO any functional role in the 
armaments collaboration issue area. This Atlantic overlay, although it acted on areas 
other than armaments collaboration, became particularly important in this respect as 
a result of the failure of alternative European based security schemes. The success 
of the Atlanticist solution occurred, at least in part, by default. The eventual collapse 
of the European Defence Community (EDC), and its replacement with the hybrid 
compromise of the Western European Union (WEU), ensured a relatively clear field 
of play for NATO to develop during the decade after 1949. Not until the late 1950’s 
did concern begin to grow about changing the unequal partnership into a more 
balanced relationship. The problem may be, as Jorgensen notes,^  that the Atlantic 
solution imposed an intergovernmental as opposed to an integrationist perspective onto 
the issue area. The multilateral cooperation exhibited by bodies involved in the issue
1 Knud Jorgensen. "The Western European Union and the Imbroglio of European Security" Cooperation 
and Conflict 1990, 25:135-152. See eqiecially pl50.
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area and the new regime reflected, at the political level, the existing interdependencies 
at other levels, as, for example, in arms production and economic relations.
It is the contention of this analysis that the relatively higher levels of armaments 
collaboration during the liberal hegemonic regime, reflected the necessity to rely on 
the hegemon to supply armaments, whether via direct transfer, production under 
licence or through such schemes as Offshore Procurement (OSP).’ However, as 
European economies recovered, interdependencies on the armaments collaboration 
level actually decreased. The European states, often with American aid, became 
increasingly self sufficient in the production of armaments. As a result, the 
armaments collaboration regime became beached on intergovernmental sandbanks, 
rather than progressing towards the integrationist shores beyond. The members of 
NATO became increasingly embroiled with debates about equalising the imbalance 
in authority and contribution between the USA and Europe. To this extent then, the 
period after the late 1950’s actually saw a progressive decline in prospects for the 
emergence of an integrated armaments collaboration regime in the North Atlantic 
area.
The following analysis posits that this situation can be accounted for with reference 
to three general problems. Firstly, the structural dominance of the USA in relation 
to her European allies, that is to say the hegemonic position of the USA within the 
issue area. The USA was manoeuvred into a position where she had to assume a 
direct and central role in the security of Western Europe after 1949. Thereafter, the 
inc^itive on the Europeans to integrate more closely (particularly with respect to 
armaments production) decreased markedly. Secondly, the USA was unable, despite 
her hegemony, to impose solutions on the Europeans due both to the cooperative 
nature of the relationship, and to her inability to bring to bear sufficient issue specific 
power to establish a fully fledged armaments collaboration regime. Finally, no issue 
linkages were formed or attempted which made progress in other areas dependent on 
progress towards greater collaboration in the production of armaments.
2 On the mechanics and effects of offshore procurement and the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme 
(MDAP) See Lord Hastings Ismay NATO; The First Five Years 1949-54 1955, Paris, NATO especially 
pp23-24 and 136-139.
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The following detailed process based analysis of the period from the signing of the 
North Atlantic Treaty, until the establishm«it of the Western European Union (WEU) 
in 1954, will attempt to demonstrate the process explanation for the failure of an 
armaments collaborations regime to develop. It will also highlight the scale and 
nature of early cooperative measures and organisational steps which encouraged an 
intergovernmental, rather than supranational, regime.
FROM TREATY TO ORGANISATION - PUTTING THE "0" IN NATO 
With the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Brussels Treaty Organisation 
(BTO) found many of its functions being assumed by its precocious offspring. The 
new organisation was not created in a vacuum however, rather it developed upon the 
existing structural concepts of the BTO. At the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers 
of the BTO, on 17 April 1948, the basis was laid for the organisational structure of 
the new body. As well as a Consultative Council and a Permanent Commission, the 
Defence Ministers of the five member states established the Permanent Military 
Committee at their subsequent meeting of 30 April. The latter was given the 
responsibility of drawing up defence plans, coordinating the military means of the 
powers, and establishing an organisational framework.*
Despite these promising beginnings however, the organisational aspects of the BTO 
never really materialised. The military organisation which was established had 
neither the human nor the financial resources to establish itself as a credible deterrent 
to the Soviet threat, still less to develop any independent role. The real importance 
of the short lived organisational structures of the Brussels Treaty is as a precedent to 
the future development of NATO. For the first time an organisation was established 
on multilateral, semi integrated lines with responsibility for Europe’s defence in 
peacetime. The BTO had a permanent Military Chairman, three commanders-in-chief 
(one for each of the services) and an international group of officers serving as a joint 
staff.* It is a comment on the utility of such concepts that they were subsequently
4
For the text of the communiqué issued by the Foreign Ministers, see CMD 7883. 1948, London: HMSO. 
"Collective Defence under the Brussels and North Atlantic Treaty." The structure of the BTO is discussed 
in greater detail by Maj Gen £  Fursden The European Defence Cammmijtv: A History 1980, London: 
MacMillian Press pp31-34.
Fursden 1980 op cit p34.
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to appear in NATO, and the proposed EDC.
The period from April 1949 until the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950 was 
one of consolidation and agenda setting for the infant NATO. The organisational 
framework of the organisation was set out, and the new organs of the organisation 
began to take shape and address the pressing issues which it faced. Chief among 
these was the German question  ^ and the character of the European commitment to 
the Atlantic Alliance. The two issues were intimately linked, and once again were 
to have profound efrects on the prospects for the emergence of an armaments 
collaboration regime. Further, the United States was to find, as in the pre 1949 
period discussed above, that its hegemonic position did not guarantee success for its 
chosen political agenda. The Atlantidst solutions favoured by the United States had 
to compete with the more "Eurocwitric" solutions, favoured in particular by the 
French.
Initially at least, the pressure for an Atlantic solution appeared set to carry the day. 
This pressure can be attributed largely to the outbreak of the Korean War, and 
attendant fears of a monolithic communist plot to destabilise and ultimately dominate 
Western Europe. The emphasis within NATO shifted from the political/rhetorical 
level of NATO as a simple guarantee pact, to the organisational exigencies of 
defending Western Europe which was still woefully ill prepared to provide for her 
own security. 1950 was to be the "fateful year"* which saw NATO transformed 
from what was in many respects a conventional guarantee pact, into a semi-integrated 
and effective military organisation. The Korean War then "put the O in NATO".^  
The new organisation became quickly focused on the short term, functional aspects 
of organising Europe’s defence. The more abstruse debates about the future political 
shape of the Alliance carried on in parallel, but the "nitty-gritty" of organising a
5
6
7
The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany had been established with the adoption of the Bonn 
Basic Law (Grundgesetz) on 23rd May 1949. Following elections in August 1949, the new states 
comprising the occupation zones of the western allies, attained legal statdiood on 20th September 1949.
Fursden 1980 op cit, devotes Chuter 3 of his work to what he entitled "The Fateful Year", see pages 50- 
104.
The phrase used by Phil 'Williams in "NATO and the Eurogroup", in K Twitchett (ed) European 
Cooperation Today 1980, London: Eurqpa Publications Limited, Chapter m  pp 29-50. Quote on p30.
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convincing conventional deterrmt in Central Europe became the remit of NATO. 
This is an important factor to bear in mind when considering the success of the 
Atlantic solution after 1954, and the intergovernmental nature of the post 1954 
regime. Eurocentric and integrationist solutions having foundered with the death of 
the EDC, it was left for NATO to inherit centre stage in the regime.
THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL ATAVISM
The concerns which coloured the debates in the shadow of the Korean War, help 
explain the urgency of the need to solve the German question, which was to dominate 
European security for the next five years. It became increasingly evident, both in 
Europe and in the United States, that German participation was vital to the successful 
defence of Western Europe as a whole. Strategically, German territory provided 
defence in depth to halt any Soviet offensive. Operationally, German manpower and 
resources were vital components in fielding a credible conventional force in Europe.
Meeting in Sq)tember 1950, in New York, the North Atlantic Council saw heated and 
complex debates on how the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) could be integrated 
into the alliance.* Despite agreemœt on the establishment of an integrated armed 
force, under the command of a Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), 
along with an international military staff, the basic problem remained unresolved. 
Growing American pressure to integrate the FRG quickly into NATO was strongly 
opposed by the French. As a result the Council could only issue vague platitudes 
supporting a German contribution. The technical details of how this was to be 
achieved were referred to the Defence Committee for their proposals.’ The 
Germans, although committed to the concept of an integrated force, demanded equal 
treatment in return for equal obligations. Chancellor Adenauer insisted that German 
units be given equal status with those of other states, whilst accepting that there 
should be no independent German General Staff. Fearing isolation in the face of 
growing momentum for an Atlantic solution to the German problem, the French
* Fursden 1980 op cit pp 78-86 contains a detailed analysis of die debates.
9 NATO Final communiqués 1949-1974 1974, NATO Information Service: Brussels p60.
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Prime Minister Pleven unveiled the Pleven Plan.^ ®
The chief architect of the plan was, in fact, Jean Monnet, who drafted the document 
in little more than two weeks, in order to present it to the Defence Committee of 
NATO meeting on 28 October 1950. The French government feared that the USA 
would attempt to force through the creation of German units under NATO command. 
As a result, the Pleven Plan proposed:
"the creation, for common defence, of a European army under the 
authority of the political institutions of a United Europe.""
The army was to have a single High Command and organisational structure, common 
equipment and common financing. It was to represent "une fusion complete" of 
contingents from participating states, organised at the level of the smallest possible 
units. In this way, the problem of reviving the German army was side stepped, since 
the first German soldiers would be recruited into the new European Army. The 
Pleven Plan further envisaged a European Minister for Defence, nominated by 
member governments, responsible to a ministerial council and a European Assembly.
France specifically excluded French forces stationed overseals from the Plan, and 
made adoption of the scheme contingent on prior ratification of the ECSC Treaty, lest 
German rearmament hinder the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC). Finally, the hand of reconciliation was once again offered to Britain, which 
was invited to join the new organisation, despite her previous refusal to consider 
membership of the ECSC. Outside France the Pleven Plan was widely regarded as 
fatally flawed. Integration of forces at the level of the smallest possible unit was held 
to be militarily unworkable. The exception of French forces stationed abroad was 
recognised as a thinly veiled method to retain an identifiable and independent French 
army, whilst denying such forces to other participating states.
The Americans, and particularly Marshall, pushed for the immediate adoption of an 
explicitly Atlantic framework. This envisaged strict controls on the German divisions
On the details of the Pleven Plan, see in particular Fursden 1980 op cit pp 86-92 and Jean Monnet Memoirs 
1978, London: Collins pp 344-350.
" Monnet 1978 ibid p347.
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which were to be raised, with no German officers above the rank of Colonel, and no 
German tanks allowed. In addition Germany was not to be allowed any naval vessels 
or missiles." Not unnaturally, both the French and American proposals received 
notably cool responses from Germany. The Defence Committee Meeting resulted, 
as expected, in the isolation of France as the only proponent of the European 
solution. With no compromise in sight, the Committee referred the military and 
political problems of German rearmament to the Military Committee and Council of 
Deputies respectively. The aim was a compromise solution between the Atlantic and 
European scenarios. In reality, the Pleven Plan suited no one but the French. It was 
probably the highest common d^iominator which Pleven could hope to push through 
the Assemblée National, and as such became the official French negotiating position. 
The American solution was unacceptable to the French, who were still haunted by the 
spectre of a revived German army, but equally unpalatable to the Germans who saw 
the proposals as second class treatment. The problem was to effect a suitable 
compromise. Monnet stylised the position as
"committees of experts ...............  working simultaneously but
separately on two alternative hypotheses, - an "Atlantic" German 
army, or a European Army - while waiting for the political choice to 
be made.""
Action passed to the NATO Council D^uties meeting in London during November 
1950, under the Chairmanship of Charles Spofford, an American. This meeting 
produced the so called Spofford Proposals, which attempted to work out a 
compromise solution. The proposals denied that there was any basic incompatibility 
between the Atlantic and European solutions to German rearmament. The German 
commitment was to be supervised by NATO in the short term, thus unhitching the 
short term problem of organising a German contribution from the longer term 
problem of creating a European Army. The Spofford compromise was, in effect, a 
cleverly crafted attempt to maximise areas of common interest, whilst relegating areas 
of dispute for later resolution.** Although the Spofford Proposals were endorsed by
12
13
Ibid p348 
Ibid p350
"  The fullest exposition of the Spofford Proposals *q*pears once again in Fursden, ibid pp92-99.
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both the Defence Committee and by the North Atlantic Council on 18 December 
1950, their recommendations were to be stillborn. Resolution of the problem of 
German rearmament was transferred from NATO to the three occupying powers to 
negotiate bi-laterally with the FRG. The Petersburg Conference, which sat from 9 
January until 4 June 1951, made little substantive progress however, despite the fact 
that France accepted the Spofford Proposals as a basis for negotiation at the 
Peter^urg talks.
This apparent volte face aroused considerable speculation at the time as to French 
motives, and is still difficult to explain with any certainty. Fursden speculates that 
a bargain was struck, noting that:
"Indeed it is suffldoitly extraordinary, despite the lack of evidence, 
to encourage speculation about whether there might have been a covert 
deal with the French: that they should accept Spofford for appearance’s 
sake, while the Alliance acquiesced in their desire for a conference in 
Paris to discuss the European Army.""
Although the conspiracy theory is a possible explanation, the actual reason for French 
acceptance of the Spofford Proposals is likely to be more prosaic: they simply did not 
believe that the Spofrbrd proposals would work. Paris would never accept the 
relaxation of controls on German rearmament inherent in the Spofford Proposals, 
which were necessary to accommodate Bonn’s insistence on equality of treatment. 
The two positions were mutually exclusive, and it proved impossible to reconcile the 
two sides of the argument within the rubric of the Spofrord Proposals. NATO had, 
in many respects, begged the question of how to integrate German forces into the 
defence of Europe. It was, therefore, incumbent upon proponents of the Atlantic 
solution to demonstrate that it could reconcile French fears and German aspirations. 
The collapse of the Petersburg Conference in June 1951 demonstrated eloquently that 
the circle could not be squared, and proposals for an Atlantic solution to the German 
question simply ran out of steam.
The failure of the Petersburg Conference and, therefore, of the Atlantic solution, left 
the Paris conference on the European Army "carrying the baby". Having begun on
Ibid pl06
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15 February 1951, and quickly become bogged down in a morass of detail, the Paris 
talks became the sole realistic forum after June 1951 for the resoldtion of the German 
question. By «[tension they were also vital in deciding the character of the security 
relationship between the United States and Europe generally, and in particular shaping 
prospects for the emergence of an armamaits collaboration regime.
By July 1951 the USA had thrown its full support bdiind the Paris talks and plans for 
what had, by now, been re-christened the European Defence Community (EDC). 
Similarly the Germans decided that only by investing all their efforts in establishing 
the EDC could they achieve their desired outcome. The complex and often 
acrimonious debates over the EDC are no part of the present analysis. The 
labyrinthine questions of the three year dd)ate amount to a research project in 
themselves, and have been covered elsewhere." The main feature of the proposed 
Community was an integrated European army, including forces from West Germany. 
There would be a single integrated command structure, similar to the NATO model, 
and the European Army would be the chief component of NATO land forces. All 
units larger than a division, as well as all supply and auxiliary services, were also to 
be integrated and led by offlcers of different nationalities.
Following from the draft proposals in the original Pleven Plan, and drawing directly 
from the patterns of supra-national policy formation and administration laid out in the 
ECSC, the EDC would have been directed by a Council of Ministers. The Council 
was to define general policy and give general guidelines for its execution. A 
Commission of nine would constitute a supranational executive, and an Assembly of 
Parliamentarians from member States would have consultative and review functions. 
Finally, a Court of Justice would hear appeals from decisions of the Commission."
16
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Kitmnger 1967, ibid pp40-53.
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The EDC Treaty was ratified by West Germany and the Benelux states by April 
1954, with Italy poised to follow soon thereafter. At this juncture the French 
government temporised, committing itself to negotiating certain protocols to the 
Treaty before presenting it to the Assemblée National. These included the retention 
of a unified, id«itifiable French Army within the new European force, a guarantee 
that United States forces would stay in Europe, a British statement about their 
relationship with and commitment to the EDC, and a solution to the problem of the 
future of the Saar basin. The negotiation of these guarantees necessitated a delay in 
ratification in French eyes, but economic factors undoubtedly played their part. As 
Harrison notes:
"The economic clauses of the EDC would have enabled the 
Commission to order armaments and other military supplies directly 
from the national industries of the member states, taking into account 
the technical and economic potential of each country and calling for 
competitive tenders."**
The French feared that they would be hindered by their relatively higher production 
costs vis à vis Germany and Italy. Similarly, political changes conspired to take some 
of the urgency of the previous years from the security question. The Korean War 
was over, and Stalin dead. The continuing American nuclear guarantee in Europe 
turned French attention to improving her own economic position, rather than making 
a further commitment to a European system of resource allocation. A growing 
resentment was also evident about British and American pressure to ratify the Treaty 
without assuming comparable commitments. This was particularly unpopular to the 
GauUists who were by 1954 represented in the cabinet of Mendes-France, the French 
Prime Minister.
"Britain by standing aloof seemed to be insisting on her superiority and 
her special relationship with the United States, while France was to 
become merely a cog in the European wheel, renouncing her 
sovereignty and losing her position as one of the Big Three, while 
Britain retained hers. To enter the EDC without securing some such 
commitment as was made subsequently by Britain as an 
accompaniment to the WEU Treaty was to abandon the principle of
** R J Harrison Europe in Question 1974, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd pl58
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equality between Paris and London upon which Fiance insisted."*’
Strong American pressure forced Mendes-France to submit the Treaty to the 
Assemblée National for ratification before he was ready, and when the problem issues 1
were still being negotiated. It is possible that some compromise may have been j
reached on the outstanding issues. The threat of an "agonising re^jpraisal” of jIAmerican policy if the Treaty were rejected, made by John Foster Dulles, i
undoubtedly backfired.^ Instead of ensuring ratification, America’s ill-judged |Iintervention contributed to the defeat of the EDC. Mendes-France allowed the Treaty 
to l^ se on a procedural motion, since it had by now no chance of being passed. No |
debate on the EDC was ever carried out, nor was a vote taken. As Fursden wryly i
notes: Ii
"After nearly four years of almost continuous controversy and '
division, the EDC - "that cumbersome baggage" - originated by the
French had been defeated by the French. EDC was dead without even I
having been accorded the honour or the dignity of a funeral
oration."" -
AN ATLANTIC REPRISE
The collapse of the planned EDC created a highly damaging political vacuum in the
security relationship between the United States and Western Europe. Any rapid
progress toward further European unity was ruled out, since the planned European i
Political Community (EPC) had ridden on the coat tails of the fisdled EDC. Those
sections of the governments most closely identified as pro-EDC had been humiliated, I
their political csqntal squandered on a firuitless venture which had no fall back I
position. The Americans and the British were alarmed at the sudden crisis, with
Britain becoming more than ever convinced that the only realistic solution was an |
"Atlantic" one. The Federal Republic of Germany relapsed into its status as an I
occupied territory, since the agreements terminating the occupation regime had been !
dependent on ratification of the EDC Treaty.
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In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the EDC, there was little conception of 
what could be done to snatch any glowing embers from the ashes of the now 
consumed scheme. It was to be the British, and more particularly Anthony Eden, the 
Foreign Secretary, who were to be the chief architects of a compromise solution. 
Unsurprisingly perh£q>s, the treaty for the Western European Union (WEU) was a 
triumph for intergovemmentalism. Deqnte initial criticism from Secretary of State 
Dulles that the proposed WEU lacked the supranational quality of its failed 
predecessor, the United States grudgingly supported Eden’s efforts to find a 
compromise solution." Ed«i considered the American desire to isolate France 
further by calling an eight power conference (which would exclude France) most 
unwise, saying in his memoirs:
"I thought this a bad plan, for whether we considered French action (in 
rejecting the EDC) right or wrong, we needed France, and I saw no 
cause to stand her like a naughty girl in the comer.""
The exact paternity of the idea of using a revised or expanded Brussels Treaty as the 
basis for a compromise solution to the problem has been the subject of considerable 
debate. The most attractive claim came from Eden himself, who insisted that the 
concept of using the BTO as a framework, came to him during a bath at his country 
cottage where he spent the weekend of 4-5 September 1954." David Carlton, 
Eden’s biographer, attributes the original concept to Sir Christopher Steel, the British 
Ambassador to NATO during the period." Fursdrai, however, credits. Sir Frank 
Roberts as co-author along with Steel"
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Dullea had described the WEU as "makeshift" hinting darkly during his European tour in September 1954 
about a renewal of the "agonistug retqipraisal" first threatened in late 1953. See Wheeler-Bennett and 
Nicholls, 1972 op cit p594; Anthony Eden Full Circle; Memoirs 1960, London: Cassell, pp 158-164
Ibid pl49
"A diplomatic traveller must have a full quiver. I wanted some new ingredient. In the bath on Sunday 
morning, it suddenly occurred to me that I might use the Brussels Treaty to do the job. At the Foreign 
Office a few days before, there had happened to be some discussion of the Treaty in another context, and 
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David Carlton Anthony Eden. A Bioeranhv 1981, London: Alien Lane, p361
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Harold MacMillan also claimed to have raised the idea of using the Brussels Treaty 
machinery, in conversation with Eden in early Sq>tember 1954, recording that Eden 
agreed with the idea." Two French contenders have also claimed credit for the 
scheme. Rene Massigli, French ambassador to Britain at the time, met Eden before 
the latter embarked on his tour of four European capitals on September 11th 1954. 
The ambassador proposed a modified Brussels Treaty with a European as commander 
in chief, in effect a watered down version of the EDC." Finally Pierre Mendes- 
France insisted that the concept had been discussed within French government circles 
for some time, and that
"the impetus for the plan came from the French. It seemed preferable 
to let it appear that it came from Eden; it was easier for the others to 
swallow.""
It is appar«it that a number of different individuals may have considered the BTO as 
a possible solution should the EDC £aü. If the exact paternity of the concept remains 
confused, its parentage and guiding influence is quite clear. Anthony Eden was the 
fundamental influence in securing an agreemart to his proposed solution in a 
remarkably short period. Indeed it is arguable that his influence was of greater 
importance than that exercised by Bevin in the original BTO. Eden’s shuttle 
diplomacy took in Brussels, Bonn, Paris and Rome between September 11th and 17th. 
During his talks he gained broad based support from everyone but the French, whom 
he persuaded to acquiesce, whereupon he called a Nine Power Conference in London 
for late September 1954."
The London Nine Power Conference is particularly notable, in that all the major
28
"  MacMillan dates the convenatioii as 8 September 1954. See Harold MacMillan The Tides of Fortune 1945 
- 1955 1968, London: George Unwin, p481
The Massigli proposal was recorded by Fursden 1980 op cit p311, note 13, in a personal interview with 
Mr Massigli on 4 6  May 1977. Eden, although acknowiedgiag the ambassadors input, poured cold water 
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It is, however, possible that the French government did conrider some form of solution, wdnch built on the 
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Eden 1960 op cit pl53-162. The Nine Powers consisted of: the members of the BTO (the United Kingdom, 
France, Belgium, Luxembourg and die Netherlands), United States, Canada, Germany and Italy.
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participants made compromises in their previous positions. The British unveiled a 
firm commitment to maintain four divisions and a tactical air force on the continent, 
except in the event of dire financial crisis or extra-European emergencies. This ended 
the long standing doubts on the part of the French and the Benelux states as to the 
strength of the British commitment to Europe’s defence/* and represented a sea 
change in British strategy unrivalled since the abandonment of "splendid isolation" 
from European afiairs more than fifty years previously. The United States reiterated 
its willingness to extend a guarantee to the new organisation along the same lines as 
that which had attached to the EDC, notwithstanding the serious misgivings of the 
State Department on the lack of supra-national content in the WEU.
The French were prevailed upon to accept that Germany would have to join the BTO 
and NATO simultaneously, and, therefore, to accq>t the de facto creation of a 
German army, even if it did lack a General Staff and operate under strict controls." 
This represented a major climb down for France, made necessary by her potential 
isolation in the post EDC period. The Federal Republic certainly ceded some of its 
sovereignty in return for accession to the WEU and NATO, but Adenauer did at least 
succeed in integrated German units being raised as equals in status with their allied 
counterparts.
Following the British and American statements at the Conference, agreement on the 
new structure followed relatively quickly. The Paris agreements instituting the 
Western European Union were signed on 23 October 1954. The French Assemblée 
National caused a brief delay by rejecting part of the Treaty during its Christmas Eve 
debate in 1954, prompting a pre-emptory statement from the British Foreign Office 
the same day. With clear, even brutal, force Eden promised that any refusal to ratify 
the whole treaty by any of the member states would result in a British style
31
32
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"agonising reappraisal" of her new continental commitment. Faced with such a stark 
choice, the Assemblée National duly passed the Paris agreements on 29 December 
1954, after M«idés-France made the issue a vote of confidence in his government."
The Paris Agreements did not simply establish the WEU, however. The Final Act 
of the Nine Power Conference comprised six parts and five annexes," and it was 
these which formed the basis for the final texts of a series of docum«its signed on 23 
October 1954." These included an agreement terminating the occupation regime in 
the FRG, a convention formalising the presence of foreign troops in the FRG, and 
a Three Power Declaration on Berlin." In addition a protocol to the North Atlantic 
Treaty on the accession of the FRG was signed," and a Franco-German agreement 
on the Saar statute.** Finally, the Nine Power Conference produced a declaration 
by the original five member states of the BTO, inviting the FRG and Italy to accede 
to the Treaty, and the (by now) seven member states signed a number of protocols 
modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty."
** Ratificadons followed by Belgium on 22 April 1955, France on 5 May, Luxembourg on 4 May, the 
Netherlands on 1 May, foe United Kingdom on 5 May, Raly on 20 April and foe FRG on 5 May. The 
WEU attained legal status on 6 May 1955. See A H Robertson European Tnstitutiong 1959, London: 
Stevens and Sons, p297. Eden*s statement is «produced in his Memoirs op cit pl71.
"  For foe texts of foe final acts, see CMD 9289. 1954, (Oct) London: HMSO"Flnal Act of foe Nine Power 
Conference held in London September 28fo - October 3rd 1954. "
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CMD 9304 1954, (Nov) London: HMSO”Documents agreed <m by foe Conference of Ministers held in 
Paris, October 20fo - 23rd 1954."
CMD 9368 1955, (Jan) London: HMSO, "Documents relating to foe termination of foe occupation Regime 
in the Federal Republic of Germany"
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Protocol I dealt with the accession of the FRG and Italy, modifying the wording and 
numeration of the original Articles, where these were inconsistent with the modified 
Treaty. It also redefined the Council of the BTO, its authority and voting procedures, 
and obliged the Council to submit an annual rqport on its activities, particularly those 
relating to the control of armaments, to an Assembly of the WEU. This Assembly 
was to be composed of the member states representatives to the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. Protocol n  "On the forces of the Western 
European Union" set out maximum levels of peacetime armed forces which member 
states could possess, which could not be varied without unanimous agreement of the 
other member states. Protocol HI "On the Control of Armaments" provided the 
framework for the renunciation of the production of certain types of weappns by the 
FRG.
The final Protocol, number IV, provided for the establishment of an Agency for the 
Control of Armaments (ACA) situated in Paris. This body, responsible to the WEU 
Council, was charged with the task of verifying that the commitments contained in 
Protocol in  were adhered to. The two main tasks in this verification process were: 
firstly, the collection and analysis of statistical and budgetary information, from the 
member states and NATO, on the level of armaments for forces maintained under 
national command on mainland Europe, and those forces under SACEUR command, 
secondly the ACA had to physically verify the accuracy of information gained from 
documentary controls via so called "Field Control Measures." These involved 
irregular visits to production plants, depots and forces in mainland Europe by ACA 
investigation teams.*®
The Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) was not established until 1955, when the 
WEU Council meeting of 7th May discussed the findings of a working party on the 
production and standardisation of armaments, and possible common production 
methods for member states. The French had strongly advocated such a body during 
the London Nine Power Conference.** In the event, however, the SAC proved to
*® See ibid passim for details.
** See Eden 1960 op cit pl69, vdio notes that:
"Mendès-France clung tenaciously to his plan of an arms pool to achieve the coordinated production and
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be far less ambitious than the fully fledged arms pool proposed by the French. As 
constituted by the Council it consisted of seven rq>resentatives, one from each 
member state. The SAC was funded from the WEU budget, and was free to establish 
any working group or sub committee which it saw fit. A small international 
secretariat was situated in Paris, headed by an Assistant Secretary General of the 
WEU, who also served as vice chairman of the SAC proper. A biannual report was 
required by the Council on the activities of the SAC during the preceding months.
EARLY ORGANISATIONAL STEPS AND COOPERATIVE MEASURES 
The first NATO body established in the field of defence production was established 
as early as November 1949. Consisting of national delegates meeting in committee 
at frequent intervals, the Military Production and Supply Board (MPSB) was charged 
with examining defence production in NATO member states, and making 
recommendations for rationalisation and the means of increasing production in those 
areas where the greatest deficiencies were exposed. The successor to the MPSB, 
known as the Defence Production Board (DPB), was created in December 1950. This 
assumed the functions of its predecessor, but introduced two improvements. First, 
a coordinator of Defence Production was ^jpointed at the head of an international 
staff. Second, the heads of the national delegations were to be continuously present 
in London.**
In late 1950 a series of reports were produced by Task Forces which had been set up 
under the auspices of the MPSB and DPB. Nine teams of senior production 
specialists drew up the reports after an extensive round of visits to NATO armaments 
producing countries, drawing from site visits and meetings with government officials. 
The reports aimed to highlight those areas in which "production additional to that 
already planned by the countries themselves"** would be necessary in order to
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standardisation of European armaments, under the aegis of the BTO. The scheme had obvious attractions, 
but raised endless practical difficulties. In particular the Americans would naturally be reluctant to channel 
all their supplies through the new Brussels Treaty structure".
See NATO Facts and Figures 1989, Brussels: NATO Information Service p263. Also Francis Beer 
tn^grarion and Disintegration in NATO 1969, Columbus, Ohio: O iio State University Press pl30-131, and 
Ismay 1955 op cit pp127-128.
Ismay ibid pl28.
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satisfy NATO’s minimum force levels. The Temporary Council Committee (TCC) 
set up in 1951, and the Annual and Triennial Review procedures subsequently adopted 
by NATO, took the DPB reports as a starting point from which to develop proposals. 
The Military Agency for Standardisation, set up in early 1951 and based in London 
under the Standing group, had responsibility for the promotion of standardisation of 
operational and administrative practices and war material. With the creation of the 
NATO International Staff/Secretariat in 1952, a new Production and Logistics 
Division was formed to assume the activities of the DPB, chaired by a NATO 
Assistant Secretary General.**
The three chief activities of the Production Division were;
(1) Long term production planning.
(2) Acting as export broker for the exchange of information, and guiding technical 
studies.
(3) Participating in the Annual Review, which involved analysing equipment 
requirements and resources for current and future years.**
According to Ismay, the aim of the new body was
"to use available resources to the best possible advantage by 
correlating the production programmes of the member countries multi- 
laterally at the planning stage."**
In 1953 a series of Correlated Production Programmes were undertaken by NATO. 
These had been planned in 1952, and aimed to achieve a degree of correlation in the 
programmes of NATO members for a number of major equipment items, ranging
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180
from aircraft, to ships, artillery ordnance and electronic equipment." These 
programmes developed on the basis of a number of existing bi-lateral projects 
undertaken in the period after the establishment of NATO. As early as 1949 Belgium 
manufactured Derwent jet engines for installation in British Meteor aircraft built 
under licence in the Netherlands, and France manufactured Nene jet engines and 
Vampire aircraft.** Belgium and the Netherlands produced jointly 440 Hawker 
Hunter aircraft between 1955-58,*’ while Italy produced 221 of the American F-86 
fighter under licence, as well as de Havilland Venom and Vampire aircraft. Bell 47 
helicopters and Fokker S-11 trainers in smaller numbers.*® The United Kingdom 
also produced Hawker Hunter and Vickers Supermarine Swift aircraft, and Dassault 
produced Mystere aircraft in France as part of the correlated production 
programme.** An interesting (and virtually unique) example of US production of 
a foreign weapons system, was the phased production of 403 British B57 Canberra 
bombers in the United States between 1953-59.** The 1953 Correlated Production 
programme, therefore, involved the production of British, French and United States 
aircraft in five western European states. Other correlated production programmes on 
electronic equipment and ammunition also produced useful results.**
The correlated production programme concept never really took off, however. The 
programmes were limited in scope, and in scale, involving production of existing 
systems by more than one NATO member. As NATO itself noted:
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"No attempt was made to draw up any overall master plan for the 
equipment of all NATO forces which would parcel out production to 
the most efficient or economical sources. Such ideas canvassed in the 
early days of NATO, ran into a number of obstacles. National 
authorities naturally tended to favour home industries and to be 
reluctant to finance multinational projects. Member countries were at 
different states of economic development. There were serious security 
problems. Furthermore, large programmes imposed upon industries 
would have had the effect of smothering incentive and reducing useful 
competition in the private industrial sector of many of the countries 
concerned."**
Correlated production was gradually abandoned in favour of individual project 
collaboration. To some extent, the failure of correlated production to proceed, or to 
develop further, is indicative of the more general failure of those in favour of a more 
integrated, or ev«i supranational, armaments collaboration regime to bring about their 
desired ends. As Vandevanter notes,** the period between the establishment of the 
MPSB in 1949 and the mid 1950’s was one of consistent rebuffs for supranational or 
integrationist plans. Despite early high hopes among those in favour of transforming 
NATO into a supranational directing mechanism, with broad powers in both the 
military and economic spheres, the reality was to prove quite different. There is 1
evidence that William Herod, the American Defence Production Coordinator of the I
ÎDPB, and his British Chief of Staff General Sir Ernest Wood, strongly supported the 
introduction of a common defence budget for NATO, and the establishment of the
!DPB as a control mechanism for an international syndicate to take orders, design i
weapons, let contracts and distribute production. The unwillingness of the member I
states to countenance such ambitious plans led Herod to resign in 1951, less than a j
year after taking office.** The ftdlure of the EDC in 1954, with its ambitious I
supranational design, marked the high water mark of plans for integration in financing I
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and armaments collaboration.
"By the mid-1950’s  NATO nations were greatly disillusioned
about the future of coordinated defence production. The organisational 
structure had progressed through the following stages:
(1) a very loose collection of individual, uncoordinated, national I
representatives (the Military Production and Supply Board);
(2) a presumably powerful, but actually relatively impotent, coordinator i
for Defence Production;
(3) a presitigious but still powerless Assistant Secretary General for 
Production and Logistics of the International Staff aided by national 
delegations of technical staff aided by national delegations of technical 
assistants; and
(4) a subministerial Defence Production Committee reminiscent in
structure of the original Military Production and Supply Board. Thus, !
after much experim«itation, final authority was once again in the I
hands of a committee of national representatives.
The system as developed by the end of 1954, with the Defence Production |
Committee sitting at the aq>ex of the collaboration process, was ess«itially the I
one that is in use today (1964), though the name was changed in 1958 to the 
Armaments Committee.""
IIn the period 1949-54, armaments collaboration was implemented largely, though not I
exclusively, through American, and in smaller quantities Canadian, military î
assistance. This helped to raise European stock levels, rebuild European defence 
production capacity, and promote a degree of standardisation via the dispersal of 
uniform, generally American, equipment. Ismay notes that the total monetary value j
of United States and Canadian aid programmes for the period 1948-1954 exceeded I
$30 billion (at 1955 prices). Over half of the total was for military equipment, $11.5 
billion was for economic aid (including goods, machinery, training and financial
57 Brig Gen E Vandevanter Weapons Production in NATO; A Study of Alliance Procesaes 1964
RM-4169-PR, Rand Corporation: Santa Monica, California. Quote pl3.
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support) and the balance for military training and "intermediate type aid" for specific 
projects within the defence budgets of European NATO states.** Military equipment 
expenditure in NATO states rose from 23% of total defence expenditure in 1951 
($9.7 billion of $42.04), to 35% in 1952 ($20.8 billion of $59.8 billion) to 40% in 
1953 ($24.8 billion of $62.77 billion).*’
Most American equipment was by direct transfer, although a proportion was in the 
form of Offshore Procurement and "defence support" (ie economic). A total of $17.5 
billion of equipment and other items to support the defence efforts of European 
NATO members was given between 1949-55, although as Ball points out, for every 
dollar furnished in aid by the United States, the European NATO members were 
spending $3 for themselves.*® Similarly in the period between July 1949 and 
December 1956, the United States provided $12.9 billion of military assistance 
(excluding deforce support). This compared to $81 billion spent by the Europeans 
themselves.**
Canadian aid in the same period amounted to $1.275 billion (April 1950 - mid 1956), 
provided to every European NATO member excqpt Iceland, which had no armed 
forces, with an additional $143 million for 1956-57.**Ismay puts the figure for 
Canadian assistance between 1950 - 55 at $850 million for equipment, and $260 
million for training aid. The equipment expaiditure included: equipping 3 European 
ground divisions (one Belgian, one Dutch and one Italian); providing 500 F86 Sabre 
jets complete with spares; radar sets, minesweepers and a wide range of ammunition 
and supplies. Much of this equipment was of modem US designs, which enhanced 
standardisation.**
58 Ismay 1955 op cit pl35.
*’ ibid p p lll and 126. All figures are for 1955 US dollars.
60 M Margaret Ball NATO and the European Union Movement 1959, London: Stevens and Sons Ltd: p88.
** ibid p89. Defence support aid was discontinued in 1957. No funds were requested for fiscal year 1958.
** ibid p89. See also "Canada’s Mutual Aid Programme* NATO Letter 1956, November 1, Vol 4 (2) pp 19- 
20.
** Ismay 1955 op cit pp135-136.
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In respect of American aid in the same period, Ismay details a total of $15 billion of 
equipment expenditure, including $1.73 billion MDAP-OSP aid, and excluding $388 
million Special Military Support for France. The MDAP-OSP aid was made up 
chiefly of $852 million for ammunition, $366 million for aircraft and related 
equipment, and $239 million for ships.** Vandevanter estimates that, by 1958, over 
one half of all the heavy equipment in use by the European NATO members had 
come from either the USA or Canada.** By the late 1950*s, however, American 
policy began to change, amounting to a switch, as Beer wryly notes, "from the patron 
saint of the mid-1950’s to most active competitor of the early I960’s."** By 1957 
American aid began to decline. Assistance programmes to European NATO members 
were seen by the Americans as less pressing, as the economic position of those 
countries improved.
Faced with balance of payments problems and increasingly restive domestic defence 
equipment manufacturers, a policy shift in favour of increasing European defence 
contributions took place within the US Administration. The arms markets of Europe 
were an inviting source of contracts for American companies, and much of the 
equipment provided by the United States in the years 1949-56 was in need of 
replacement. In addition, the newly rearming Federal Republic of Germany promised 
to be a large and potentially important source of orders for military equipment during 
the late 1950’s and early I960’s.*’
Before proceeding to analyse the development of the regime during the 1960’s, it is 
necessary to examine the period discussed above from a process based perspective.
CONCLUSION: THE TRIUMPH OF INTERGOVERNMENTALISM
The institutional character of the armaments collaboration regime can justifiably
considered to have been determined by 1955. The intergovernmental, as opposed to
** ibidpl37.
Vandevanter 1964 cit pl4.
** Beer 1969, op cit pl45.
"  For a diacusfiion of these issues, see Beer 1969 ibid ppl45-171.
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supranational, nature of the regime was directly attributable to the failure of the EDC 
as the discussion above demonstrates. Other inputs naturally contributed to the 
triumph of intergovemmentalism over supranationalism, but it is difficult to overstate 
the centrality of the ill-starred effort to construct an int^rated European Army. The 
period between 1949 and 1954 resulted in an unequivocally inter-govemmental 
structure for the armaments collaboration issue area, and fatally weakened prospects 
for a strong, integrated armaments collaboration regime.
The organisational structures in place, chiefly NATO, but also after 1954 the WEU, 
could not provide the engine necessary to drive a supranationally based armaments 
collaboration regime forward. The hegemonic state, America, could not impose an 
integrated regime, and none of the European states had either the resources or the 
political strength to promote such an integrated armaments collaboration regime. The 
following analysis will account for this outcome, using a process model to 
demonstrate why the regime was "captured" by intergovemmentalism. In addition 
to this explanation, the utilisation of a process based model can offer valuable insights 
into the political processes operative during the period, and help to explain the |
subsequent lack of progress in the armaments collaboration issue area. Ii
The intergovemmental cast, which the early years of the liberal hegemonic regime, |
afforded the armaments collaboration regime, cannot be seen as the outcome of I
American policy. Nor can it be seen as attributable to structural or situational factors ]
alone. As discussed above, the United States began by favouring an Atlantic solution I
to the problem of what form the new regime should assume. This subsequently I
changed to an acceptance of, and increasingly strong support for, a Eurocentric 
regime under the aegis of the EDC. On the coU^se of this option, the United States !
acquiesced in a British brokered compromise solution, which institutionalised an 
intergovemmental approach and, arguably, fatally damaged future prospects for 
armaments collaboration by restricting such collaboration to a few, largely I
unsuccessful, NATO led projects. In all three cases the United States failed to 
achieve her objectives. Why should this be the case, bearing in mind the continuing 
centrality of the United States to European security during this period?
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As in the previous period of regime negotiation discussed in Chapter 6**, the United 
States retained considerable influence capability during this period. The huge scale 
of American economic, and, more importantly, from the point of view of this 
analysis, military equipm«it aid discussed above, represented the only feasible source 
of armaments required in the necessary quantities in the early to mid 1950’s. Having 
become involved in the security of the Atlantic area generally, and Western Europe 
in particular, by joining NATO and giving guarantees to preserve European security 
from direct and indirect Soviet aggression, the United States was sq>parently in a 
position to impose the type of security regime decided upon by the American 
administration. Conversely, the Europeans had little influence capability with the 
exception of perceived weakness and exploiting the American fear of communist 
infiltration. This was particularly true of Italy and France which had large and 
influential domestic communist parties. This sq>peal to the weakness and vulnerability 
of western Europe’s democracies could be overplayed, however, and became steadily 
less convincing as the 1950’s progressed and European economies recovered. Stress 
saisitivity on the part of the United States was apparently low, due to continued 
European dependence on American aid. The Europeans were unable to bring any 
great pressure to bear on the Americans in terms of armaments during this period, 
since they were playing the role of "demandeur". Once again the potential stress 
sensitivity of the Europeans was relatively great, since they were so heavily, and in 
some cases almost exclusively, dependant on supplies of American armaments or OSP 
goods.
In an organisational context, the United States proved unable to mobilise her issue 
specific power to promote armaments collaboration. In the early stages of the period 
under discussion, the United States failed to achieve accq>tance of an Atlantic based 
solution to German rearmament in particular, or the organisation of European security 
more generally.
The Atlantic solution favoured by the United States foundered due to strong 
opposition from both France and West Germany. The failure of the Spofford 
Proposals and of the Petersburg Conference between November 1950 and June 1951
See above ppl37 to 164.
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epitomised the lack of success on the part of American negotiators to achieve their 
desired ends. United States policy could not simultaneously satisfy the contradictory 
aspirations of the French and the West Germans. Acceptance of an Atlantic solution 
was not linked to Amaican participation in NATO, or continuation of US aid, and 
no fall back position had been prepared when this solution was abandoned. America 
did not attempt to coerce the Europeans into acceptance of an Atlantidst approach, 
seeing the relationship as cooperative. It is arguable that this reflected divisions 
within the United States administration between "pro-Atlantic" and "pro-European 
integration" factions, and that such divisions adversely affected the ability of the USA 
to prevail in these negotiations. Once again, the ^>parent issue specific power of the 
United States was not matched by situation specific influence.
Subsequently, American support for the EDC concept signally failed to achieve the 
desired outcome. The United States, despite initial scepticism, had become a true 
convert to the EDC plan. The supra-national aspects of the scheme struck chords in 
certain sections of the US administration, and meshed well with the prindple of self 
help depending on mutual aid. The threat of an agonising reappraisal of US policy 
towards Europe following the coUsq>se of the EDC is evidence of American 
impatience with progress toward a solution to the problem of German rearmament, 
and the organisation of European security more generally. It represents a clear and 
potent attempted use of issue linkage by the Americans, directed unmistakably toward 
France, to the effect that failure to ratify the EDC treaty could result in America 
turning her back on Europe. The threat, however serious, was insufficient to secure 
French agreement, and plans by the United States to isolate France as punishment 
were averted by the Europeans - chiefly the United Kingdom - as discussed above.
The fact that France was prepared to "call the bluff" of the United States at such an 
important juncture, demonstrates that situation specific power lay chiefly with the 
French, even if issue specific factors favoured the United States. Once again the 
French were committed, this time to retaining a separate and identifiable French 
army, and enjoyed enough cohesion to risk rejecting the EDC in the face of American 
threats and the disapproval of European allies.
On the failure of the EDC, the British brokered compromise of creating a
188
purposefully intergovernmental body in the form of the WEU, can hardly be seen as 
a triumph for US policy. The United States was constrained to accept what it 
regarded as a watered down substitute, since this was the highest common 
denominator which assured; firstly French acceptance, secondly, direct British 
involvement and finally a framework for German rearmament. The British were able 
to capitalise on their previously aloof attitude towards the EDC, whilst large sectors 
of the political elites in France, Germany and the United States were in disarray, 
having been tarred with the brush of failure when the EDC collapsed. The French, 
although previously successful in resisting American pressure, were now effectively 
isolated and forced to acquiesce in the Atlantic solution hawked around the European 
capitals by Anthony Eden. The United States, whilst un h^ y at the lack of supra­
national elem«its in the WEU, were happy enough in the end to endorse the new 
scheme, which was not a great deal différait from the original Aflanticist proposals 
of four years earlier. Finally, the West Germans were luqipy with a scheme which 
ensured a measure of equality of rights and the opportunity to become a full member 
of the Western Alliance.
The importance of the foregoing summary, is in its indication that the triumph of 
intergovemmentalism, qntomised by the formation of the WEU and German 
rearmament and entry into NATO, prematurely ossified the prospects for armaments 
collaboration. During the course of the EDC debate, armaments collaboration was 
restricted almost exclusively to the supply of American equipment or its production 
under licence. Further, the activities of existing institutions (firstly the BTO and 
subsequently NATO) in respect of promoting armaments collaboration were 
negligible. As a result, when the EDC collapsed, the only vehicle suitable for the 
promotion of armaments collaboration were both firmly inter-govemmental in nature.
Earlier in this chuter, it was posited that three general problems could help account 
for the formation of the armaments collaboration regime in the form detailed above, 
and that these informed the process based analysis of the issue area.
Structural Pommange
The first factor was the structural dominance of the United States within the issue 
area. The hegemonic position of the United States, meant that certain policy
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decisions had direct and important influence on the development and progress of 
armaments collaboration, even if such policies were not consciously intended to 
impact upon the issue area. Two policies are of particular importance in this regard. 
First was the introduction of the concq%t of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and 
the consequait less«iing of the imperative to strengthen conventional forces. 
Reliance on nuclear wesqxjns, and the effective abandonment of the Lisbon Force 
Goals set in 1952 by NATO, dealt a severe blow to the prospects for integrated 
armaments production or collaboration, both within Europe and between Europe and 
America.
The second policy decision which was to prove of major importance, was the 
encouragement given by the United States for the re-establishment and/or 
development of European defence industries after 1945. This policy had a number 
of aims; chiefly it was expected to provide employment in war ravaged European 
economies, encourage re-industrialisation and economic growth, and improve the 
balance of payments of the European states. In addition, production of armaments 
in Europe would provide alternative sources of supply and avoid overtaxing the 
"arsenal of democracy". However, since American aid (unlike Canadian) was 
distributed on a bi-lateral basis, and not under the a%is of NATO or any other 
organisation, there was little prospect of pursuing any plan to provide collaboration 
in armaments production among the European States.
As Beer notes:
"The specific pattern of sacrifice implied by this ideology (of 
armaments collaboration) was one in which - initially - the greatest 
arms benefits seemed to go to the Europeans and the greatest burdens 
to the United States""
Throughout most of the 1950’s the United States, as hegemon, accepted the 
burden.'*® Increasingly, however, from the late 1950’s onwards, greater emphasis
"  Beer 1969 op cit pl63.
Eiaenhoiwer specifically acc^ted that even if foe trade off between American contributions and European 
contributions was not even:
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was placed on collaborative projects and joint production under the aegis of NATO. 
These projects will be examined in greater detail in the following chuter. Most were 
generated in the mid to late 19S0’s and continued into the I960's. It had long been 
realised that the distribution of labour operative during the formative years of the 
allianc e  could not last forever. Thus Eisenhower, in his first Annual Report as 
SACBUR in 1952, had «idorsed the rq>ort of the Temporary Council Committee 
which had called fon
"a more equitable pooling of production facilities and for a more 
equitable sharing of the burdens incident to the defence programme" 
continuing
"Europe must become self-sustaining in military manufactures at the 
earliest possible date .... America cannot continue to be the primary 
source of munitions for the entire free world!
The experience of developing armaments programmes under the NATO umbrella was 
not a happy one, as the following chapter will demonstrate. This lack of success 
stemmed from the fact that NATO was an intergovernmental rather than supranational 
body. As such, it could not push forward armaments collaboration without the 
permission of the member states. NATO funded programmes implied contributions 
not only from the United States, but also from the European allies. In both cases, 
resistance to such expenditure increased steadily during the 1960’s. In the case of the 
United States, this reflected the desire to increase armaments sales to Europe and 
avoid opening American markets to European or NATO funded systems. For the 
Europeans, who were increasingly developing their own modem armaments 
infrastructures, contributions to NATO programmes reduced the funds available to 
finance national programmes. A Westan European Union report on armaments
71
"Each of us must do his part. We cannot delay, nationally or individually, udiile we suqiiciously acrutinize 
the sacrifices made by our neighbour, and, through a weaseling logic, sedc some way to avoid our own 
duties."
See Dwight D Eisenhower "Unity of Purpose Urged for Security of North Atlantic Area” Department of 
State Bulletin XXEV, No 606 (February 12, 1951) p249.
Dwight Eisenhower "Rrst Anniversary of SHAPE as an Opwatiooal Headquarters" Department of S t^  
Bulletin XXVI, No 668 (^ r il 14, 1952), pp575, 578.
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collaboration quoted SACEUR General Norstad as saying that:
"the three insurmountable obstacles to the joint production of 
armamaits were first the United States, second the United Kingdom, 
and finally France",^
The encouragement of the armamoits industries of the European allies given by the 
United States was not coloured by any plan as to how production could be 
coordinated. After the failure of the EDO, NATO found itself quite unable to evolve 
in the direction necessary to promote such action, especially in competition with 
national authorities.
Nature qI M  Relationship
The second major problem referred to above was the cooperative nature of the 
relationship between the United States and the Europeans. As previously discussed, 
this served to drastically reduce the issue specific strength of the United States. 
Although the French rejection of the EDC had lead to an ovot American threat to 
stage an "agonising reappraisal” of US commitments to Europe, the threat had been 
ineffective. The perceived commonality of interests with the European allies, other 
than France, exceeded the immediate knee jerk reaction of the US administration to 
isolate France altogether.
In a situational sense, American ability to promote armaments collaboration was 
compromised by the differing agendas of the European allies in regard to the issue.
The British displayed an equivocal attitude towards supra-national schemes. Whilst 
supporting the principle of the EDC for the continental allies, the United Kingdom 
steadfastly refused to become directly entangled. This undoubtedly contributed 
towards eventual French rejection of the EDC. As early as 1946, Churchill had 
called for the creation of a United States of Europe in an address at Zurich
72 Western European Union Joint Production of Armaments Document No 336 (April 13, 1965) p7.
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University.^ Taken together with positive sounding noises from the United 
Kingdom during World War Two about the post war order in Europe’^ , this 
apparent British enthusiasm proved to be greater in the breach than in the observance. 
The continental Europeans were, on reflection, over sanguine in their assumption that 
Great Britain would assume a leading role in the uniting of Europe.^  ^ It was a role 
which the British had neither the desire nor the means to fulfill. This unwillingness 
had two main foundations. The first was essentially intellectual. Churchill 
epitomised the new, stating bluntly: "we are with them but not of them.*^  ^ To many 
in Britain, Europe still began at Calais. Britain remained, however precariously, a 
great power. The "three circles" of the Commonwealth, Europe, and the Anglo- 
American special relationship, still overkqpped in London as far as the British were 
concerned. The Attlee cabinet which swept to power in 1945 contained no ardent 
Europeans. Even Bevin, for all his neglected efforts to promote the formation of the 
BTO and NATO, can hardly be seen as an ardent European. Bevin remained most 
concerned with the formation of an Atlantic relationship and the preservation of the 
special relationship between London and Washington.^ '^The second source of British 
ambivalence was the serious politico-economic situation in Great Britain in the post 
war period. Domestic reconstruction took precedence over building a new Europe. 
As Rothwell notes, the combination of the horrendous losses to pre war wealth and 
foreign investments, growing colonial unrest and the pressing need for economic 
reconstruction made the environment for taking radical steps vis-a vis Europe rather
For the text of this speech, given on 19 Sept 1946 see Keesings Contemporarv Archives 1946-48, Vol VI 
p8138.
See for example F L Schuman "The Council of Eun^e" American Political Science Review 1951, 45(6): 
724-40, eqiecially p725 ^%tich discusses Churchill*s outline plans for a council of European states.
Anthony Nutting believed that: "There can be no doubt that at the time Great Britain could have had the 
leadership of Europe on any terms #uch she cared to name. If we had offered our hand it would have 
been graq>ed without question or condition." See A Nutting Europe will not wait 1960, London: Hollis 
and Carter, p3.
Hftiimrd 5th Series, Vol 515, Col 891, 11th May 1953.
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77 JcdmBaylis "Britain, foe Brussels Pact and foe continental commitment." International Affairs 1984,60(4): 
615-629. See also Allan Bullock Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-51 1983, London: Heineman, and 
I<fon Baylis "British wartime thinking about a poet war £un^>ean securiQf group*. Review of International 
Studies 1983, 9: 263-281.
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hostile.’*
British ambivalmce towards the general movement towards European collaboration, 
was reflected in the armaments collaboration issue area during this period. In his 
detailed analysis of the European armaments base of the seven major western 
European states between 1955-64, Harlow details a telling critique of British 
policy.”  This demonstrates convincingly that the United Kingdom attempted during 
this period to spread limited resources too thinly, in a vain attempt to remain a world 
wide power.
In the period 1949-64 British defence expenditure was greater, both in absolute terms 
and as a percentage of GNP, than any other European state. Further, the British 
were the only state to attempt to maintain a range of weapons systems compatible 
with that of the superpowers, both nuclear and conventional.*" As Harlow notes:
"It is plain today (1967) that the attempt has tidied, and Britain must 
more realistically be compared with France than with the United States
or the USSR Nevertheless, the procurement policy of the last
twenty years, and to some extent of the last ten years, must be seen as 
part of an attempt to remain the smallest of the great powers rather 
than the strongest of the middle powers."*^
In the ten year period from 1955-64, the United Kingdom spend $20.3 billion at 1967 
prices on defence procurement. This was roughly one tenth of the figure spent by the 
United States in a single year on defence production, excluding defence research 
which accounted for 32% of the British total of $20.3 billion.*’ The disparity 
betwe«i resources and ambitions resulted in longer lead times for the introduction of
’* Victor Rothwell Britain and the Cold War 1941-47 1982, London: Cape, pp40-45. 
”  Harlow 1967, Part 2, op cit pp7-25. 
ibid p8. 
idem.
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82 Figures are from Harlow 1967 Part 2 op cit p9, and Table 1 p 24. He concludes that "the difference in 
absolute expenditure is so much greater foan foe difference in military ambitions that one must draw foe 
conclusion that Britain has been trying to do too much.” ibid p9.
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systems and a greater likelihood of cancellation as a result of reductions in defence 
expenditure or technical hitches in the programme. Any delays or pos^wnements 
risked making the system obsolete even before it entered service. The total cost of 
weapons systems cancelled between 1952-62 was $672 million in 1963 prices.*^  
British procurement policy sqjpeared to be altered with bewildering frequency. Thus, 
in 1957 a shift in emphasis toward nuclear forces and missiles resulted in the 
cancellation of the Avro 730 bomber and reduced emphasis on aircraft. By 1959 the 
manned bomber had been reinstated, this time in the guise of the TSR/2. In 1960 the 
Blue Streak missile programme was scrsqyped, but in 1962 Polaris was procured from 
the United States. Finally in 1964 the American Phantom aircraft was procured for 
the Royal Navy in preference to the TSR/2, and almost inevitably as a result of the 
TSR/2 was scrapped in favour of options (never to be fulfilled) on American F i l l  
bombers.*^
Such difficulties did not, however, encourage either greater cooperation with Britain's 
European allies, or even production of American systems or components under 
licence. Only during the early to mid 1960*s did Britain begin to purchase any great 
amount of foreign equipment - almost invariably of American origin - and this tended 
to replace cancelled British projects rather than supplement domestic requirements. 
It is worth quoting Harlow at some length on this subject:
".... the successful examples of building wesqx>ns under licence in 
France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Belgium and Holland since 1955 
were either ignored by Britain, or regarded as a course of action open 
only to countries without a world financial role to play and with 
industries which could not develop all wes^ns independently. This 
point of view, apart from being proved wrong by events (Britain's 
policy of independent development has led to a position where she is 
forced to purchase directly from the United States), foils to realise the 
potential gains from trade.
Harlow 1967, Part 2 op cit plO.
^  Harlow 1967, Part 2, op cit plO.
Harlow 1967, Part 2 op cit pH.
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There was virtually no interest in Britain in fulfilling defence requirement by 
collaboration with advanced European states before the mid 1960's.
In the case of France a similar attachment to independence in armaments production 
can be seen, if from a somewhat difference perspective. Whereas the United 
Kingdom can be seen to have moved steadily away from a position of self reliance 
in the period 1955-64, Fiance moved towards the same position. Despite an 
apparently weak position in the immediate post World War Two period, France had 
a number of hidden assets which she used to particularly good effect in the field of 
defence technology and production. French defence industries did not suffer to the 
same extent as those of most other Western European states, since French industrial 
centres emerged from the war relatively unscathed. Further, France could 
concentrate her admittedly limited resources on innovation and developing new 
systems, since she was unencumbered by surplus wartime inventory requiring 
maintenance and renewal. Her immediate needs were met with American equipment, 
much of which was supplied free. Importantly French policy, even during the far 
from stable Fourth Republic, exhibited a strength of direction which stands in marked 
contrast to that of its British counterpart. Decisions were frequently taken by the 
technocratic élites, frequently products of the Écoles Nationale d’Administration, with 
scant reference to the government itself.*"
Another important factor in France's favour was the steady diminution of her 
overseas commitments, and therefore spending, especially after the independence of 
Algeria. As Harlow notes:
"once the Algerian war had been settled, France could not only rid 
herself of the incubus of a large army but concentrate all her defence 
exp^diture within metropolitan France or nearby Germany. This had 
the dual effect of eliminating the element of overseas support costs in 
the French defence budget, thus liberating resources for research, 
development and production, and also of fredng foreign exchange for
86 This is particuiarly true of the Commissariat à TEuergie Atomique (CEA). See for example: Peter Craig 
"Frédéric Joliot and Fraace*s nuclear heritage." New Scientist 1985, February 7th: 16-19 and also David 
Marsh "France Tests its atomic might". Naw Sciamtimt 1985, February 14fo: 18-22. These articles e:q>lain 
how foe French nuclear weapons programme came to fruition despite foe o{q»ontion of both Faure and 
MoUet, Prime Ministers between February 1955 and May 1957.
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defence procurement or support of the franc."*’
Lacking British overseas commitments after the early 1960*s, or German sensibilities 
to the immediate Soviet threat or American pressure to participate in NATO 
armaments programmes (or to buy American systems), France was able to pursue a 
much more independent policy in terms of armaments production. Systems were 
developed according to a timescale and specification which suited French purposes.
Both Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany started to become active in 
armaments production relatively late, due to their status as defeated belligerents. The 
FRG did not begin spending money on her own armaments until after 1955. 
Thereafter, her policy was consciously designed to demonstrate her loyalty both to 
NATO, and more especially the United States, by supporting armaments collaboration 
and standardisation. A major part of the motive to buy a large amount of American 
equipment was to help offset the costs of US troops stationed in West Germany. The 
emphasis also made operational sense, since German forces in NATO were deployed 
in the main to operate in concert with American forces. This de facto standardisation 
was regarded as beneficial by NATO authorities.** The Federal Republic also acted 
during the period 1955-60 as the most enthusiastic advocate of collaborative projects 
initiated during this period for example: the NATO standard ground support fighter, 
the G91 designed by Italy*"; the F104 Starfighter project; and the Hawk ground-to- 
air missile project. Between 1955-60 Harlow estimates that more than half of 
German procurement expenditure went to foreign states."" The procurement of large 
amounts of foreign produced items, as well as political considerations, inhibited the 
development of a strong armaments industry during the 1950's. Germany was, 
therefore, not well placed to act as a motor to drive greater armaments collaboration, 
except insofar as her participation in the main NATO led projects is concerned. 
Since most of these did not come on stream until after 1960, the German role in this 
earlier period was restricted mainly to the purchase of large amounts of equipment
87
88
Harlow 1967, Part 2 op cit p26. 
Harlow 1967 op cit p39.
*" Harlow 1967 Part 2 op cit p42 puts the number of Hat G91*s procured at 150. All were manufactured in 
Germany.
90 ibid p41.
197
from the USA and other allies, as well as some military aid."^
Italian policy on the procurement of armaments during the 1950's laid greater stress 
on licenced production within Italy, than did those of her NATO allies. Government 
intervention was commonly much more direct in Italy than in other European states, 
being channelled through the Instituto per la Riconstruzioni Industriale (IRI). Many 
defence contractors in Italy were part owned by one of IRI's two main holding 
companies, Finmeccanica and Fincantieri. The latter operated almost exclusively in 
the shipbuilding industry, whilst the former coordinated production and investment 
in general engineering, electronics and aviation. The purpose of this system was 
twofold. First was to encourage industrialisation, especially in the poorer South. 
Second was to give preference in defence procurement to Italian companies, since the 
IRI's role had encouraged private and public interests to combine. Italy was the 
largest recipient of American grant aid under the MAP between 1956-65, with a total 
of $1,149.60 million."’ As such, much of her military equipment was American, 
with limited amounts from other European NATO members. Harlow notes that: 
"Italy’s procurement policy has remained basically unchanged since 
1955. The basis of this policy seems to have been that if the 
equipment required was not of Italian design, it and its spares should 
be capable of being wholly or partly produced in Italy under
licence  Ev«i with licenced production the country is unable and
unwilling to underwrite major production programmes for procurement 
on its own, and prefers to form consortia.”""
Like Germany, Italy joined both the Hawk missile and F104 Starfighter projects, and
Harlow points out that: "ft is sometimes assumed in general discussions of the problem that the United 
states rearmed Germany out of her own pocket through her Nfilitary Assistance Programme. This was 
clearly not the case. American aid to Germany has been mostly economic, not military. A considerable 
portion of this was in loans wdiich have been rqxaid. Military aid received under MAP has been about 
$900million between 1945 and 1965. This is less than one quarter of what France received in all forms 
of military aid, less than both Britain and Belgium and under half of the aid received by Italy." ibid p41. 
For full details and figures on aid given to the various states, see C I Harlow The Europem Armaments 
Base: A Survey. Part I: Economic Aspects of Defence Procurement 1967, London: Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Table 4, p7.
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received a boost wh«i NATO chose both the Fiat G91 as standard ground support 
fighter, and the 105mm Howitzer gun as a NATO standard. It can be seen, 
therefore, that Italian policy in relation to arms procurement concentrated on the 
development of Italian industry via production under licence, procurement from the 
USA, and the manufacture of parts and assemblies for foreign systems by Italian 
subcontractors."*
This review of the four major European NATO states demonstrates the difiering 
agendas which each actor had. The small states such as the Netherlands and Belgium 
had even less latitude in armaments collaboration terms due to their relatively small 
defence industrial bases, and the smaller quantities of end items required. Both 
Holland and Belgium relied primarily in the late 1950’s on American and British 
equipment either bought, transferred as aid, or produced under licence. Before 1960 
both states found it difficult to sustain large defence expenditures, and as a 
concomitant, procurement expenditure was relatively low.""
Jme Linkage
Explicit issue linkages were not a feature of the early period of the regime discussed 
above. Whilst it is true that the USA did explicitly tie aid to European measures of 
self help, the amount of American aid was far exceeded by European expenditure. 
The US threat of an "agonising reappraisal" when the French rejected the EDC, apart 
from being notably unsuccessful, represented a threat to withdraw US forces and 
support from Europe rather than a realistic attempt to construct a replacement for the 
EDC. American pique at French intransigence left the field open for the British to 
make the best of a bad situation. American policy, from the signature of the North 
Atlantic Treaty to the late 1950’s, contributed to the lack of armaments collaboration
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95
Sec Harlow ibid pp57-65.
la Belgium, procurement e:q>enditure as a percentage of defence expenditure averaged only 7.4% between 
1955 and 1959, compared with 14.8% between 1960 and 1964. The correqmnding figures for the 
Nefoerlands are 20.2% and 32.5% respectively. Hgures from Harlow ibid pp2. Table 1 p5 (for Belgium) 
pp51-52 and Table 1 p55 (for Holland). The higher figures for the Netherlands are 20.2% and 32.6% 
respectively. Hgures from Harlow ibid pp2. Table 1, p5 (Apr Belgium) pp51-52 and Table 1 p55 (for 
Holland). The higher figures for the Netherlands reflect the larger amount of equipment bought from 
abroad. As Harlow notes: "Dutch companies in the aerospace, shipbuilding, electronics and vehicles
industries are far less dependent on defence orders (flxan those of Sweden)  with less procurement
money available, the defence industries have less change of growing. A deliberate decision not to build 
an independent arms base must be seen as an essential characteristic of Dutch defence policy" ibid p52.
199
both within Europe and between the USA and Europe. Only the United States had 
the issue specific power to promote a fully integrated armaments collaboration 
regime. Instead, American policy encouraged a renaissance of European defence 
industries, and failed to promote the establishment of any structure which could act 
as an engine of integration within the issue area.
The potential benefits of such a policy seem to have been neither investigated nor 
indeed appreciated by the US administration. As a result, American aid was not 
linked to progress towards any degree of armaments collaboration, except that carried 
out under the limited aegis of NATO. Both Britain and Fiance were far from positive 
toward the concept of armaments collaboration, due to their insistence on retaining 
their world role and maintaining the ability to produce the widest possible range of 
armaments. Only Germany, Italy and the smaller European states had a real interest 
in promoting armaments collaboration during this period. It was hardly possible, 
however, for such objectively weak actors to attempt issue linkages which could have 
promoted any form of integrated armaments collaboration regime. Rather, all of 
these states adopted in their own way to the intergovernmental structure which 
emerged after 1954.
The bargaining and coalition building aspects of the process explanation are again 
highlighted during this period. The negotiations which attended the EDC plan 
involved compromises on all sides. To the French, the EDC represented a method 
of preventing immediate German rearmament and entry into NATO. Further it would 
ensure that no independent Germany army or general staff could be created. The 
United States, despite its earlier support for an immediate Atlantic solution to the 
problem, was constrained to support the EDC when the Spofford Proposals failed. 
It subsequently became a "cheerleader" for the concept of an integrated European 
Army. The British, although supporting the principle of the EDC, made it quite plain 
that they intended to stay aloof, and resisted giving any unequivocal guarantee of 
British commitment to the defence of Europe. This ambivalence was to have serious 
consequences, as events in 1954 were to prove.
The scramble to salvage something from the ruins of the EDC demonstrate rather 
well the importance of bargaining, compromise, coalition building and the role of
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individuals. The lole of Eden and his shuttle diplomacy can hardly be overestimated 
in this regard. Not only did the United Kingdom use her influence to mollify the 
United States, she compromised the "splendid isolation” which had characterised her 
earlier policy toward continental Europe by agreeing to an explicit commitment of 
forces to Europe. The French accepted the creation of a German army, whilst the 
Federal Republic accq>ted limitations to her sovereignty in return for the political 
respectability signified by membership of the WEU and NATO.
The ^parent failure of the early organisational steps and cooperative measures, 
discussed earlier in this Chapter, to evolve into a fully fledged armaments 
collaboration regime is not difficult to account for. During the early days of NATO, 
the body was limited, inasmuch as it was not considered likely that it would be 
required to fulfil the range of roles which were to be assigned to it from the late 
1950’s. As a result, the regime which emerged reflected the inter governmental 
features of the NATO structures evolved in the early 1950*s. NATO’s role in 
promoting collaborative projects in the late 195Q’s and I960’s reflect the absence of 
any other suitable vehicle for such projects to be carried out. The WEU was hobbled 
from birth by a lack of resources, and of the infrastructure and staff which would 
have allowed it to play a more vibrant role. The problem for NATO was that its role 
as promoter of armaments collaboration was one for which it was ill-suited. NATO 
found itself hamstrung by the failure of member states to surrender control over the 
process of armaments production to any other authority than themselves. In addition, 
there was little chance of NATO being able to force the pace in this regard. The 
hegemon would not (or could not) invest NATO with the necessary authority. 
Neither would the United States make any commitment to buy armaments developed 
and/or produced in Europe in any significant quantities. As the following Chapter 
will indicate, NATO led projects were limited, and frequently left the participants 
wary of joining further NATO controlled collaborative projects.
If any period can be said to have been the ideal time for the development of an 
integrated armaments collaboration, it was the period between 1949 and 1955. The 
failure of the EDC and the triumph of intergovemmentalism discussed above 
demonstrate how effectively the prospects for armaments collaboration were limited 
at this early date. This is not to say that had the EDC succeeded, armaments
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collaboration would automatically have ensued. What can be argued with a 
reasonable degree of confidence however, is that had the EDC actually come into 
being, prospects for armaments collaboration would have been considerably brighter.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
REGIME CHANGE: FROM LIBERAL HEGEMONY 
TO COMPEITIIVE COLLABORATION
INTRODUCTION
In examining regime change within the armaments collaboration issue area, it is not 
possible to point to one particular date or evoit which precipitated an observable 
alteration in the regime. The process, as discussed in Chapter 4 above must be 
regarded as evolutionary rather than revolutionary.^  It is, however, possible to 
narrow the focus of the search and attempt to account for such change using the 
process model developed earlier.’ Once the parameters of the regime had been 
established as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 above, the next significant attempted 
change in existing structures emanated from the United States during the late 1950’s.
In the early years of NATO, the new liberal hegemonic r^ime saw the United States 
drawn into close involvement in Europe’s security and, more specifically, into being 
the primary source of military equipment for the European allies. The scale of this 
commitment was such that by 1958 more than half of the heavy equipment in the 
armed forces of European states had been supplied by the United States and Canada, 
whilst the Off Shore Procurement (OSP) Programme had helped revitalise European 
defence industries by building equipment (financed by the United States) in European
2
See Chapter 4 p94.
This is not to say that regime change cannot be a concomitant of a single event or series of events. Jonsson 
notes that in international relations, changes in payoff structures between states involved in negotiating 
regimes are frequently the result of nuÿor wars. Such conflicts both change the distribution of power and: 
"dramatically demonstrate the costs of interstate conflict, and the yearning for cooperative arrangements 
becomes particularly strong after a devastating war." See C Jonsson International Aviation and the Politics 
o f  U egj^ft Çfrai;nge 1987. T endon; FrancM  P in tar. Quote p23. Similarly, Beer notes in his study of NATO 
armaments collaboration that "Resources in this sphere were to portions of national defence budgets; 
utilitarian sanctions and i^ecialized personnel were involved in foe research, development, and production 
of military material. Neverfoeless, foe political element proved strong while foe technical element was 
weak. Advances took place mainly in situations of crisis. Ofowwise foe benefits of coopération were 
outweighed by foe costs." F A Beer Integration and Disintegration in NATO 1969, Columbus: Ohio 
University Press. Quote pl71-172. Beer goes on to claim that after foe Soviet military threat of foe late 
1940's and early 1950's initiated American military aid, subsequent crises such as Suez in 1956, foe launch 
of Sputnik in 1957 and even foe Berlin crises of foe early 1960's were major contributing factors in 
attempted broadening of European participation. See ppl71-175.
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facilities for distribution to European armed forces."
Initially at least the United States government was strongly in favour of building up 
NATO’s role in the armaments production issue area, such that by December 1950, 
the Financial Times could report that:
"Mr Dean Acheson, United States Secretary of State, envisages the 
appointment as Chairman of the Defence Production Board, of a 
production specialist with powers in the economic field parallel to the 
military powers of General Eisenhower."*
However, over the course of the 1950’s the scale of American assistance did decline" 
and American government departments came to favour increasing European 
contributions toward the defence of western Europe. As Beer notes, balance of 
payments problems and the increasingly attractive prospect of European armaments 
markets from the mid 1950’s onwards, made policy makers and defence industries in 
the United States push for a change in American policy."
THE JOINT PRODUCTION PHASE
The change was embodied in two differing, through complimentary, ways. Firstly 
was a heavy emphasis on NATO joint production projects. The United States and the
Figure from Brig Gen E Vandevanter Coordinated Weapons Production in NATO: A Study of Alliance 
Proceaaea RM4169-PR, 1964, Santa Monica: Rand pl4.
Financial Timea, December 12th 1950.
American military and economic aaaiatance to NATO alliea totalled $9.7 billion between 1946 and 1948, 
roae to $15.2 billion in the period 1949-1952 and aubaequently fell to $12.3 billion for 1953-1957, and 
$4.25 billion for 1958-1961. See Table 6 US Military and Economic Aaaiatance to NATO Alliea 1946- 
1966 in Beer, 1969 op cit pl46 Figurea in 1966 $
Ibid ppl45-147. See alao E Van der Beugel From  M arahall Aid to A tlantic Partnerahip; European 
Integration as a Concern of American Policy 1966, Amaterdam: Elaevier Publiahing for an intereating 
treatment of American policy and attitudea. Van der Beugel waa cloaely involved in the eatabliahment of 
the OEEC; W Diebold "The changed economic poaitioa of weatem Europe: aome implicationa for US 
policy and international organization*. Tntemational Qraoniratinn I960, 14(1): 1-19 and alao L Gordon 
"Economic Aapecta of coalition diplomacy: the NATO eijqierience". International OrganîTatinn 1956,10(4): 
529-543.
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Federal Republic of Germany represented the nexus of this effort. With few 
exceptions the systems produced were American, and the major customer was the 
Federal Republic.’ The emphasis on individual projects followed the abandonment 
of the correlated production programme discussed in Chapter 7 above,* and aimed 
to improve chances for collaborative projects to bear fruit by involving NATO 
authorities more directly and, where possible, involving the parties to each project 
from the development stage." The various projects and weapons systems procured 
under the NATO aegis over the next decade constituted the core of collaborative 
armaments production and acquisition in the North Atlantic area.^ "
The second embodiment of America’s changing policy was the adoption of an 
increasingly active military sales programme. This began during the Eisenhower 
administration, but became particularly intense after the inauguration of President 
Kennedy." Within the United States administration a number of organisational steps 
reinforced the drive towards sales. In October 1961 the Department of Defence 
established an International Logistic Negotiations (ILN) office. The ILN had a sales 
force of 21 professional officers organised into four teams - red, blue, white and grey 
- each with different functional and regional responsibilities. Such was the success
10
11
The projects themselves will be discussed below. Germany was the m*yor customer during the late 1950's 
and early 1960's as she required replacements for much of the early equipment which had been supplied 
in her immediate post rearmament period. See also Vandevanter 1964 op cit passim; Beer 1969 op cit 
Chapter 4 pp 131-175; N ^ O  Facts and Figures 1989 1989, Brussels: NATO Information Service, Chapter 
15 pp263‘283.
See Chapter 7 ppl83-185 above.
See the description in NATO Facts and Figures 1989 cit pp265-266.
Treatments of this important area are, perhtqxs surprisingly, rafoer rare. The most detailed discussions can 
be found in Beer 1969 op cit, C J Harlow The European Armament» Ba«e: A Survev. Part 1 Economic 
Aspects of Defence Procurement and Part 2 National Procurement Policies. 1967, London: Institute for 
strategic studies. Both of these pamphlets form bsue 2 of the Defence. Technology and the western 
Alliance series; Vandevanter 1964 op cit; and R Facer "The Alliance and Europe: Part 3 We^mns 
Procurement in Europe Capabilities and Choices." Adelohi Paner 108, 1975, London: Institute for 
Strategic Studies.
Beer 1969 cq) cit attributes pressure for such sales to the Department of Defence, and places the initiation 
of the new policy in the late 1950's pp146-147. The first overt indication was the sudden reversal of 
previous American policy, in July 1958, to allow US firms to compete for the NATO Maritime Patrol 
Aircraft at the terminal states of the design competition. Before tins, only European companies had been 
invited to enter designs. The episode is detailed by Vandevanter 1964 op cit p62-63.
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of the ILN that by 1964 its director, Henry J Kuss, was promoted to Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defence. This was widely seen as a reward for boosting military 
sales. The Defense Dq>artment also sponsored a liaison group with private 
industry known as the Committee on Military Exports of the Defence Industry 
Advisory Committee."
Finally, the shift in American policy from aid to sales was specifically linked to US 
government support for NATO projects which involved joint production of American 
systems. This support was both direct, in that financial assistance was given to the 
projects," and indirect where
"Americans supplied technical assistance, testing equipment and 
valuable engineering drawings. The United Stated provided funds for 
equipment, waived reimbursemait for R&D expenditures, and agreed 
to pay licence fees and royalties. The United States also pledged itself 
to purchase some of the product for distribution as military assistance 
to other European countries.*"
Such assistance acted as a powerful incentive for potential buyers to "buy American". 
It was also, as Harlow notes, most probably recouped by American industry via the
"  A staff study for the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate notes that:
"The \foite team, for example, devotes almost its entire efforts to selling 
military equipment to West Cfermany in an effort to offset by military sales the
*q»proximately $775 million it costs the United States in dollars to keep our 
troqps in the Federal Republic (West Germany has bought some $3 billion 
worth of military equipment in the last 4 years 1964-15167. The measure of foe 
ILN's success is foe 600 per cent increase in annual military sales over foe 
levels of foe 1950s".
US Senate "Arms Sales and Foreign Policy: Staff Study Prepared for foe use of foe Committee on Foreign 
Relations" 1967, 90th Congress, 1st session January 25fo p3.
" See Beer 1969 op cit pl47.
"  Exact financial contributions to specific projects are difficult to assess and vary according to source. See 
for example Robert Rhodes James Standurdp-ntion and Common Production of Weapons in NATO 1967 
London: Institute for International Studies pp 14-19, and, for slightly different figures. Beer 1969 op cit 
pl49,
" Vandevanter 1967 op cit p43-44. The quotation is q>eoifically in relation to foe Hawk missile programme 
but foe types of support detailed are applicable across foe board to foe different NATO systems.
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provision of support services, spare parts supplies and training."
DECLINING COOPERATION AND THE ROLE OF AC 253
By the mid 1960’s the Joint Production phase introduced above began to founder as 
the programmes initiated under the aegis of NATO began to dry up. There were, 
however, two other important motivations for the decline in cooperation, and the 
failure of further projects to take the place of those which were coming to an end. 
First was the increasing unwillingness of the United States to cooperate with the 
Allies on advanced systems, or on basic research. This reflected the continuing 
emphasis on exports and a disenchantment among American manufacturers with the 
collaborative projects which had been organised under the NATO flag." The 
second motivation was attributable to changing German attitudes toward collaboration 
in the procurement of armaments generally, and toward NATO sponsored projects in 
particular." As German rearmament programmes drew to as close during the mid 
1960’s, the emphasis of German policy switched from the large scale procurement 
which had characterised the period fiom 1955-1965 towards the maintenance of 
existing material. Further, future procurement was expected to help advance German 
access to high technology areas such as computers, electronics and space."
18
"  Harlow, Part 1. 1967 op cit p l9.
"  Beer 1969 op cit pp150-152 discusses these problems in relation to the United States, and in relation to the 
Federal Republic ppl56-158. For a somewhat fuller treatment, see John Calmann European Cooperation 
in Defence Technology; The Political Aspect 1967 London; Institute for Strategic Studies.
German centrality in fois context is esqplained by foe fact that foe Federal Republic provided foe backbone 
of foe NATO armaments programme. The Western £un^>ean Union estimated in 1964 that Germany 
accounted for 69% of £urcq>ean NATO eiqpenditure on foe five major NATO procurement programmes 
(Atlantique aircraft. Hawk and ûdewinder missiles, F104 aircraft and foe Bullpup mianle) for 1960-1963. 
See Western European Union Joint Production of Anp«fpent«. Document No 304, February 26,1964 table 
pl3. The actual figure in 1964 US dollars was $1,218 million of a total of $1,770 million. The percentage 
shares of Great Britain and France were 0.42% and 5.25% respectively.
"  Calmann 1967 ibid pp 12-13 discusses changing German attitudes to these issues. On foe importance of 
German-American relations more generally see R Morgan The United States and West Germany 1945-1973 
1974, London: Oxford University Press. This subject has attracted less attention than it deserves in foe 
literature. See, for example: R McGeehanThe German Rearmament Ouestion: American Diplomacy and 
European Defense after World War H. 1971, Urbanâ, El: University of Illinois Press; P Johnson 
"Washington and Bonn: Dimennons of Change in Bilateral Relations" hiternatiopA] Organfz-ati^ n 1979, 
33(4): 451-480 and H Gatzke Germany and foe TTti4t<>d A "Special Relarionnhin?" 1980, Cambridge 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. On foe domestic political implications in Germany of integration into 
NATO see J Richardson on Germany and foe Atlantic Alliance: The Interaction of Strategy and Politics. 
1966, Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press.
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As Beer notes:
"Most NATO production programmes - the Fiat G91, Bréguet 
Atlantique, and the F104G aircraft; the Hawk, Sidewinder, Bullpup 
and AS30 missiles; and the Mark 44 Torpedo - had been approved in 
the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. In the mid-1960’s these projects 
were broaching completion without agreement having been reached 
on Allied co-operation for succeeding generations (of production)."’"
This problem was recognised by the NATO authorities. Their first attempt at reform 
was to formulate what NATO Secretary General Stikker called the "doctrine of 
flexibility". The new doctrine aimed to reduce the dominance of national delegates 
to the Armaments Committee, and embodied a change of philosophy. According to 
NATO this was
"based on recognition of the fact that the countries cannot be 
compelled to cooperate nor constrained to observe rigid procedural 
rules. They emphasised flexibility and the need to make cooperation 
as easy and as advantageous as possible. The mandatory aspects of the 
earlier system were abandoned.”’^
As a result NATO undertook what was acknowledged to be a "fundamental 
reappraisal of the whole approach to cooperation".”  In October 1965 a high level 
committee known as AC 253 was established under the chairmanship of James 
Roberts, a Deputy Secretary General. Its purpose was to review current NATO 
activities in arms research, development and production, and to propose new 
solutions. The Committee prepared a report which set out the principles on which 
cooperation should be based, procedures which should be followed and a proposed
20
21
Beer 1969 op cit pl35.
NATO Facts and Rgitreg 1989, Bnuaels: NATO Infonnatioii Service p269-270.
”  ibid p269.
208
new structure for this sq)proach.” The new initiative was not to prove a great 
success however. As an attempt at changing the existing regime the AC 253 report, 
and the institutional changes which it brought about, signally failed. Not only did the 
"flexible approach" fail to kick start a new round of NATO collaborative projects, it 
actually oversaw a decline in such projects at the expense of non-NATO bi-lateral and 
tri-lateral projects or production under licence.
Before proceeding to a process based analysis of both the joint production phase, and 
the attempted change engendered by AC 253, the various NATO collaborative 
projects of the late 1950’s and 1960’s will be introduced. In addition the institutional 
procedures which governed such projects will be discussed.
EARLY INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
"NBMR’S"
The joint production phase introduced above had its origins in the mid-1950’s. The 
United States began, towards the end of 1956, "to make suggestions for coordinated 
efforts for the introduction of advanced weapons."’* Although NATO attributes this 
to American worries about cost constraints,’" others have attributed the motivation 
to a desire to increase Alliance cohesion in the wake of the Suez and Sputnik 
crises.’" At the NATO Council meeting of December 1957, the Heads of 
Government emphasized the importance of greater standardization and integration 
both of defence equipment and logistics and support functions. The final 
communiqué of the council noted the offer by the United States to undertake 
significant sharing, as well as the scheduling of a ministerial armaments conference 
for April 1958. Finally the council called for "increasing coordination of Allied
23
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The AC 253 Report was presented to the NATO Council of Nfinisters in May 1966 and approved as the 
basis for reforming the existing structure. See NATO Facts and Heures 1989 op cit p269. Beer, 1969 
op cit pl34 places the meeting in June 1966. The text of tiie report was not published by NATO, but its 
contents were based closely on foe report of Brigadier General Vandevanter, an external export wfoo worked 
for foe Rand Corporation. Vandevanter Co-ordinated Weapons Production in NATO 1964 op cit.
NATO Facts and Heures op cit p266.
Ibid. This cites American awareness of her own expenses incurred during foe planning and production of 
increasingly costly modem armaments.
Beer 1969 op cit pp132-133.
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research, development and manufacture of modem w e^ns."”
The European NATO members submitted a proposal to the April 1958 Defence 
Ministers meeting for a list of specific items which they believed might be produced 
jointly. The proposal was passed to the Defence Production Committee (DPC) for 
consideration. Before long, however, it was realised that the Committee’s terms of 
reference were not wide enough, since they excluded research and development. As 
a result, the Council extended the terms of reference of the DPC to include R&D 
matters, and changed it’s name to the Armaments Committee. Finally, a special 
group of civilian and military specialists was established by the Council to 
recommend future developments in the armaments collaboration field.”
The report produced by this group led directly to the adoption of new standing 
procedures by the council at its meeting on November 4th 1959.”  The most 
important recommendation of this report was that the potential advantages of joint 
production could only be realised if cooperative planning were to be adopted at the 
earliest stage. Projects would have to be from "cradle to grave". In order to 
operationalize this new approach the NATO Basic Military Requirement (NBMR) was 
introduced. According to NATO,
"it represented a determined effort to improve cooperation. Under this 
system, the NATO Military Authorities established agreed NATO-wide 
basic military requirements, as the starting point from which 
operational characteristics and their technical specifications could be 
derived. Common equipment could then be developed to meet these 
requirements."""
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Sec NATQ FilWl 1949-1974. 1974 Bnueelt: NATO liiformation Service p221. See also
NATO Facte aod Figures 1989 op cit p266.
Ibid p267. Beer 1969 op cit pl33.
See Rhodes James 1967 op cit p27. The report was titled "NATO Cooperation in Research Development 
and Production of Military Equipment.” No published source of this report could be found, although its 
contents are discussed by Rhodes James and also Beer 1969 op cit pl36.
NATO Facts and Heures 1989 op cit p267.
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The procedure drawn up for NBMR’s encompassed up to nine different phases 
through which a given project would pass. The Armaments Committee and the three 
Service Advisory Groups"^  took the lead in trying to identify possibilities for 
collaborative production of new or existing weapons systems. As a result, some of 
the systems which were eventually given the NBMR label did not in fact go through 
all of the phases associated with the drawing up of a new NBMR.
The first stage of an NBMR involved a proposal from a member state or NATO 
agency for research prior to the establishment of an official requirement being drawn 
up, after consultations with other member states, NATO agencies and the relevant 
NATO commands. If suitable, the proposed NBMR was then officially accepted. 
Stage two covered the issue of the NBMR, during which the Standing Group, made 
up of representatives of the member states, acted as coordinator between national 
authorities and the NATO commanders concerned with the given requirement. This 
Group studied draft plans and outline proposals, evaluated them and finally chose 
either to reject the proposal or to publicize it as an NBMR.
The succeeding three phases, three, four and five, constituted in depth analysis of the 
technical specification of the proposed systems, the operational characteristics and 
types of roles the system was required to fulfil. The best option was then chosen by 
multi-national agreement. The NATO secretariat provided the chairman and 
secretarial back up for each NBMR, and each NBMR had a Project Military Advisor 
(PMA),'usually a senior NATO Military Commander. Decision making within each 
NBMR was in the hands of the awkwardly titled Ad Hoc Mixed Working Groups 
composed of national delegates.
The final three stages saw the NBMR come to fruition, dealing as they did with 
prototype production, military evaluation and tests, production of the system and 
operational testing. Each stage was a national rather than NATO responsibility, 
although a certain amount of administrative supervision of the NBMR was carried out
31 The Naval Service Advisory Group was established in 1958, followed by one each for the Army and Air 
Force in 1%2. The purpose of the groups was to act as support for the Armaments Committee on matters 
pertaining to each service, using serving officers as foe advisors. Ibid p267.
211
by NATO. The major role however was played by the Standing Group of national 
government r^resentatives. As Beer notes:
"Once NATO had approved a proposal as an NBMR, then the control 
or authority of NATO as such was limited to the administrator and 
observer functions of the International Staff (secretariat) and the 
advisory role of the major NATO commander concerned (the Project 
Military Advisor)"."’
A number of different systems came under the NBMR umbrella. In the seven years 
the procedure was used, between 1959 and 1966, 49 projects were produced and 
progressed through the early stages to be promulgated as NBMR’s."" Of this 
number, however, none progressed further than stage five, and only two advanced 
that far."* Not one of the NBMR’s actually resulted directly in the cooperative 
development or production of equipment items. Seven of the NBMR’s did lead to 
production of equipmait by one or more member states which fully or partially 
fulfilled the original requirement. Of the balance, 19 were closed or allowed to lapse 
and 23 "remained under study", a euphemism for having been quietly dropped 
without actually admitting that no result had been achieved.""
As NATO itself admitted:
The NBMR approach had proved unsatisfactory and the NATO 
Military Authorities found themselves in a situation which was both 
illogical and uncomfortable in that they were approving NATO Basic 
Military Requirements without having responsibility for developing and 
producing the resulting equipment, and in many cases without having 
adequate scientific and technical advice or political and economic
32
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Beer 1969 op cit pl37. The procedural aiqMwts of foe NBMR process as they were, theoretically, supposed 
to operate are discussed in Beer ibid ppl36-138 - See also Rhodes James 1967 op cit pplO-15 and 
Vandevanter 1964 op cit ppl7-28, 56.
See NATO Facts and Figures 1989 op cit p268.
"* NBMR's 3 and 4 were for Vertical Take Off/Short Take Off and Tending (VESTOL) strike/reconnaissance 
and tactical tranqwrt aircraft. Each will be discussed further below. Beer 1969 cit pl41.
35 NATO Facts and Figures 1989 op cit pp268-269. Beer 1969 op cit pl38.
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guidance. m36
In short, NATO found itself in the unenviable position of being responsible for 
choosing which system best fulfilled a given NBMR, thus alienating the unsuccessful 
candidates, and of having little effective control over a system once it began, and yet 
still being criticised for the shortcomings of others in falling to make a success of the 
NBMR process. It was a no-win situation for NATO, unsatisfactory in terms of 
filling the Basic Military Requirements previously set out and wasteful of previous 
resources as collaboration failed to become the norm among the member states. 
Before proceeding to examine the attempted change represented by the AC 253 
reforms it is pertinent to briefly examine the major collaborative projects which did 
take place under NATO’s aegis from the late 1950’s to the mid 1960’s, since their 
progress gives an insight into the problems associated with the promotion of 
armaments collaboration in the North Atlantic area.
Flat G91
The project for an aircraft which would be csq>able of operating in the roles of close 
ground support, reconnaissance and some interdiction and counter-air missions, was 
begun in 1954. The requirement was for a very light weight jet fighter,- and was 
coordinated by a board of officers assigned to SHAPE and Allied Forces Central 
Europe (AFCENT) Headquarters." After soliciting designs from allied aircraft 
companies, and elaborating on the military role required of the proposed aircraft, 
NATO was faced with a range of 10 designs from companies m France, Great Britain 
and Italy. Of these designs, five were developed as prototypes and evaluated during 
1957 by an international group of test pilots from European NATO states and the 
United States which had been appointed by the NATO Advisory Group for 
Aeronautical Research and Development (AGARD).
Three aircraft were chosen as being closest to fulfilling SHAPE’S operational
NATO Facts and Figure» 1989 op cit p269.
Ibid p265. Beer 1969 op cit ppl38-140, Vandevanter 1964 op cit p 17-19. The G91 project began before 
the NBMR process was initiated.
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requirements; the French Dassault Edendard VI and the Bréguet 1001 Taon, and the 
Italian Fiat G91. Interestingly, the United States subsidised all the three finalists, 
contributing $5 million towards the development and construction costs of the two 
French entries and $4 million towards the development of the Bristol Orpheus engine 
which powered the G91. In addition the three prototypes and 27 pre-production 
aircraft for the competition were financed by the United States."* As a result of the 
competition AGARD recommended the adoption of the G91 as NATO’s standard light 
ground-support fighter, and in November 1958 SACEUR confirmed that the Fiat 
G91, powered by a Bristol Orpheus turbojet,
"had been adapted as the standard lightweight tactical strike/ 
reconnaissance aircraft for employment in the European theatre of 
NATO."""
During the summer of 1958 an international squadron of pilots put the G91 through 
an extensive series of tactical tests in Italy, before moving on to train with AFCENT 
forces in the Central European front. Further to these tests, 40 aircraft were ordered 
by Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany.*" Fiat eventually produced 348 G91 
aircraft in total, including 94 for delivery to the Federal Republic and 50 for the 
United States which were delivered to the German Luftwaffe.*  ^ Apart from Italy 
and Germany, no other NATO member states procured the G91. The French in 
particular were bitter about the selection of the Italian G91, arguing that since none 
of the three aircraft had fully met the NATO requirement, all of the finalists should 
be given the NATO label. The French objected to last minute changes in the 
requirements for the competition which they believed favoured the Italian entrant, and
"* See Harlow Part 2, 1967 op cit p60, and Beer 1969 op cit pl39. 
"" Vandevanter 1964 op cit pl7.
Ibid pl9.40
41 As Vandevanter notes (1964 op cit plS) NATO announced in December 1958 that
"in consideration of the orders placed by other countries, the United States will 
procure fifty 091 Lightweight Strike filte r  aircraft for deployment with the 
forces of its Allies."
These aircraft were not for American use, as Beer 1969 op cit pl39 realises, but were delivered to the 
Luftwaffe as military aid, wkich Beer xppw# not to have discovered. See Harlow (Part 2), 1967 op cit 
p60, and NATO Facts and Figures 1989 op cit p265.
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believed that the United States had pushed the G91 for political reasons reflecting the 
apparent weakness of Italy’s economy and political instability. Such was the strength 
of French disapproval, that the French representative to the committee which 
evaluated the three aircraft disassociated himself from both the report of the 
competition, and the choice of the Italian aircraft.*’
It is possible, although all but impossible to prove, that the United States did favour 
the Italian design for motives that were not strictly military. The real reason is likely 
to be more prosaic however. According to Harlow, when licensed production of the 
American F-86 Sabre aircraft came to an end in Italy in 1958,
"series production of the G-91 was introduced. The fact that 
production facilities were available at that time may have been one of 
the reasons why the G-91 design (which was similar to the F-86) was 
chosen as the NATO standard light ground support fighter in 
competition with two French designs."*"
Bréguet Atlantique 1150
The requirement for a modem maritime patrol aircraft with an anti-submarine 
capacity was identified by NATO in 1956 to replace obsolete American F2V Neptune 
aircraft which dated from the mid 1940’s. The project began in earnest when the 
NATO Defence Production Committee established a group of experts in early 1957 
to convert the basic military requiremait into a detailed set of operational 
characteristics required for the maritime patrol role.** Technical specifications were 
issued to aircraft companies in Europe and America, resulting in the submission of 
fifteen projects.*"
The Armaments Committee evaluated the various designs and selected the French
*’ French attitudes are discussed by Beer 1969 op cit pp139-140, and by Vandevanter 1964 op cit pp 17-19.
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Harlow (Part 2), 1967 cit p60. Italian produced F86 Sabre aircraft had been supplied to Germany which 
may also help explain German procurement of the G91.
NATO Facts and Figures 1989 op cit p26S.
Beer 1969 op cit pl40.
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Brégnet 1150 on January 30th 1959, adopting the name Atlantique for the project. 
The original four producing naticms, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Netherlands assumed responsibility for managing the project and 
financing development along with the United States. Detailed design planning and 
manufacture was handled by an industrial consortium. Work on the prototypes and 
on production models was shared between firms from all four European members, 
with participation from British companies. Much of the vital electronic equipment 
for the aircraft was of American origin but was built under licence in Europe.^
Although early estimates of the planned production of the Atlantique were between 
126 and 144 aircraft,a total of only 87 aircraft were in fact produced; 20 for the 
French Navy, 9 for the navy of the Netherlands and 18 for that of I ta lySp are  
parts and logistics for all the users of Atlantique aircraft are provided via an 
international warehouse controlled by an International Supply and Logistics Centre. 
Overall the French were disappointed with the response to the project. The scarcity 
of orders did much to disillusion France as to the value of NATO programmes.^^e 
British, although absent as buyers of the aircraft, contributed both the engine supplier, 
Rolls Royce, and the manufacturer of the propeller, De Haviliand.^ In summary, 
the Atlantique project is frequently held up as an example of successful application 
of the NBMR concept, representing as it did a multinational collaborative project, 
producing a successful end product.^  ^ As Beer notes in contrast;
Vandevanter 1964 op cit pp27-28; NATO Facts and Reurea 1989 op cit pp265-266; Rhodes James 1967 
op cit ppll-12. Beer 1969 cit pl40.
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Rhodes James 1967 op cit pl2, who had access to NATO files estimates provisional procurement planned 
at the start of the project as follows; France 70, Netiierlands 20, Germany 18, Portugal 12-24, Norway 6, 
Belgium up to 6.
Italy jointed the project in 1968. See NATO Facts and Figures 1989 op cit p265-266 which also details 
procurement figures.
See Beer 1969 op cit pp158-159, who quotes French Defence Minister Messmer on his disappointment on 
the project. Harlow Part 2 1967 op cit, estimates that Bréquet handled only 45 % of Atlantique production, 
with the balance spread across partners in Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany, see p34.
See Beer 1969 op cit pl54, who places the value to the companies of Atlantique orders as £10 million for 
Rolls Royce and £2 million for De HavUland.
This positive, not to say idealised, conception of ± e  project is well illustrated in NATO Facts and lugures 
1989 op cit pp265-266 and 268.
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"The Bréguet Atlantique was the only project developed from its 
earliest stages within NATO. However, the Atlantique predated the 
NBMR procedure and was less the result of than the inspiration for its 
adoption.
NBMRs 3 and 4
These two projects can be discussed together as they were seen at the time of the 
promulgation as linked. The requirement for a NATO V/STOL strike reconnaissance 
and also a tactical transport aircraft was drafted in 1958 and allocated the code 
NBMR 3 for the former and NBMR 4 for the latter.®®
NBMR 3 was drawn up by June 1961 on the basis of an estimated 1000 aircraft
requirem^t for NATO airforces in the strike and reconnaissance role. The ensuing 
competition attracted 12 entrants from companies in France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Great Britain. At this point the project aborted as a result of the 
incompatible positions taken up by the national delegations involved in the project.®* 
Both the French and British delegations made no secret of the fact that they had no 
intention of abiding by the outcome of the competition, and would equip their forced 
with the Mirage m-V and Hawker P-1127 (later renamed the Harrier) respectively.®® 
Even the Federal Republic hinted that they were considering production of the VJ-
10ID which was being test flown during 1962.®®
®^ Beer 1969 op cit pl38.
®® IbidpW l.
®* Vandevanter 1964 op cit p57-59.
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Ibid pS9. it is significant that France and the United Kingdom acted effectively as "spoilers" in this regard, 
resulting in the failure of the project, and that the projects which had succeeded had excluded both countries 
in the case of the G91, and one of them (Great Britain) in the case of die Atlantique. Beer 1969 op cit 
notes that from a British perqiective;
"the failure of I*mMR*s 3 and 4 to progress beyond the stage of preliminary evaluation 
had a negative effect on 6 e  aeroqpace perspective. In order to enter the competition 
firms had undertaken substantial expenses high as £100,000 in some cases.
When there was no authoritative outcome, airframe and engine companies lost interest 
in the NATO arena." Quote pl55.
See I W Taylor "VTOL: The Key to NATO Air Power" NATO's Fifteen Nations 1967, 7(6): 90-97. 
Harlow also discussed attempted German development of aircraft in his European Armaments Base: A 
Survev Part 2 1967 op cit p46, noting that:
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The experience in NBMR 4 echoed that of NBMR 3. After paring down the initial 
projects Altered to a short list of two or three designs, the parties involved again 
failed to agree on which should be developed and allowed the whole project to 
lapse.®’
Further Cooperative Programmes
The remainder of collaborative projects of the late 1950s and 1960s wUl be 
considered together since in all cases they represented projects which began life 
outside the NATO framework with no initial input from NATO institutions. Rather, 
national authorities or companies came together independently of NATO to establish 
the projects which later assumed the NATO mantle. The systems concerned were, 
with one exception, of American origin.®* The Hawk surface-to-air missile and 
Sidewinder air-to-air missile were both existing American projects chosen by different 
combinations of European NATO member states in the late 1950* s. The F104 G 
Starfighter flghter-bomber was adopted as a NATO programme in June 1961, having 
been agreed upon by four European states in December I960.®® The Bullpup air-to- 
surface missile and the M-72 Light Anti-tank weapon were both of US origin and 
were adopted in May 1962 and July 1963 respectively by the NATO Council 
following discussions betwemi countries interested in the systems. The only non- 
American system involved was the French AS-30 air-to-surface missile which was 
subject to a NATO Steering Committee for production after June 1962.®°
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"the (German) Defence Ministry has had a disconcerting habit - familiar in 
other countries •> of deciding that there is not really any requirement for a 
design they have supported, such as the DO-31 or the VT-101, even \dien the 
prototype has been reasonably successful."
None of the indq>endent German projects of the period progressed past die prototype stage. Beer 1969 op 
cit pl57 also notes that Germany decided in 1961 to issue its own military aircraft requirements, 
independently of NATO, for the first time. Beer considers the change as a result of growing German 
reluctance to become involved in NATO projects, which had not returned die benefits expected, and that 
this in turn contributed to NATO’s fidlure to new armaments programmes in the mid 1960’s.
Beer ibid pl41.
See; NATO Facts and Figures 1989 qi cit pp266-269, and Beer 1969 qp cit pl41-142.
NATO Facts and Figures 1989 op cit p268.
Ibid p268-269.
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With the excq>tion of the Starfighter and Hawk programmes, most of these projects 
were relatively small scale. In the case of the Hawk missile, the United States 
offered the system to interested European states for production in Europe. Five states 
accepted the offer in 1958; France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, 
Five European companies participated in production of the missiles with coordination 
from a Board of Directors of the NATO Hawk Management Organisation. The initial 
phase of the programme was completed in 1967.“
The Starfighter programme began with a German decision to procure the American 
Lockheed F104 G fighter bomber.® Subsequently, Italy, Belgium and the 
Netherlands agreed to participate in a joint production programme. This was 
accepted as a NATO programme in June 1961. Almost 1,000 aircraft were produced 
before the completion of the programme in 1966.® The aircraft were produced in 
Europe on two different production lines, one in Italy and one in Germany,® by 
different consortia organised on regional lines. The South-West group was headed 
by Fiat as main contractor, with responsibility for assembling parts produced by 
Italian sub-suppliers, as well as responsibility for integrating production and assembly 
of parts with the west group of companies from Belgium, consisting of Avions Fairey
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Rhodes James 1967 op cit estimates the relative oqwnditures at $1500 million for the Starfighter, $660 for 
the Hawt missile, $40 million for the Sidewinder and $30 million for the Bullpup. pp 14-19 figures in 
1967$). NATO estimates that the M72 Light Anti-Tank weapon cost just over $10 million, but puts 
e?q>enditure on the Bullpup at $38 million. The extra $8 million is probably accounted for by the changing 
value of the US dollar, and qtare parts orders placed after the completion of the programme in 1967. See 
NATO Facts and Figures 1989 op cit p268. R is not clear i^ether the figures are in 1989 values.
Ibid p266. Subsequently, the participating states embarked upon an improvement programme for the system 
to enhance its capabilities and prolong its service life via fee Haaic limited Improvement Programme 
(HEUP). These efforts continued through fee 1970*s. Greece, Denmark and Norway joined the HAWK 
organisation in 1972, 1973 and 1986 respectively.
Harlow (Part 2) 1964 op cit p39, for example, notes of Germany that "her decision to build fee Lockheed 
F104 G in Europe started fee European consortium for feat aircraft" Further, Beer notes (see Beer 1969 
op cit pl57) that
"In fee case of fee F104 G, fee German government accepted some financial 
losses in its ratio of contracts to contributions in order to entice Belgium and 
fee Netherlands to participate, because Germany had insufficient domestic 
capaciQr to undertake a larger share of fee project herself.”
® NATO Facts and Figures 1989 op cit p268. For details of fee number of aircraft procured by each 
country, see Harlow (part 2) 1964 op cit pp3, 39-42, 52 and 58.
® Harlow ibid p3.
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and SABCA
It is important to note in relation to the Starfighter programme that parts produced for 
completed aircraft were firequently manufactured by one group of companies for the 
use of all the others involved in the project. For example, all the General Electric 
J-79 engines for the European produced aircraft were produced by three companies; 
FN of Belgium, Fiat of Italy and MAN Turbo of Germany.®
Of the total number of F 104 G*s procured, Italy received 125, Holland around 120, 
Belgium 100 and Germany around 700. The exact delivered numbers are subject to 
dispute, as certain aircraft were either supplied direct by Lockheed from the USA, 
or sent in knock down form to begin production on the European assembly lines.® 
On completion of the Italian production, Italy ordered a further 165 F104 S aircraft, 
which was an improved version of the F104 G capable of performing an interceptor 
role. It had been hoped that other members of the project would follow suit.® In 
the event, however, only Italy actually ordered this version.
In total, the Starfighter programme is estimated to have cost at least $1.5 billion, of 
which $40 million was contributed by the US government.’  ^ Harlow estimates that 
Germany alone paid between 500 and 600 million US dollars to the United States for 
direct purchases, licencing fees, spares and training, while 200-300 F104 G aircraft 
for Germany were actually built wholly or partly by Italy, Belgium and the
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Ibid pp3, 58 and 60. 
Ibid p3.
Harlow puts the numbers of aircraft supplied in these ways as follows; 3 TF 104 G trainer versions bought 
by Belgium direct from Lockheed (p3), 96 F104 G’s bought direct by Germany from fee USA (p39), 25 
F104 G’s supplied free to fee Netherlands by fee US government and 18 TF 104 G trainers bou^t direct 
from Lockheed (p52). The United States also financed 25 F104 G*s produced for fee Italian Air Force as 
part of MAP, and a further 25 were financed directly by fee US government which supplied fee electronics 
and technical assistance. It seems likely that feese aircraft represented fee initial 50 aircraft produced in 
Italy (p58).
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Ibid p58 and 60.
See Rhodes James 1967 op cit pp 14-19.
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Netherlands at a cost of $100 million to Germany in each case.’  ^ It is difficult to 
quantify the exact amount of revenue from licence fees and sale of parts) for the total 
project paid to the United States, but one estimate puts the figure at approximately 
$1.15 billion. It is possible that the figure could be a good deal more as this does not 
include the cost of training pilots in the USA.’* The programme ended in 1966 after 
the production of almost 1000 aircraft’®
THE END OF NBMR’S AND ATTEMPTED REGIME CHANGE VIA AC 253
The failure of the NBMR procedure was amply demonstrated by the fact that none 
of the 49 requirements formulated actually resulted directly in cooperative 
development or production of equipment. A scheme originally intended to increase 
flexibility had, in fact, become too rigid. Further the projects which had been 
undertaken, such as the G91, Atlantique and Starfighter were coming to an end in the 
mid 1960s with no sign of a successor generation of collaborative projects.’* As a 
result, NATO decided to attempt to change the existing structure. The "flexible 
approach" announced by Secretary General Stikker, in summer 1965,’® although it 
represented a start, could not be seen as an end in itself. The formation of AC 253 
under the chairmanship of James Robers, a deputy Secretary General of NATO, was 
specifically aimed to reform the existing system and improve prospects for armaments 
collaboration. As NATO notes, the new procedures "emphasised flexibility and the 
need to make cooperation as easy and as advantageous as possible. "’°
71
72
Harlow (Part 2) 1967 op cit p39.
See Beer 1969 op cit plSO. All such figures remain largely informed guesswork, as the participating 
nations did not generally identify licence expenditure or receipts separately in defence spending figures.
NATO Facts and Figures 1989 p268 is not more q>ecific as to the exact production figure. The figures 
quoted by Harlow (Part 2) 1967 op cit passim, put fee total at around 970 aircraft excluding aircraft 
supplied direct from fee USA.
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Beer 1969 qp cit 0135 notes fee importance of this motive to NATO decision makers.
NATO Facts and Figures 1989 op cit p269; Beer 1969 qp cit pl67. Beer notes ibid pp 167-168 
"Although fee doctrine of flexibility attempted to cut down fee number of 
instructed delegates sitting at any given table, it did little to bring them there 
in fee first place."
NATO Facts and Figures 1989 op cit p269.
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The prospects for change did not look particularly bright Large sections of the 
NATO bureaucracy had a vested interest in the existing system of NBMR s and could 
not be expected to favour radical change. SHAPE played a more neutral role, as it 
was not opposed to reform of the system. It had, however, been closely involved in 
drawing up the military requirements which formed the basis of the existing 
procedure. Beer also notes that General Fischer, the French Director of Armaments 
on the NATO International Secretariat, and also Chairman of the Armaments 
Committee, opposed any change to the system with which he was closely 
associated.”
In spite of this unpromising prospect, Roberts aimed to radically alter the system to 
not only allow, but also encourage, real collaboration in research, development and 
production phases of armaments. Using the influaitial report by Brigadier General 
Vandevanter as Support,’* Roberts advocated the scrapping of the NBMR concept 
and the substitution of a system which was at once more flexible but also binding on 
the participating states. This vision of a new s^ pproach stood in marked contrast to 
the previous NBMR procedure, but aimed to progress beyond the limited scope of 
earlier projects which had bem outside the official NBMR framework.
"Roberts favoured a system of partial membership which would 
overcome problems of unanimity; he also supported the principle of 
time limits on participation without contribution. If, by the second 
meeting of a given working group, a nation had not committed itself 
to participate in research and development expenses, he hoped that it 
might be required to withdraw."”
The proposed new system drew heavily on Vandevanter* s study, particularly with 
reference to the inability of the existing institutions and organisational framework to 
accommodate the frequently contradictory aims of buyer and seller nations. 
Vandevanter* s solution to the problem of choosing between more than one state
Beer 1969 qp cit pp168-169.
Vandevanter 1964 op c it
Beer 1969 op cit pl68.
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sponsored candidate for production, and encouraging unsuccessful candidates to 
accept the opposing project, was the introduction of a partial and binding "permissive 
system". The innovation was to be that the weight each nation had in a given project 
for collaborative armaments production, was to be proportional to the amount that 
nation had committed itself to purchase. *°
Despite opposition within the NATO and SHAPE bureaucracy, and the fact that AC 
253 actually consisted of national representatives at a higher level than those generally 
serving on the Armam«its Committee, Roberts succeeded in having the report 
approved by the NATO Council in June 1966. By giving this approval the Council 
of Ministers consigned both the Armaments Committee and the NBMR procedure to 
oblivion. Henceforward, cooperative action took the form of proposals from any 
member state or NATO Military Authority being discussed by a group formed 
specifically for that purpose, as long as at least two states sponsored the group.*^  
Participating states could decide against participation during these discussions and 
simply pull out of the working group. Those states remaining would then proceed 
to develop detailed production plans and operational characteristics.
At the point when a final commitment to the project was imminent, the working 
group would present a report to NATO asking that the project be officially designated 
as a NATO project. The designation brought with it an obligation to submit an 
annual report to NATO and agreement that other member states be allowed to join 
the project at a later date on equitable terms. The body managing the project was 
called a NATO Steering Committee, and could take whatever form the participants 
wished. Otherwise the arrangements within the project were left to the discretion of 
the members of the given project.®
The other major institutional innovation which emerged from AC 253 was the 
creation of a new high level Committee of National Armaments Directors (CNAD)
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Vandevanter 1964 op cit pp90-95.
NATO Facts and Rzurea 1989 op cit p269-270.
Ibid. The basic structure remains in place to feis day.
223
to replace the Armaments Committee. This was to meet twice a year to establish 
high level policy, whilst the more mundane functional matters would be dealt with by 
National Armaments Directors Representatives (NADREPS). Beneath this level the 
three Service Advisory Groups were changed into Service Armaments Groups, which 
considered military criteria, and the old committee of Defence Research Directors, 
established in 1964, was replaced with the Defence Research Group which focused 
its efforts on cooperative research.®
Given the inbuilt structural obstacles which AC 253 had to overcome, it is somewhat 
surprising that Roberts succeeded in pushing his recommendations through to final 
approval. Beer notes that although national r^resentatives to AC 253 were "heavily 
instructed" by national governments, the fact that they spent two weeks at a time 
visiting NATO, and that they tended to be at higher levels than normal delegates to 
the a Armaments Committee, meant that they had a degree of latitude with which to 
change their instructions.® On constructing an agreement within AC 253 Roberts 
also persuaded the NATO Military Committee in Washington DC to endorse his 
recommendations, a factor which undoubtedly aided the approval at the subsequent 
Coundl of Ministers meeting.®
In retrospect AC 253, whilst it represents a real attempt to revitalise the springs of 
cooperation, promised considerably more than it was subsequently to deliver. Roberts 
himself did not maintain his involvemait in the issue area, robbing the new structure 
of an important and charismatic actor. The new CNAD met too infrequently to be 
of use in the minutiae of day to day armaments collaboration, largely obviating its 
potential as a focus for reducing the instruction of national rqpres^itatives within the 
issue area. What was worse, the NADREPS who fulfilled the more permanent
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Ibid p270 discusses the origiiuil changes in 1966 and developments feereafter. See also Beer 1969 op cit 
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requirements were generally military officers of the rank of Colonel or above, a 
situation which was little advanced from the Armaments Committee the new structure 
had replaced.
Ultimately Roberts had been forced to compromise on important aspects of his 
proposals to make them accq>table to national rq>resentatives. Weighted voting 
therefore became not the norm, but an option available for use. Notwithstanding the 
new institutional arrangemaits resulting from AC 253 "voting was left to ad hoc 
arrangemmts by the members of each particular project, scarcely an improvement on 
what had gone before."® To a large extent, AC 253 and its attendant institutional 
developments simply represented a scaling down of the more inclusive NBMR 
approach, since it aimed to bypass the strictures of unanimity which had hobbled the 
NBMR programme at lower levels.
At higher levels, however, whether in the Armaments Committee or in CNAD, 
decisions were still required to be unanimous.® National governments remained 
pre-eminent, both due to the continued centrality of national representatives in the 
bureaucracy, but more importantly because states and not NATO remained ultimately 
responsible for planning, researching, ordering and buying armaments. Indeed the 
most radical solution to the failure of NATO to evolve a coherent armaments 
collaboration policy, that is to say some form of NATO central procurement agency 
with or without a central budget, was simply not considered by AC 253. The report 
produced by Robert Rhodes James between 1965 and 1966 advocated just such a 
solution. Rhodes James had been a NATO Research fellow during the period, with 
access to NATO personnel and confidential files. Beer goes as fiu* as to speculate 
that the report was expressly commissioned by the NATO hierarchy.® The report 
concluded that "little success can be achieved in the field of major ab initio joint 
equipment projects in the future without central funding arrangemaits, at least for 
feasibility and design studies," and continued that this could be achieved for as little
Ibid pl71.
Ibid pl35, 137.
Ibid pl69.
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as £50 million per annum. The alternative was to leave NATO completely dependent 
on national governments or individual firms for even the most basic programmes.®
Support for AC 253 had come mainly from the principal producers of armam^ts; the 
United States, France and Great Britain. All three had much to gain from the 
doctrine of flexibility in armaments collaboration, since confining production to two 
or three powers, who then sold the armaments on to the other NATO members, 
would be far more effective than attempting to coordinate unwieldy projects with up 
to 15 members. The concq>t of wdghted voting was particularly attractive in this 
regard, as demonstrated by the Dqartment of Defense in the USA backing 
Vandervanter*s study which had proposed such a scheme.^ The smaller NATO 
member states which would have constituted the buyers of much of the coUaboratively 
produced equipment, were generally unimpressed by the change. The NBMR 
programme had provided access to high-technology areas which would have been 
otherwise beyond their reach. In addition, the odsting system gave the smaller states 
an elective veto power which they would have lost under the proposed new system. 
Although Canada and the Netherlands were more positive toward the change, most 
of the smaller states attempted to halt, or at least modify, the changes which came 
from AC 253. In conclusion, an analysis will be attempted from a process based 
perspective of the attempted regime change engendered by the AC 253 episode. This 
will aim to highlight why the changes, supported by the three major armaments 
producers, were effectively watered down by the other member states despite the 
institutional changes which did take place.
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CONCLUSION
This Chapter has focused particularly on the NATO eaqperience of armaments 
collaboration during the 1960*s. This concentration is a function of the fact that the 
collaborative projects which did take place during this period were, almost without 
exception, carried on within either the direct or indirect scope of NATO. Further the 
progress, or to be more precise the lack of progress, within the armaments 
collaboration issue area throughout this period, in spite of both the NBMR structure 
and the attempted changes put forward by AC 253, ensured that collaborative 
production of armaments in the future would actually decrease both in scale and 
scope. A direct correlation between the institutional failure of NATO as a nexus for 
the promotion of an integrated armaments collaboration regime, and the resultant 
diminution of collaborative ventures, can be defended.
After the late 1950’s only NATO presented any realistic platform for the promotion 
of armaments collaboration. As such, the issue area became hitched to the success 
with which NATO could transform itself from what was, to all intents and purposes, 
a semi-integrated alliance, into a supra-national authority responsible for the 
procurement of armam«its from initial planning through to delivery of finished 
items.®^  In short, the failure of the attempted regime change represented by the 
recommendation of AC 253 represents an important discontinuity in the analysis, and 
also, therefore, a fitting point at which to conclude both the current Chapter and the 
thesis as a whole.
In analysing both the joint production phase and the attempted changes of AC 253 
discussed above, structural and situational explanations once again prove to be 
relatively poor indicators of the outcomes within the armaments collaboration issue 
area. Structurally the United States still dominated the issue area due to her 
continued advantage of scale over the European allies. Harlow and Facer writing 
some eight years sq>art, in 1967 and 1975, both attest to the relatively small scale of
91 Rhodes James 1967 op cit p22-25 discussed the measures regarded as necessary for fee promotion of such 
a "NATO procurement agency", concentrating on fee relatively basic and inexpensive step of empowering 
CNAD to undertake studies vfeich would determine which projects were viable. Once again, fee 
importance of promoting collaboration from fee earliest possible point - and preferably at fee planning stage 
- was stressed.
227
individual European armaments companies compared with those of the United States, 
as well as the huge disparity in defence spending both in absolute terms and in 
percentage of GNP terms between the hegemonic actor and the European NATO 
states.® This continued centrality in structural terms did not, however, translate 
into control over either the joint production phase or the AC 253 episode.
In the former case the United States could not impose a solution which encouraged 
greater collaboration through NATO. The conspicuous successes of the joint 
production phase rested mainly on the role of the Federal Republic of Germany as 
loyal ally attempting to offset American costs by procuring American defence 
equipment as a quid pro quo for the continuing presence of American forces in 
Europe. The parallel military equipment sales drive by the United States exhibits 
how the United States attempted to hedge its bets by, on the one hand encouraging 
joint production through NATO, whilst on the other undertaking an increasingly 
active sales programme.”
The United States was able in the short term to utilise situation specific strengths as 
discussed above, to subsidise American armaments systems both in direct financial 
terms and via technical assistance. This made such systems an attractive, one might 
almost say irresistible, option to European NATO states such as Germany, Italy and 
the Benelux group. Once more however, the situational strength possessed by the 
United States cannot explain why the joint production phase came to an end on terms 
which were not dictated by the hegemon. America was unable to use her structural 
or situational dominance to force or entice an increasingly sceptical Germany into 
another round of joint production, nor was she able to convince domestic American 
defence contractors of the potential benefits of collaborative projects organised via 
NATO. Finally the United States could not give up the addictive drug of military
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findings of fee Plowden Report on fee state of fee British aircraft industry in 1965 ufeich advocated a switch 
to European collaboration from Atlantic collaboration. See "Report of fee Committee of Inquiry into fee 
Aircraft Industry Appointed by fee Aviation Minister under fee Chairmanship of Lord Plowden 1964-1965. " 
CMND 2853. 1965 London: HMSO pp44-48, 55-56 and 91-95.
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equipment exports for the "cold turkey" of participation in collaborative projects, still 
less the purchase of such systems for use by United States forces.
The case of AC 253 demonstrates that although a powerful combination of the three 
largest armaments producing states, the United States, France and Great Britain, 
could help push the recommendations of the Committee through, they could not see 
them operationalized in the face of determined opposition from the other buyer states 
within NATO. This combination of the three major armaments producers, together 
with the parts of the NATO bureaucracy which supported the AC 253 proposals ought 
logically to have carried the day from a structural and situational standpoint. Since 
the reforms detailed by AC 253 failed to bring about a new lease of life for 
armaments collaboration in the late 1960’s, the new institutional arrangements 
notwithstanding, an explanation of the actual outcome must be sought elsewhere.
A Process Based Explanation
In the earlier discussion of the process model it was noted that bargaining, coalition 
building and the organisational context were the primary determinats of such an 
analysis.® These factors can help explain aspects of the situation discussed above 
which are not well served in an analytical sense by existing structural or 
functional/situational models. Both the joint production phase and the AC 253 period 
analysed above are particularly suited to such a treatment. Firstly they have not 
previously been examined from this standpoint Secondly the role of this period as 
a "make or break" one for the prospect of developing armaments collaboration within 
the North Atlantic community of states from the late 1960*s onwards, appears to have 
been overlooked. It is the contention of this analysis that a more thorough 
examination of the episodes discussed above can provide valuable insights into the 
present state of armaments collaboration.
Influence capability in the period under discussion appears at first sight to lie largely 
with the United States, as had been the case in earlier episodes. However, European 
influence capability had also increased relative to the hegemon since the 1950*s. The
94 See above pp 114-117, 135-136 and 159.
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disparity both in general economic/industrial terms, and in armaments production 
capacity more specifically, between the United States and the European NATO States, 
had decreased, which allowed the Europeans greater scope to attempt to influence 
American policy. Indeed, the influence capability of the Europeans was increased by 
the growing dqiendance of the United States on Eatopcsin markets for armaments 
from the early 1960*s onwards.
The stress sensitivity of the Europeans rested primarily on fears of losing access to 
high technology areas without collaboration with the United States, and, particularly 
in the case of the Federal Republic of Gmmany, the perceived necessity to use the 
purchase of American armaments to offset the cost of the American forces stationed 
in Europe. For the United States areas of stress sensitivity c^itred on the fear of 
being excluded from European armaments markets, and a desire to decrease the cost 
of hegemony by promoting increased efficiency in the armaments production 
capabilities of the allies.
The advantages of collaborative armaments development and production were 
potentially substantial. As Beer summarized;
"Politically it should hskp to cement the Alliance. Militarily there 
should be a better fit between strategy and available means; increased 
tactical mobility from better availability of spare parts, fuel and 
ammunition; and consolidated training. Economically, pooled efforts 
should involve cost reductions from economies of scale and shared 
costs of research and development. Technologically, the Allies would 
be provided with the best equipment available"”
What Beer neglects to mention is the possibility that the United States might have an 
interest in promoting armaments collaboration which had more to do with attempting 
to offload some of the financial burden of hegemony onto the European allies, than 
it did with concerns for the efficiency of NATO forces. The major problem with
Beer 1969 op at p 173. See also Vandevanter (1964 op ck pp 2-3,54).
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such an approach was the lack of agreement between the major supplier nations and 
the buyers of the end items. Their motives for entering collaborative projects were 
different and often contradictory.
Issue specific power during this period still lay with the United States. Although the 
basic relationship between the United States and the European states which were 
members of NATO was still regarded as co-operative, this was less important in the 
period under discussion than in earlier periods. As noted above ® from the late 
1950’s, and more noticeably in the 1960’s, the United States changed its policy into 
a two pronged assault which represented nothing less than an attempt to co-opt 
European armaments industries into an American dominated regime. The points of 
this assault were, on the one hand, the strong support for joint production schemes, 
and on the other hand a marked increase in the sales efforts of the United States 
within Europe. This more assertive American approach signalled the end of the years 
of American and aid and direct transfers, and the emergence of a more hard nosed, 
commercially aware and competitive approach.®
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It is important to highlight the potential importance o f domestic political constraints on the formulation of 
United States foreign policy generally, and on the prospects for promoting armaments collaboration 
specifically. Eisenhower’s farewell address as President on January 17th 1961 had warned o f the dangers 
inherent in the "military industrial complex”, (see Public Papers o f the Presidents of the United States; 
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It is, of course, arguable that the operation of a military industrial complex could help explain the failure 
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and armaments industries, easy access to the Pentagon and Pork barrelling in the US congress could all be 
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military budgets o f the 1945-50 period, or the dramatic switch from defence to welfare spending overseen 
by the Nixon administration. Thus, although the military industrial complex generally, or the revolving 
door, pork barrelling and access to the Pentagon specifically, may help explain the failure of armaments 
collaboration to develop to some extent, it cannot be seen as a central theme. See also, Seymour Melman 
The Permanent Was Economy: American Capitalism in Decline 1974 New York: Free Press; W Carroll 
Pursell Jr (ed) The Military Industrial Complex 1972 New York: Random House, Fred Cook The Warfare 
State 1962 New York: Columbia University Press; Bruce M Russett and Alfred Stepan Military Force and 
American Society 1973 New York: John Wiley.
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The issue specific and situation specific power of the United States is further evinced 
by the adoption of the AC 253 recommendations. In spite of determined opposition 
from most of the smaller European NATO members, and outright hostility from 
sections of the NATO bureaucracy, the United States was able to bring her issue 
specific strength to bear in an attempt to promote continued collaboration, backed by 
the United Kingdom, France and the US. Department of Defence.”
Thus in both issue and situation specific terms, the United States had, if anything, 
increased her influence when compared with previous episodes within the issue area. 
This increased power did not necessarily translate, however, into control over 
outcomes. Despite the fact that the Americans pushed both joint production and the 
AC 253 changes, and succeeded in seeing both projects bear fruit, they were unable 
to operationalise either into the type of armaments collaboration regime which would 
have brought about some of the benefits detailed by Beer above.”
Organisational context cannot therefore be expected to provide sufficient independent 
explanation of the paradox of increased American issue and situation specific 
influence being unable to ensure the success of American sponsored outcomes during 
the period in question. Once again it is necessary to seek the presence of intervening 
variables which can help explain the process of regime formation or change during 
the 1960’s.
Structural Dominance
The United States role in the introduction of the joint production phase discussed 
above reflected the continuing structural dominance of the hegemon within the issue
98
99
Detailed discussions o f this period are hampered by a serious lack o f primary documentary evidence, and 
a dearth of analyses o f the issues involved. Unlike the earlier periods discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 above, 
the 1960’s have attracted relatively little attention in relation to the types of questions this analysis attempts 
to address. As a result, the conclusions in this Chapter as to specific policy positions and negotiations are 
necessarily speculative, but grounded in the treatment of the earlier episodes already discussed.
It follows from the discussion o f American motives above that altruism, in terms o f increasing the efficiency 
and effectiveness of NATO and the allied defence effort, was only part o f the reason that the United States 
remained interested in armaments collaboration. Self interest played as great a role, even if this was not 
explicit policy.
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area. The switch of policies from the granting of military aid to the sponsoring of 
joint production and an increased emphasis on armaments sales, was due both to 
domestic pressures in the United States to reduce the financial burdens attendant on 
the American commitment to Europe, and an indication that these pressures were 
strong enough to encourage an attempted alteration to the intergovernmental 
armaments regime established during the 1950’s.
The existing structures within NATO which were available for the operationalisation 
of armaments collaboration after the late 1950’s, were simply not equal to the task. 
The intergovernmental nature of the available structures, the origins of which were 
discussed above^ °°, could not extend the joint production programme to its logical 
conclusion, as NATO lacked the institutional autonomy, the authority and the 
leadership to evolve into the focus for a truly integrated armaments collaboration 
effort amongst the NATO member s ta t e s .T he  obvious shortcomings of the joint 
production programme led directly to the attempted revitalisation of the process 
through the AC 253 structure. Once again, however, the introduction of the 
institutional changes did not ipso facto bring about the desired regime.
The United States was able to use its structural dominance inasmuch as it could easily 
dominate the joint production programmes which involved systems of American 
origin. Further, programmes such as the Starfighter, Hawk missile and Sidewinder 
missile were generally more attractive to the Federal Republic of Germany and 
smaller NATO states such as Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands who constituted the 
major armaments buyers, due to their competitive price and/or more advanced 
technology than equivalent systems produced by Britain or France. Neither the 
United Kingdom nor France were involved in the joint production programmes to any 
great extent, and in both cases their experience of the competitions and of production
See Chapter 7 above.
For two interesting early treatments of these issues see Beer 1969 op cit pp 131-165, and Rhodes James 
1967 op cit pp 9-20.
233
phases made them sceptical of the value of such arrangements.^ ®
The buyer/seller dichotomy is important to the discussion since it had profound 
effects on the regime. Not only were the three major seller nations in competition, 
and therefore unlikely to agree to integrate their efforts, but the buyer nations had 
different agendas to the United States, Britain and France as sellers. Most 
importantly, however, the United States, despite her dominant position, was unable 
to enforce armaments collaboration and was unwilling to open her domestic 
armaments market to European competition, or to procure the systems produced as 
a result of joint production programmes.^ ® Facer succinctly points out the 
concomitants of American structural dominance within the issue area:
"The truth is that, for the time being at any rate, the United States does not 
need to collaborate with other countries in weapons development, while aU 
European countries must do so, at least in some fields. While financial 
pressures on American defence procurement are indeed increasing, economic 
and industrial factors are continuing to pull strongly away from collaboration, 
and there is no sign that the research and development base in the United 
States will be so reduced as to be unable to meet the vast bulk of the 
American military’s likely requirements"
The British aircraft industry was hostile to the joint production process due to the expense of preparing 
entries for the competitions which did not result in any return. They were also critical o f the Plowden 
Report wluch implied that the United Kingdom should buy larger complex aircraft from the Unites States 
to produce under licence. See CMND 2853, 1965 op cit pp 12, 44-48, 55-60, 71-95, and Beer 1969 op 
at pp 153-155. Similarly the French were disappointed with the small returns on projects such as the 
Atlantique, and critical of the F104 being chosen in preference to the Mirage m . As Beer points out:
"The experience of Dassault in the competition for the lightweight Strike Reconnaissance Aircraft, 
the F 104 G, and NBMR’s 3 and 4 - and that of Breguet, especially with regard to the Atlantique 
- could have done little to increase the legitimacy of NATO in their eyes" ibid p 159.
The United States never bought any weapons system which was the result of a NATO collaborative 
production programme for the use of its own forces, preferring to "buy American". Although differences 
in specification required, the possible world-wide usage required by the US forces, and difterences in the 
procurement cycle doubltess all contributed to this lack o f enthusiasm for European produced systems, it 
should be remembered that the United States also imposed a swingeing 50% price differential on offshore 
procurements for American use. This militated against the purchase of non-American goods. See 
Vandevanter 1964 op cit pp 29-30; The Economist, June 5th 1965 p 12 discusses the effects of US price 
discrimination against European armaments.
See Facer 1975 op cit p33. This argument would qipear to be just as valid in 1991 as it was when Facer 
published his study in 1975. Whether this will continue to be the case in the past Cold War international 
system remains to be seen.
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The importance of the differences in scale between the armaments production 
capability of the United States, and that of the European NATO states, cannot be 
underestimated in this context. It is not the purpose of this study to examine the 
vexed question of the "Two Way Street" between the United States and Europe in 
defence equipment, since such an analysis could easily comprise a thesis in itself. 
From the standpoint of the present study however, the startling imbalance in the 
defence equipment trade across the Atlantic must be regarded as an important 
indication of American structural dominance within the issue area and also an 
important aspect in the failure of an integrated armaments collaboration regime to 
develop. Throughout the 1960’s the relative strength of American defence industries 
when compared with those of Western Europe, combined with high levels of 
American sales and the desire of the United States to offset the stationing costs of 
American forces in Europe, led to increasing European resentment and heightened 
resistance to buying American armaments.^ ®
Structural dominance in terms of the differences in scale between the United States 
and Europe in armaments production, but also as a result of conscious policy 
decisions by different states, had an impact on the issue area which adversely affected 
the prospects for collaborative development and production of armaments. In the case 
of the United States, the most important policy decision was the erection of high 
discriminatory barriers against defence equipment not produced in the United States, 
with the exeption of offset agreements negotiated for particular projects.^ ® The 
United Kingdom, on the other hand, removed barriers to the purchase of foreign
See Ibid p31 where Facer notes that during fee 1960’s fee Europeans bought $8 billion o f aircraft, weapons 
and electronics from the United States, whilst the United States bought only $700 million o f equipment from 
Europe, mainly components and less sophisticated equipment.
The abortive British purchase of F i l l  mrcraft from the United States in 1965 involved the negotiation of 
generous offset terms for British industry. Ibid p31. A useful discussion of offsets as a production method 
can be found in Stephanie Neuman "Offsets in fee International Arms Market" in World Militarv 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1985 United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1985, 
Publication Number 123, Washington DC: General Printing Office pp35-40. See also Carl Groth "The 
Economics of Weapons Co-production" in Martin Edmonds (ed) International Arms Procurement: New 
Directions 1981 Oxford: Pergamon Press pp71-83.
Similarly Keith Hartley discusses the British purchase of Phantom aircraft in "The Political Economy of 
NATO Defence Procurement Policies" in Edmonds 1981 op cit pp98-114. He notes on p. 106 that had the 
British purchases the aircraft "off fee shelf" from McAir (McDonnell-Douglas), their unit cost could have 
been between 23 and 43 percent lower than production under an offset agreement.
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equipment, whilst the Federal Republic of Germany accepted specific obligations to 
buy American armaments to help offset the cost of US forces in Germany. Other 
states, particularly the smaller NATO states frequently bought American equipment 
for financial reasons.^ ®
This dominance can, therefore, help explain how the United States was able to 
promote the joint production phase of armaments collaboration, and how the changes 
inherent in the AC 253 report were approved. The fact that neither episode led in the 
end to further armaments collaboration, however, is more difficult to account for in 
these terms.
Nature of the Relationship
As in previous episodes discussed above the nature of the relationship between the 
United States and European NATO members remained co-operative. Once again this 
limited the scope of coercive measures which the United States might otherwise have 
used to achive desired policy outcomes. The co-operative relationship did not, 
however, prevent the United States instituting a high pressure sales campaign during 
the 1960’s, nor did it encourage the Americans to lower barriers to European systems 
being procured for the American forces.
Indeed in certain respects the relationship, although generally co-operative, contained 
important elements of competition not present in the previous periods discussed in 
earlier chapters. As the title of the present chapter indicates, during the 1960’s, the 
United States shifted its position from that of a liberal hegemon dispensing largesse 
in the form of MD AP/OSP aid and promoting the reconstruction of European defence 
industries, to that of a competitive collaborator. This new policy aimed both to 
encourage increased collaboration in the design and procurement of armaments within 
Europe and across the Atlantic, but also to make sure that such collaboration did not 
occur at the expense of the United States ability to penetrate European markets for 
armaments.
Facer 1975 op cit p31-32.
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The analysis of the joint production programme and the changes engendered by the 
AC 253 report discussed above demonstrate how difficult it was to reconcile the 
agendas of the actors within the issue area. Perhaps predictably the outcome of both 
episodes was a marked difference between the smaller NATO states, and the larger 
producers such as France, the United Kingdom and, increasingly as the 1960’s 
passed, the Federal Repbulic of Germany. The United States appears to have been 
content with the level of penetration of the European armaments market she already 
enjoyed, calculating that for buyers such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy, 
American armaments would generally be cheaper and therefore more attractive in 
view of their limited resources.
Even when Germany began to be more assertive from the mid 1960*s in demands for 
participation in high techology areas, and built up an indigenous defence production 
capability, the United States did not push the proposed changes set forth by AC 253 
to their logical conclusion. It is at least arguable, as noted by Facer above, that 
armaments collaboration was simply not particularly important to the United States. 
The "game" of armaments collaboration was simply not worth the "candle" of the 
investment of time and resources which would have been required to institute a truly 
integrated regime. The type of regime and organisational set up which emerged by 
the late 1960*s, according to this scenario, represented the highest common 
denominator which could be sold successfully to all the participants.^ ®
The compromises which would have been required from the United States in order 
to promote greater collaboration do not appear likely, since they would have 
necessitated a much more open, if not actually free, market for European armaments 
in the United States, and a reduction of the imbalance in the Two Way Street. 
Similarly the Europeans, particularly France and Great Britain, would have had to 
accept the rationalisation and closure of parts of their defence industrial bases, and 
specialisation within Europe on production of a more limited range of weapons
See note 103 above
109 This is not to say that United States policy explicity called for such outcomes, merely that structural factors 
and the effects of policy decisions taken both by the United States and the Europeans, resulted in outcomes 
which can rationally be explained in these terms.
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systems.
Such compromises were highly unlikely by end of the 1960’s. Indeed, they were 
considerably less likely at this stage than they might have been at previous points in 
the development of the regime discussed above, before it was "captured" by 
intergovemmentalism.
Issue Linkage
The United States did not explicitly use issue linkage for either the joint production 
phase, or for the AC 253 episode. No linkages were forged to issues outwith the 
armaments collaboration issue area, and even within the said issue area, the United 
States never tied progress or participation in either joint production, or the proposals 
of AC 253, to continued American participation in the issue area generally. This left 
progress within the issue area in the hands of NATO which, as a result of its 
intergovernmental character, was ill-suited to the task. Authority within the issue 
area remained largely in the hands of national governments and their 
representatives.
Both Britain and France were ill disposed toward the joint production programme 
carried out under the NATO banner, but had little issue specific power to influence 
either the United States, or the European participants in the projects involved. The 
independent production stances assumed by both Britain and France limited both their 
interest in collaborative projects, except where these held out the prospect of a 
nationally developed system being adopted as part of a collaborative venture, and 
their ability to collaborate in the first instance, since neither was willing to relinquish 
control to either NATO or a specially formed collaborative organisation for specific 
projects.
See for example Beer’s discussion of the authority structure of NATO armaments programmes, in Beer 
1969 op cit pp 136-144.
For detailed discussions of the policies of both states see Iferlow Part 2 1967 op cit; and Beer 1969 op cit
ppl52-155 and 158-160.
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In the early period, Germany was a relatively enthusiastic participant in the joint 
production phase, and could, at least indirectly, link this enthusiasm to efforts to 
appear a loyal and reliable ally to the United States. By spending large amounts on 
armaments of American origin, the Germans hoped to avert any criticism in the 
United States of the cost of keeping American forces in Europe. Increasingly, 
however, as the 1960’s saw Germany become increasingly assertive politically and 
more advanced industrially, this linkage began to dissolve. Germany became more 
interested in promoting her own defence industrial capacity, and turned increasingly 
to projects involving other European states. The lack of success in promoting 
collaboration through NATO played a part in this, as did the desire to use 
collaborative projects as political capital with France and Great Britain,
The Germans appear to have adopted an opportunistic approach, participating in early 
NATO projects to gain experience and access to advanced technology, but turning 
away from these after the mid 1960’s in search of projects which promised to provide 
greater returns in basic research and development, training in, and information about, 
state of the art technology, and the prospect of a more competitive position in 
international markets.
The negotiations which resulted in the approval of the AC 253 report saw a rare 
incidence of the three major sellers of armaments, namely the United States, Britan 
and France, agreeing to promote the same policy, if for different motives. This 
apparent unanimity did not, in the end, achieve the desired result, since the buyers 
of armaments remained sceptical of the motives for the charge, and feared that the 
changes sought under AC 253 would simply have resulted in them being denied 
access to joint production of advanced systems. Although it may never have been 
explicitly stated by the smaller NATO states who bought most of the equipment, the 
changes which AC 253 sought to bring about never had a chance of receiving their 
support. Generally states such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy favoured 
leaving things much as they were under the old joint production programmes, since 
these well suited their needs.
See Beer 1969 ibid p 155-158.
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The role of bargaining, compromise, coalition buüding and the part played by 
individuals is well demonstrated by the efforts of Roberts and the AC 253 committee 
to have the proposals accepted by the NATO authorities in the teeth of both national 
oppostion and the inertia of the NATO bureaucracy which had developed and 
operated the previous system.
The events of the 1960’s within the issue area, including the failure of the joint 
production programmes to evolve into anything more than project-by-project 
collaboration, and the abortive reforms proposed by AC 253, simply confirmed 
existing patterns. The United States, despite continued centrality within the issue 
area, could not impose armaments collaboration on the unwilling European allies. 
Hegemonic decline may help to explain the inability of America to prevail in desired 
policy outcomes discussed in the chapters above to some extent. It is important, 
however, not to overestimate the rapidity of this decline, and to recognise that its 
effects may have been less obvious within the defence and security issue areas than 
in the economic and industrial spheres.
The organisations operative within the armaments collaboration issue area failed to 
coalesce into a focus for the establishment of an integrated regime. Neither NATO 
nor the WEU could break free of the essentially intergovernmental nature which had 
been imparted to them at birth. They signally failed to construct linkages to external 
groupings, whether domestic interest groups within the member states, armaments 
produces or other international organisations.
In summary the episodes discussed above effectively ended any realistic prospect for 
the development of an armaments collaboration regime within the North Atlantic 
community of states. The present condition of armaments collaboration can be 
directly traced to the events discussed above, such that later developments in the 
institutional field such as the Eurogroup and the Independent European Programme 
Group (IE. PG), simply serve to highlight the futility of attempting to change the 
regime via existing organisational structures, or through governmental actors who 
represent states with different and often competing agendas.
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION
Comme quelqu’un pourrait dire de moi que j ’ai seulement fait ici un amas de 
fleurs étrangères, n’y ayant fourni du mien qu le filet à les lier.
Montaigne^
The preceding analysis has detailed the role of a number of different models in terms 
of their explanatory power in relation to discrete episodes of regime formation and 
change within the armaments collaboration issue area in the North Atlantic 
community of states between roughly 1949 and the late 1960’s. As a general point, 
the analysis has consciously eschewed reliance on one specific model to help explain 
observable episodes of regime change. Rather the study has attempted to recognise 
the centrality of the phenomenon first considered in detail in Graham Allison’s 
seminal study of the Cuban missile crisis,^  and apply this in relation to an issue area 
with impeccable "high political" credentials.
Allison’s central thesis was that great care must be exercised in the use and 
application of a given theoretical framework, since such constructs can be at once 
illuminating and obfuscating to the student of politics. It is, in a theoretical sense, 
highly dangerous to assume that one particular model will be applicable across a 
range of issues, time scales or international settings. As Allison noted:
"Conceptual models not only fix the mesh of the nets that the analyst 
drags through the material in order to explain a particular action, they 
also direct him to cast his nets in select ponds, at certain depths, in
1
2
One could say that 1 have only gathered a bunch of other people’s flowers, my own being no more than 
the string that binds them.
G. T. Allison Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 1971, Boston: Little, Brown.
34
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order to catch the fish he is after"^ .
In reality the search for one overarching conceptual model with universal applicability 
across the whole spectrum of political phenomenon is doomed to failure. Stafford 
Beer illustrated this point well in his attempt to highlight the dilemmas inherent in 
constructing a generally applicable "theory of organisations". He invited us to 
imagine:
"We are in the countryside, surrounded by all the intricate 
multicolored ever changing complexities of the natural environment. 
A specialist comes along. "Can you understand it all then?" he asks. 
No we agree, it is all a great mystery. "What you need", says the 
specialist, "is a pair of my truth spectacles". We buy them for a small 
sum - though it is more than they are worth, because the truth 
spectacles are simply dark, red tinted glasses. "What do you see?" 
asks the specialist. We tell him that we see everything is red. What 
is more, we cannot any longer see a lot of the complicated details that 
we saw before. "Exactly! That is our triumph" says the specialist. 
"What you are seeing is the truth which underlies all the confusion. 
The world is really red. And the rules which govern it are actually 
quite simple""*.
If, as is often espoused, parsimony is a scientific virtue ,^ then the role of alternative 
explanatory models is to add complexity as necessary to existing simpler models 
which fail to adequately account for real situations. Following the work of both 
Keohane and Nye, and of Jonsson, where simplified models are found wanting,
Ibid p4.
S Beer "Death is Equitinal: Eighth Annual Bertalanfiy Lecture". Bdiavioral Science 1981, 26: 185-196. 
Quote p 187.
See for example C Jonsson International Aviation and the Politics o f Regime Change 1987, London: 
Frances Pinter, pp 152-153.
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complexity may be added step by step, relaxing the assumptions of the original 
model®.
Economic models for example regard regime change as a function of changing 
technology or supply and demand dynamics. Political explanations are deemed 
irrelevant in this model. Since these types of explanation were found to be 
unsatisfactory, the next level of aggregation was to insert politics as a concern, with 
the overall or issue specific structure. This structural model, either alone or in 
conjunction with economic factors, was also tested for explanatory power.
Since this level of explanation was found wanting in the explanation of regime 
formation and change within the armaments collaboration issue area, situational 
factors were added to the reckoning. These suggest that regimes are rational 
responses by governments in dilemma type situations, and are not simply the result 
of power structures. The perceived shortcomings of all the existing explanations led 
to a concentration on the processes which engender international regimes. Process 
models relax the assumption of functional/situational and of structural models that 
state actors are invariably rational and unitary. Rather, regimes are viewed as the 
result of bargaining processes at various levels where transnational networks and 
boundary role occupants are of particular importance.
In summary, the foregoing analysis has demonstrated not that the process model can 
displace extant models, but that it can play an important part in conjunction with such 
models. The challenge for students of political science generally, and of regime 
analysis in particular, is similar to that facing any professional; the possession of the 
correct tools for the job at hand, and the judgement necessary to use the right tools 
at the right time^ .
Development of the process model can be largely attributed to the work of
Ibid pp 152-165; R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye Power and Interdependence 1977, Boston: Little, Brown 
p58.
Keohane and Nye 1977 op cit pl62.
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Christer Jonsson, although the framework of the concept had been developed in 
earlier works.* A clear progression can be observed in Jonsson’s published works 
relating to the international aviation issue area, culminating in his book "International 
Aviation and the Politics of Regime Change" published in 1987. This work applied 
the process model Jonsson had done so much to formalise in his earlier articles.^  As 
a "first cut" Jonsson’s analysis, and indeed this thesis, must be seen as necessarily 
preliminary in nature. Further development in relation to other issue areas may 
reinforce the claims of organisation theory to play a useful role in the study of 
international organisations.*® In the event that the opposite should prove to be the 
case, such analyses will at least have served the purpose of allowing the study of 
international organisations from a fresh perspective.
With the collapse of the Cold War world order, the role of international 
organisations, particularly in relation to security and defence issues, has been thrown 
into stark relief. The role of the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy 
Authority (IAEA) and the European Community, to name only the most prominent, 
will be increasingly called into question and criticised as a result of their involvement 
in, for example, the Gulf War 1989-90, the break up of the former Yugoslavia and
10
See the discussion in Chapter 5 pp 107-112, and especially the arguments o f Keohane and Nye 1977 op cit.
Jonsson 1987 op cit, but see also his "A Cognitive Approach to Mtemationai Negotiation" European Journal 
of Political Research 1983, 11:139-50; "Literorganization Theory and Litemational Organization" 
International Studies Ouarterlv 1986, 30:39-55 and "Sphere of Flying: The Politics o f International 
Aviation” International O ryanizatinn 1981, 35: 273-302.
For example, Jônsson 1987 op cit p l64, suggests
"the final answer to die question (of what generalizable lessons concerning issue - areas and 
organizations can be learned from the process model) ... has to await further comparable case 
studies of other international issue-areas. Some steps have already been taken in that direction. 
Tentative findings from the atomic energy, refugees and maritime issue areas tend to confirm the 
importance of the hypothesized issue - specific and organization - specific factors in accounting 
for variance in network structure and performance."
Another likely candidate issue-area could be in space, particularly with reference to the role of the 
European Space Agency A) in promoting an autonomous European presence in the space industry. ESA 
exhibits all the necessary qualifications to be the subject of such an analysis as an international organisation 
representing European states, with its own bureaucracy, national delegates, a budget given by the member 
states and strong links with organisations in the aeroqiace and space fields such as Inm arsat and NASA, 
as well as links to commercial companies and governmental agencies.
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in Somalia. There can be little doubt that other agencies and organisations, and other 
issue areas, will come under similar scrutiny as the new international order is 
established.
It is, perhaps, in the matter of contextuality that the process model can be found 
wanting. The concentration engendered by the process model on issue areas, 
organisations, regimes and the role of individuals and networks in international 
organisations, tends to obscure the political context within which the putative regimes 
and international organisations operate. This is not to say that the process model is 
thereby invalidated. Nor does it assume that the actors within an issue area operate 
within a rarefied atmosphere with little or no connection to the realpolitik of the 
international system. Rather, it accepts that there is a certain danger inherent in the 
process model of not being able to see the wood for the trees. Just as contemporary 
international organisations and regimes will have to contend with a fast changing, post 
Cold War international system lacking the certainties of a "comfortable" bi polar 
order, the subjects of this analysis must be placed firmly in their context; an evolving 
bi-polar system and the onset of the Cold War in the immediate post World War Two 
period.
In general this analysis has, for the sake of brevity, tended to take the external 
environment if not as a given factor, then as more "rational" than is actually the case. 
This reification is defensible in terms of the process model being developed if for no 
other reason than that certain background, "historical" information (what might be 
termed the issue-setting) must be assumed to avoid the analysis becoming bogged 
down in the minutiae of everyday political interaction in international relations. 
Whilst every endeavour was made in the second section of this analysis, beginning 
with Chapter Six, to highlight the external environment’s role in regime formation 
and change, it was absolutely necessary to set limits on how far outside the ambit of 
the particular issue area at hand the analysis could afford to go in a theoretical sense.
The potential shortcomings of the process model should not blind researchers, 
however, to the shortcomings of the various competing models discussed during the
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earlier analysis. It is this very fact which emerges most clearly from the theoretical 
study detailed in Chapters Two and Four above.
The issues which this study attempted to address were, fundamentally, those of why 
the armaments collaboration issue area in the North Atlantic community evolved in 
the manner it did, what role, if any, American hegemony and international regimes 
had in this evolution, and finally, whether organisation theory could play a useful role 
in the analysis. Chapters One to Five address the basic theoretical concerns of the 
analysis, and Chapters Six to Nine apply the process model developed to a specific 
issue area.
The first Chapter discussed the concept of complex interdependence and hegemonic 
stability with particular reference to the paradigm shift in international relations away 
from the state centric approach. As a result the analysis was focused on an issue 
based approach. Finally, the Chapter concluded with an explanation of the rationale 
for the choice of the armaments collaboration issue area in particular, highlighting the 
fact that by examining an area of "high politics" the study specifically set out to 
answer criticisms of regime analysis as being "doomed to success" by virtue of their 
previous concentration on relatively less conspicuous areas of low politics.
Chapter Two concentrated on the definition of the international regime concept, and 
examined critically the existing theories of regimes. The conclusion reached was that 
the relative lack of theoretical development of the concept of international regime 
could not be used as a bar to the application of regime characteristics to the 
armaments collaboration issue area. It would be anomalous to posit the utility of a 
concept in one discrete area of political science, and thereafter deny its applicability 
in related fields. As an issue area exhibiting collaboration and co-operation in a 
number of different forms over the period 1949 to the late 1960’s, armaments 
collaboration is presumed to be a fortiori a candidate for analysis in regime terms.
Chapter Three examines the debate on the status of the American hegemony, 
particularly as it pertains to the armaments collaboration issue area. The analysis
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posits two contending views on the state of the said hegemony. Firstly the 
traditionalist conventional wisdom which holds that the days of American hegemony 
are numbered, that this descent from preeminence is inevitable, and that the 
concomitants of this decline are increasing instability within the global political 
economy. Further, declining hegemony is seen as inimical to the formation or 
alteration of regimes.
Secondly the radical view epitomises a conservative view of the prospects for 
continuing American dominance, viewing American predominance in the global 
political economy as a long term, structural phenomenon, and seeing a fundamentally 
healthy, if not immortal, hegemony. The conclusion reached in the Chapter is that 
whilst the radical case can alert us to the shortcomings of hegemonic stability theory, 
and to the continuing centrality of the American political economy within the 
international system, "the end of history" has not yet been reached.
The fourth Chapter represented a first cut of the explanation of regime change, 
examining in turn the technological, surplus capacity, structural and 
functional/situational explanations of regime change. Concluding that none of these 
explanations in and of themselves were sufficient. Chapter Five proceeded to 
introduce the process model of regime evolution. This new model highlighted the 
importance of bargaining and of coalition building and the centrality of the study of 
organisations as structures, and organisation as a process. The heretofore neglected 
role of organisation theory in the analysis of international organisation was examined, 
in an attempt to explain their apparent lack of synergy despite similar areas of 
concern. Finally the importance of transnational networks and the organisational 
context were discussed, and a summary of the new dynamic process based model 
presented. This process model, it was posited, may provide important insights into 
the creation and transformation of regimes, by virtue of its concentration on the vital 
role of bargaining as an intervening variable between divergent interests, and the role 
of networks in encouraging such action.
Chapter Six introduced the first episode of regime formation or change within the
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issue area, discussing the negotiations which led upto the signature of both the 
Brussels and North Atlantic treaties. The conclusion examines these events in relation 
to the models presented earlier, finding that the process based model has considerable 
utility in accounting for the failure of the United States to obtain desired policy 
outcomes notwithstanding her dominant structural and functional/situational position. 
The United States found herself much more closely linked to European security than 
she had wished, and this had important implications for the future progress of 
armaments collaboration both within Europe and between Europe and the United 
States.
Chapter Seven considered the operation of what had been styled the liberal hegemonic 
regime, examining the debates centring on the EDC, the collapse of the EDC concept 
and the birth of the WEU. Early organisational steps within the NATO framework 
are set out and finally the conclusion examines the construction of an 
intergovernmental form of regime and attempts to account for this outcome using a 
process based analysis. The study of this early period is held to be vital to a full 
understanding of the later process within the armaments collaboration issue area, 
although the actual level of co-operation in the production of armaments during the 
early to mid 1950’s was relatively small. Future developments can only be 
meaningfully analysed with reference to the organisational context within which 
earlier developments took place.
The Chapter ends with a discussion of three general problems introduced early in the 
chapter which were deemed to have had an influence on the formation of the 
armaments regime as it evolved during the period. These were; the structural 
dominance of the United States within the issue area, the co-operative nature of the 
relationship between the United Stated and the European NATO members, and the 
use or otherwise of issue linkage within the issue area. In summary the period 
between 1949 and 1955 is seen as fundamental to the lack of development in 
armaments collaboration. The success of intergovernmental solutions discussed in the 
chapter demonstrate how effectively the prospects for an integrated armaments 
collaboration regime were stunted at an early stage.
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Finally Chapter Eight examines two particular episodes within the armaments 
collaboration issue area during the I960’s. Firstly, the joint production phase, in 
which the various collaborative projects carried out under NATO’s aegis are studied, 
and the NBMR process is critically examined. Secondly the attempted regime change 
represented by AC 253 and its findings is discussed, and the reasons for the failure 
of the attempted change are examined. The conclusion of the chapter applies the 
process based model to these episodes in an attempt to account for the outcomes 
described earlier in the chapter.
The models used in this analysis not only give different answers but also pose 
different questions in relation to the basic queries posed in this study of regime 
evolution in the armaments collaboration issue area. The type of questions for which 
an explanation have been sought - "Why did the United States become more directly 
involved in European security after 1945 than wartime policy would predict?"; "Why 
was collaboration in armaments production not achieved between 1949 and 1955?"; 
"Why did the demise of the EDC and the formation of the WEU not lead to a new 
armaments collaboration regime?"; "Why did the attempted changes engendered by 
the NBMR programme and AC 253 report during the 1960’s fail to promote changes 
to the existing regime?" are interpreted in different ways according to the model used.
Economic and structural models attempt to provide "because of" replies to such 
questions. The former searches for basic technological or supply and demand factors 
which might lead to regime creation, maintenance or change. In contrast, the latter 
attempts to account for such changes with reference to shifts in the issue specific 
power structure within which the issue area is set. Situational models, in contrast, 
provide answers of an "in order to" kind. Regimes are regarded as coping 
mechanisms constructed by actors, usually governments, to broker a collectively 
rational result from the conflicting demands of individual national actors whose 
disputes would otherwise result in collectively irrational outcomes.
Finally the process model suggests "as a result of" answers by studying the dynamics 
of the political processes which result in agreements or failures to create, maintain
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or change regimes. The basis of this model is an examination of the bargaining 
processes which lead to decisions to form, or indeed not to form, regimes within a 
given issue area.
Whilst it can be argued that the models used in this study are, in fact, incompatible 
since they would predict different outcomes for the same episode**, they also exhibit 
areas of commonality. The conclusion suggested by this study is that the models are 
complimentary since "neither model can provide a full explanation,... a combination 
of models is warranted. One model may apply quite well for one episode, but poorly 
for another".*^
The conclusions attendant on the q>isodes of regime formation and change within the 
armaments collaboration issue area are, therefore, relativistic. Each of the models 
has utility in accounting for alterations in the regime at certain times, but none can 
be held to have universal applicability. Economic models were found to be of limited 
usefulness. The structural model has utility in accounting for American centrality in 
the regime after 1955 via the MDAP/OSP programme, and for the joint production 
projects of the early 1960’s and the AC 253 report being adopted. It is less 
successful, however, in accounting for the limits placed on American action 
throughout the period and, in particular, the fact that the European states were able 
to draw the United States into a direct commitment to defend Europe on terms which 
were often contrary to stated American policy.
Situational models have some value in that they illuminate the reasons why regimes 
are created in a general sense. They are less valuable, however, in predicting 
outcomes in individual cases, especially where situations are ambiguous. As Jonsson
11
12
Jonsson 1987 op cit p l54 raises this possibility in relation to the attempted change of the Chicago-Bermuda 
regime in international aviation in the 1970’s. According to structural models, the United States ought to 
have succeeded in attempts to change the regime by virtue o f its issue - specific power, while the process 
model explains why the United States failed.
Ibid.
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notes*^  this is particularly true of situations where the number of actors multiply 
and/or the choices facing actors are not of a clear cut either/or nature.
The process model developed in this analysis demonstrates its utility in terms of 
amplifying the importance of bargaining processes and the existence or effectiveness 
of transnational networks in a given issue-area. The contention that non-state actors 
are commonly excluded from playing significant roles in high political issue areas is 
confirmed to some extent by the lack of regime development in armaments 
collaboration. Transnational networks had difficulty in playing independent roles due 
to the security aspects of the issue-area, and its high political credentials. It is, as a 
result, more difficult to apply experiences in the armaments collaboration issue area 
to other issue areas which lack this high political content, or vice versa.
The theoretical task of this study has undoubtedly been made more difficult to 
complete as a result of the chosen issue area. Despite the fact that certain factors are 
common across various different issue areas*^ , the unique characteristics of the 
armaments collaboration issue area obviously have an effect on the explanatory power 
of the model.
The possible criticism of the process model discussed above beg the question as to 
what corrective action might be taken to improve the sq>parent lack of contextuality 
in the {M'ocess based analysis discussed in earlier Chapters. In particular the wider 
processes at work within the armaments collaboration issue area appear to deserve 
closer examination than the process model presented above has allowed. Reference 
has previously been made*® to the role of nationalistic impulses in protecting 
indigenous armaments production capabilities, as well as to the "revolving door" 
syndrome linking defence contractors, military personnel, civil servants and elected
13 Ibid p l57.
*"* Jonsson, in his study of international aviation issue area identified the lack o f East-West polarization, the 
pluralistic setting in which the regime evolved and, finally, the ability o f linking pin organisations to assume 
the role of intervening variables within the network. Ibid ppl60-161.
15 See Chapter 6 above pp133-137.
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representatives. The many possible linkages between such groupings, not only in the 
United States but in Western Europe, comprise a thesis in themselves. Any treatment 
of such a complex series of issues must await further analysis.
Another problem lies in the fact that treatments of procurement processes in the 
armaments production area tend to deal with more recent periods than the time scale 
of this analysis. One of the most thorough treatments was contained in Martin 
Edmonds book on international arms procurement, an edited volume containing a 
number of interesting Chapters on various different weapons systems and the 
problems of promoting cooperative procurement.*® Other treatments have 
concentrated on particular weapons systems, as for example Dorfer’s analysis of the 
F16 tighter sale to various European countries in the face of competing European 
produced alternatives.*’ The problem with such analyses, however, is that they are 
all ex post facto in that the basic organisation structure of the armaments collaboration 
issue area had been decided before the subjects of these works were on the drawing 
board, let alone being produced. The process based model detailed above, and the 
regime which it engendered, cast a long shadow over the prospects for the 
development of more integrated armaments collaboration in the North Atlantic 
area.**
Obviously, the process model alone cannot describe the totality of factors which 
ensured, that armaments collaboration in this area was a relative failure. It is 
important not to attempt to over-reach the explanatory power of any model. What 
can, with some justification, be claimed, is that the process model highlights some
16
17
Martin Edmonds latematiottal Arms Procurement: New Directions 1981 Oxford: Perganon Press, and two 
of the contributing authors William Bajusz "International Arms Procurement: Multiple Actors, Multiple 
Objectives"; and Cindy Cannizzo "Procurement via the Two-Way Street: Can it achieve its objectives?”
Ingemar Dorfer Arms Sale: The Selling of the F-16 1983, New York: Praeger.
** Indicative of this fact is the somewhat plaintive conclusion in most works relating to later organisational 
attempts to promote greater European collaboration in armaments production, that prospects were hobbled 
from the start by the pre-existing organisational environment. See for example: C Gorden "The WEU and 
European Defence Cooperation" Orbis 1978, 18(l):254-265, Herbert Wulf "West European Cooperation 
and Competition in Arms Procurement: Eiq>eriments, Problems, Prospects. ” Arms Control 1986,7(2): 177- 
196, Phil Williams "Nato and the Eurogroup" in K Twitchett (ed) European Cooperation Todav 1980, 
London: Europa Publications, and S Kirby "The lEPO: The Failure of Low Profile High Politics". Journal 
of Common Market Studies 1980, 18: 175-196.
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factors which may heretofore have been hidden or neglected by existing analysis.
In a general sense the failure of an explicit regime to develop within the armaments 
collaboration issue area can be explained with reference to process based variables 
detailed above. As Krasner notes;
"Once a regime is actually in place, it may develop a dynamic of its own that 
can alter not only related behaviour and outcomes but also basic causal 
variables".*^
An explicit regime, based on written documents with legal force which identifies an 
independent organisation as decision maker, and which has a membership of all the 
potential states within the given issue area, gives the greatest scope for linking pin 
organisations to play a significant role. It follows that in issue-areas characterized by 
non-regime situations or diffuse regimes based on tacit understandings provide less 
fertile ground for linking pin organisations to play a role. Most importantly from the 
perspective of this analysis.
"the worst kind of regime, from the view point of a prospective linking-pin 
organisation, is probably an explicit and widely adhered to regime which does 
not bestow any significant role upon that organisation".’®
This study does not, in conclusion, provide a definitive answer to the general problem 
of the utility of contending theories of regime creation, maintenance and change. The 
process model cannot be regarded as a panacea to the shortcomings of existing regime 
analyses. It can serve, however, as a corrective to extant models. To summarize, 
the analysis may beg more questions than it answers in relation to what fresh insights 
can be gleaned on organisations and issue areas generally from the study of
19
20
See Stephen Krasner "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous variables". 
International Organisation 1982, 36: 497-510. Quote p500.
Jonsson 1987 op cit pl61.
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armaments collaboration.
The final word on the subject must be sought in future analyses of other issue-areas 
utilizing different case studies, in an attempt to add not only more strings to the bow 
of students of international relations, but to clarify the situations in which different 
theoretical arrows should be fired.
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